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This study investigates the tumultuous negotiation relationship between the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, from Kim Jong Il's 
accession to power in 1994 to the historic but short-lived September 19, 2005 agreement. 
The purpose of this work is to gain understanding regarding North Korea’s negotiation 
strategies, in order to bring contributions to the literature on negotiation, rogue states, and 
Northeast Asia.  
The literature lacks a clear understanding of how North Korea has been operating 
since 1994, at which time Kim Il Sung passed away and power was assumed by his son, 
Kim Jong Il. Gaining a clear understanding of what has happened under the Kim Jong Il 
Administration leads to the construction of a comprehensive analysis of all the different 
bilateral and multilateral negotiation episodes that have occurred between the United 




issues as two weeks of bilateral talks to free an American pilot who crashed by accident 
on North Korea territory in December 1994 to years of nuclear talks). 
This research is qualitative in nature and based on archival and media resources, as 
well as interviews conducted with those who served under several different 
administrations in the United States and in Korea, Japan, and China, as well as scholars, 
politicians and negotiators. 
The study concludes that there is a distinctive North Korean negotiation strategy, but 
that this strategy is increasing in complexity and is highly dependent on the United 
States’ position in the world. North Korea is also revealed as a strategic, non-random 
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Chapter One. Introduction 
 
a. Painting the Context and Stating the Problem 
 North Korea, and to a larger extent the question of the security of Northeast Asia 
in the post-Cold War era, has attracted the interest of many scholars. Key focal points in 
the literature on North Korea include the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea at the end of World War II, the fragile peace that has followed the Armistice 
reached at the end of the Korean War, the security dilemma facing regional and 
international powers in light of North Korea’s potential accumulation of weapons of mass 
destruction, inter-state relationships amongst the powers of East Asia, reunification 
possibilities for the two Koreas as well as potential prospects for a unified Korea. A 
single thread unites these different empirical paths: North Korea is generally portrayed as 
an unpredictable, mysterious, fascinating, and dangerous state.   
 It also seems impossible to separate North Korea from its neighbors and 
especially from the roots of its creation: World War II led to the division of the Korean 
peninsula and the two Koreas quickly became the embodiment of the Cold War with the 
United States fighting for South Korea’s freedom from Communist Soviet Union 
People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. Over the past fifty years, North Korea has 
become a dangerous, unpredictable and unreliable crazy state that harbors weapons of 
mass destruction and supports terrorism. Thus, North Korea is major concern for the 
international community as well as for the United States. President Bush’s 2002 Axis of 
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Evil speech summarized once again Washington and Pyongyang’s relationship: tension, 
militarism, distrust, unpredictability and weapons of mass destruction. 
 
 Considering the nature of the North Korean regime as well as its willing isolation 
from the world of international politics, is it possible for the United States to talk to North 
Korea? Are there avenues for these two states to solve difficult problems such as whether 
North Korea should have the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy despite the risk that 
it might convert it into nuclear weapons?  Should the United States maintain a strong 
military presence along the border between the two Koreas?  
 During the Cold War, the United States was largely preoccupied with the 
containment of the Soviet Union. The United States’ involvement in the Korean War, 
despite Washington’s initial reluctance to include South Korea into its military security 
perimeter showed that the American government saw the Korean peninsula as a pivotal 
region that could, if it was lost to Communism, eventually lead to a change in the balance 
of power. After the Korean War and the signature of the 1953 Armistice, the United 
States did not recognize North Korea officially. Washington tried to help South Korea 
democratize using various means such as economic incentives as well as political backup 
such as supporting Princeton-educated Syngman Rhee as the first South Korean 
president. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the international community was forced to deal 
with a new kind of enemy that had arisen from the Third World and that had often been 
born out of former socialist states: rogue states or states of concern became particularly 
salient in February 1991, after Iraq invaded Kuwait. 1 The term “rogue states” was far 
from being new in the United States, but some contend that the 1991 Iraq war confirmed 
                                                 
1 James D.  Torr, ed., U.S. Policy toward Rogue Nations (Greehaven Press, 2004). 
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“the existence of a new species of rogue threats.”2 Just a few years later, Kim Il-Sung, 
North Korea’s Great Leader, died and his son Kim Jong-Il, dubbed “Dear Leader,” took 
over. Even though it was implicitly assumed that North Korea would not survive such a 
regime succession, North Korea has indeed endured, and became one of the most isolated 
and dangerous states in the international system. It has an abysmal human rights record, it 
is a totalitarian system, it supports international terrorist networks and it has developed 
nuclear weapons and defied most international laws. Yet at the same time, North Korea is 
a weak state that suffered from poor economic planning and multiple floods and famine. 
The collapse of the Soviet system of assistance to former communist allies has left 
Pyongyang on the verge of economic collapse.  
Paradoxically, a very weak North Korea is taking very dangerous actions: it is 
building weapons of mass destruction, even though other countries like Iraq which were 
suspected of building such weapons were stopped by the United States early on. A state 
as economically weak as North Korea would be expected to either implode due to civil 
war or revolutionary conflict, or accept international aid in order to enable its people to 
survive and thus eventually leading to economic development, even if its leaders’ 
privileged positions might be threatened. Nothing of this sort has happened in North 
Korea, nor is there any sign that it might happen in the near future.  
Hence, North Korea’s and the United States’ negotiating behavior is to be studied 
in this dissertation, as it has important implications for the possibility of improving the 
strategic relationship between these two countries, and as a similar methodology could 
also be used to look at other “rogue” or dangerous states such as Cuba or Iran. It is also 
                                                 
2 Michael T. Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
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important to study North Korean strategic behavior in order to understand how North 
Korea has managed to survive over the years, and how it has kept on threatening 
Northeast Asia’s security since the end of the Cold War. Because North Korea is such a 
hermetic state, there are only a few avenues through which Pyongyang has interacted 
with the world, and in particular with the United States. One of these avenues has been 
via negotiations. Understanding the negotiation patterns and settings involving North 
Korea and the United States, especially since negotiations over the past few years 
between North Korea and the United States have been extended in order to include 
regional actors such as China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, is crucial in light of the 
post 9/11 world. Such a study is also important in light of the United States’ preventive 
war against states that could threaten Washington’s security 
.  
b. Looking at the Literature 
Much of the literature depicts North Korea as unchanging and with a set rogue 
character. It is pessimistic in tone and sees few possibilities for amelioration of strategic 
ties. Several scholars, however, stand out because of their alternate viewpoints on North 
Korea and their hope for prospects to improve strategic ties. Young-Whan Khil and Peter 
Hayes look beyond North Korea’s nuclear threat to its economic needs and consider 
concessions that might provide the preconditions for effective confidence-building. They 
offer an encompassing view of the Korean problem, dealing with issues such as nuclear 
technologies, economic policies towards North Korea, and regional stability.3 They also 
support the 1994 Agreed Framework which included provisions for bringing North Korea 
                                                 
3 Young Whan Kihl, Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). 
 5
two light-water reactors in exchange for the freezing of its nuclear activities. As of today, 
the United States and its allies as well as North Korea, are in breach of this contract, and 
a new contentious standoff has arisen due to the non-respect of the terms of the 
framework. Others look at more specific problems with optimism, such as Robert 
Dujarric who provides a contemporary take on North Korea, reunification and its 
relationship with other East Asian powers and who predicts a soon-to-be-achieved 
reunification between the two Koreas. However, one might be skeptical about such 
optimism, especially considering the fact that the North Korean regime has kept its hold 
on power despite economic difficulties. 
 American and Korean scholars have studied the relationship between the United 
States and North Korea extensively, usually with a focus on accounting for dynamics in 
U.S. strategic behavior in its negotiations with North Korea. There is, however, 
considerable disagreement regarding how their strategic relationship should be 
understood and particularly, on the question of which approach the United States should 
take to prevent and resolve conflict with North Korea. The present debate about the 
relationship between North Korea and the United States is largely centered on the Bush 
administration’s policies towards the peninsula. At the heart of the discussion is North 
Korea’s possession of nuclear armaments and how the United States should craft its 
foreign policy to address this challenge. Some advocate a hawkish approach made of 
sticks (North Korea would have to comply to specific terms in order to avoid being 
sanctioned), while others call for an approach that engages North Korea instead of 
punishing it. As the war in Iraq is still raging, there is an increased opposition in the 
world to President Bush’s usage of preemptive action to target states named in the 
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President’s 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech.  Hence, there are numerous vehement critics of 
the Bush administration’s foreign policy choices, especially as such choices could lead to 
military intervention designed to depose specific regimes. Duffy, Gibbs and Calabresi 
critique the Bush doctrine of being “with or against” the United States in fighting evil 
states. They suggest that it is untenable to apply such a doctrine across all of the “Axis of 
Evil” states. They argue that this focus on polarization has occupied the American 
government and that such a focus is responsible for the slow decision by the government 
to make public North Korea’s declaration that Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons. 
Their volume also shows inconsistencies in Washington’s preemptive doctrine since 
North Korea has not been militarily challenged by the United States even though it 
possesses weapons that Iraq never possessed itself.4 Similarly, many authors including 
Stan Crock insist on the need for the United States to hold talks with North Korea in 
order to sustain negotiations and especially in order to strengthen diplomatic ties with 
Pyongyang.5   
 The previous research, while offering competing vantage points and prescriptions 
to ameliorate the strategic relations between the U.S. and North Korea, too often holds 
North Korean strategic behaviors constant. It assumes continued unpredictability over 
time and does not account for variation in North Korean strategy even though the shifting 
North Korean behavior has important implications for U.S.-North Korean relations ties 
and possibilities for preventing or resolving conflict. The South Korean government’s 
point of view, however, is that the United States military should be pulled out of the 
                                                 
4 Michael Duffy, Nancy Gill and Massimo Calabresi, "When Evil Is Everywhere (Has Bush Been Right All 
Along, or Is His World View Part of the Problem?)," Time Atlantic 180, no. 18 (2002). 
5 Stan Crock, "Why Bush Must Talk to Pyongyang," Business Week Online, October 25 2002. 
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Korean peninsula eventually, and that Korean affairs should be left into Korean hands. 
The timeline for such a force withdrawal, however, remains an unknown variable. 
 
c. History of negotiations 
Lacking in the current literature is a clear understanding of how North Korea has 
been operating since 1994, when Kim Il-Sung passed away and power was assumed by 
his son, Kim Jong-Il. The specific question that should be addressed is whether there is a 
consistent North Korean negotiation strategy when Pyongyang interacts with the United 
States as well as with other actors.  Thus, case studies of major negotiation episodes in 
the last decade are analyzed. This is done using content analysis of archival data and in 
particular news coverage of the negotiations as well as declassified documents. In 
addition, elite interviews of negotiators and experts knowledgeable about these episodes 
were conducted.  This data is used to explore and account for variations in North Korean 
negotiation styles.  
 
 North Korea’s relationships with other countries during the past 10 years have 
been rocky at best. Even in his last days, Kim Il-Sung had to consider whether to sign the 
Agreed Framework. By mid-1994, the United Nations Security Council had already 
asked North Korea several times to stop the refueling of one of its nuclear reactors and 
had requested permission for United Nations’ monitoring teams to perform inspections.6 
Despite the agreement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea to penalize 
North Korea for its illicit nuclear program, Jimmy Carter’s invitation for a private visit to 
                                                 
6 Chicago Sun-Times, “U.N. Weighs Next Step on North Korea,” June 2, 1994.  
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North Korea showed that Pyongyang’s leaders were still willing to negotiate an 
agreement regarding nuclear weapons.7 However, on July 8, 1994, Kim Il-Sung passed 
away, his death thus ending a period of more than 50 years in power. His son, Kim Jong-
Il, assumed the leadership of North Korea, but without obtaining the title of President. 
Kim Il-Sung’s passing occurred just when North and South Korea had set late July as a 
date for a historic summit, and thus put these talks on hold.8  
 On October 21, 1994, and despite Kim Il-Sung’s passing, the United States and 
North Korea signed the Agreed Framework which paved the way to a gradual elimination 
of conventional nuclear energy in North Korea in exchange for oil shipments and the 
building of light-water reactors by a United States-led consortium. North Korea also 
agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to verify its 
compliance to the program. 9  Cooperation started out relatively well as the I.A.E.A. 
inspectors were effectively allowed to visit North Korea’s main nuclear complex in 
November at which time they reported that North Korea had halted its nuclear 
operations.10 However, the December 17 shooting of a U.S. army helicopter that had 
wandered into North Korean air space led to a negotiation episode that lasted more than 
three weeks as American negotiators tried to secure the release of the surviving pilot.11 
Despite these events, the I.A.E.A. completed its assessment of North Korea’s progress 
towards the suspension of its nuclear operations.12 In early 1996, several attempts were 
                                                 
7 USA Today, “Carter’s Stock Rises with Mission / North Korea Agrees to 3 Conditions,” June 23, 1994.  
8 The New York Times, “Death of a Leader; Kim Il-Sung, Enigmatic ‘Great Leader’ of North Korea for 5 
Decades, Dies at 82,” July 10, 1994. 
9 The New York Times, “U.S and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute,” October 22, 1994.  
10 The New York Times, “U.N. Says North Korea Halted Nuclear Program,” November 29, 1994. 
11 The Washington Post, “North Korea Says 1 Pilot Was Killed; U.S. Demands Return of Body, Survivor in 
Helicopter Downing,” December 19, 1994. 
12 Chicago Sun-Times, “North Korea Shuts Door on Nuclear Talks; International Agency to Continue 
Reactor Watch,” April 22, 1995. 
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made to discuss North Korea’s missile proliferation issues, with the United States and 
North Korea managing to open talks in Berlin in late April.13 After having agreed to pay 
North Korea $2 million to recover the remains of U.S. soldiers killed during the Korean 
War, the United States imposed sanctions on Pyongyang during the same month in 
retaliation for North Korea’s transfer of missile technology to Iran.14 Minor crises (the 
term crisis will be hereafter referred to as using Ury’s definition of (1) a situation that has 
high stakes, (2) little time to deliberate, (3) is characterized by uncertainty and (4) that 
does not seem to have many options15) then ensued, such as when American Evan Carl 
Hunziker was arrested for spying in North Korea, although he was finally released three 
months later. 16  A more serious crisis ensued in September when a North Korean 
submarine went aground off the coast of South Korea. Confrontation between the South 
and North Korean militaries followed and clashes claimed about twenty lives on both 
sides.17 In October, North Korean preparations of a missile test site progressed, but after 
several meetings in New York between Washington and Pyongyang, the U.S. Department 
of State confirmed that the tests had been cancelled.18 The U.S. kept on urging North 
Korea not to deploy its Nodong missiles and to end sales of scud missiles to foreign 
countries. However, no agreement was reached during the June negotiations, and in 
August, Washington imposed new sanctions on North Korea for subsequent missile 
proliferation-related activities.19  
                                                 
13 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “N. Korea Talks,” April 21, 1996. 
14 The New York Times, “North Korea is Paid for Help on War Dead,” May 21, 1996.  
15 Richard Smoke William Ury, "Anatomy of a Crisis," in Negotiation Theory and Practice, ed. J. William 
Breslin and Jeffery Z. Rubin (Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1991). 
16 Chicago Sun-Times, “American Detained by N. Korea Goes Home,” November 28, 1996.  
17 The New York Times, “North Korea Threatens the South Over Killing of Soldiers from Sub,” September 
28, 1996.  
18 Times-Picayune, “N. Korea Cancels Test of Long-Range Missile,” November 10, 1996.  
19 The Daily Yomiuri, “U.S.-North Korea Missile Discussions Fizzle Out,” June 15, 1997. 
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Just as South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung announced in his inaugural speech 
on February 25, 1998 the new Sunshine Policy outlook meant to seek reconciliation of 
the two Koreas, the U.S. imposed new sanctions on North Korea because of its transfer of 
missile technology to Pakistan.20 The Rumsfeld Commission reported that the D.P.R.K. 
and Iran were rogue states that threatened U.S. interests, and North Korea tried to bargain 
with Washington, stating that it should be compensated for financial losses for stopping 
its missile technology exports.21 By August 1998, however, North Korea had successfully 
launched its Taepodong missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.22 As the third 
round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks began in New York in October, expected 
negotiation outcomes were low, as the U.S. repeatedly requested Pyongyang to terminate 
its missile program in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Pyongyang believed 
lifting the economic sanctions was a key aspect of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In 
December 1998, the U.S. accused North Korea of developing secret underground nuclear 
plants.23 Talks were held that month in Pyongyang to discuss these allegations. North 
Korea agreed in principle to the idea of having inspectors check the validity of these 
claims, but no common ground could be found regarding appropriate financial 
compensation, and the United States balked at North Korea’s demand of $300 million to 
compensate for the inspection of the Kumchangri site.24 By March 1999, however, a 
compromise had been found, and inspectors were allowed to examine the site in 
exchange for food. No trace of nuclear activity was found when the site was inspected in 
                                                 
20 The Washington Post, “N. Korea Admits Selling Missiles; Move Seen as Test of U.S. Embargo,” June 
17, 1998. 
21 The New York Times, “Panel Says U.S. Faces Risk of a Surprise Missile Attack,” June 16, 1998. 
22 The New York Times, “North Korea Fires Missile over Japanese Territory,” September 1, 1998. 
23 Financial Times, “N. Korea Nuclear Suspicions,” December 8, 1998. 
24 The Washington Post, “Admission Fee: $300 Million,” November 22, 1998. 
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May.25 Subsequent food deals and food donations occurred in early 1999, and former U.S 
Defense Secretary William Perry visited Pyongyang and delivered a U.S. disarmament 
proposal during four days of talks. However, the situation started to turn sour. The North 
Korean and South Korean navies clashed in the Yellow Sea. Talks were held between the 
two Koreas to come up with an agreement but broke down less than two hours after they 
had begun. North Korea met several times with the United States during the year to 
discuss military options. Some progress was achieved: Pyongyang agreed in September 
to freeze its testing of long-range missiles for the duration of the negotiations in order to 
prove its willingness to cooperate. William Perry’s 1999 comprehensive report about 
North Korea called for a new integrated approach to negotiations that would involve 
engaging Pyongyang instead of alienating it. Following those prescriptions, Bill Clinton 
decided to ease economic sanctions against Pyongyang. At the same time, the United 
States admitted to having delayed the signature of contracts related to the building of the 
two light water reactors which were part of the Agreed Framework.26 
The year 2000 showed increased steps toward cooperation. Kim Jong-Il met with 
Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea, and agreed to try to satisfy the Korean people’s joint 
desire for reconciliation. Encouraged by this meeting, the United States decided to lift 
trade sanctions imposed on North Korea. Subsequently, North Korea decided to extend 
its ban on missile flight-testing, and the U.S. responded by promising to renew talks on 
missile-related matters. In August 2000, a selected number of Korean families who had 
been separated since the division of the Koreas had the opportunity to spend time with 
one-another, and in September groundwork for a highway between the two Koreas was 
                                                 
25 The New York Times, “Suspected North Korean Atom site is Empty, U.S. Finds,” May 28, 1999. 
26 Journal of Commerce, “U.S.-Led Group to Sign Nuclear Reactor Deal,” December 13, 1999. 
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initiated, as well as work for a railway system connecting the two Korean capital cities. 
In October, subsequent steps towards reconciliation were taken; a top military aide to 
Kim Jong-Il traveled to meet President Clinton in Washington, and Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang.27 However, a seventh round of missile talks held 
in Kuala Lumpur in November failed to deliver on the momentum of Albright’s visit.28 
Colin Powell affirmed in March 2001 that the new administration of George W. 
Bush would pick up exactly where the Clinton administration had left off but President 
Bush declined to endorse Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy when Kim visited Washington 
in 2001 as President Bush seemed to differ on the topic of North Korea’s credibility.29 
North Korea, reacting to the new tone emanating out of Washington, cancelled 
ministerial-level talks with Seoul. Washington announced in May that the United States 
would deploy a new ballistic missile defense program in Asia which could be used for 
preemptive strikes against North Korea. Aside from the United States’ position, other 
agreements were signed between Russia and North Korea, and the two Koreas reached 
subsequent agreements to recommence meetings among separated families. But the tide 
changed once again. Despite its condemnation of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, North Korea was singled out by the Bush administration in the infamous Axis of 
Evil speech of January 2002. Subsequent deadly clashes between Pyongyang and Seoul’s 
navies as well as North Korea’s admittance of having a secret nuclear weapons program 
ended all U.S. oil shipments to Pyongyang. 30  In December, North Korea began 
reactivating the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, and international inspectors were thrown out 
                                                 
27 The Washington Post, “Albright, N. Korea’s Kim Meet for Historic Talks,” October 24, 2000. 
28 The San Francisco Chronicle, “North Korea, U.S. End Talks Without Deal,” November 4, 2000. 
29 The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Bush Fumbles Policy on North Korea,” March 19, 2001. 
30 Wall Street Journal Abstracts, “No More Carrots for North Korea,” November 19, 2002. 
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of the country.31 In early January, North Korea decided to withdraw from the nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.32 During the spring of 2003, following the invasion of Iraq, 
North Korea declared several times that it would increase its military power in order to 
fight a potentially aggressive United States. 
 An already tense situation was aggravated during the April 2003 trilateral meeting 
among the U.S., China, and North Korea, when Pyongyang officially disclosed that it 
possessed nuclear weapons. 33  North Korea offered once again to freeze its nuclear 
program by the end of 2003 in exchange for concessions from the United States, but 
President Bush refused the North Korean offer, saying that North Korea had to close its 
program entirely. The talks ended, but with an agreement to meet again for subsequent 
dialogues. On August 27, 2003, the Six-Party Talks involving North Korea, South Korea, 
the United States, China, Japan and Russia took place, but ended without any 
agreement.34 North Korea subsequently called for a bilateral non-aggression pact with 
Washington but the offer was flatly refused by President Bush. Finally but not 
surprisingly, in November 2003, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization board announced that it would suspend the construction of the two light-
water reactors that was part of the 1994 Agreed Framework deal, following several 
reports that left no doubt regarding the fact that North Korea had been working on 
potential nuclear matter at the site of the Yongbyon reactor.35 
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34 The Washington Post, “N. Korea Retreats from Further Talks on Weapons,” August 31, 2003. 
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 Following an unofficial visit by U.S. representatives to the Yongbyon facility, 
Six-Party Talks were held again in February 2004. They ended with a promise by all 
sides to work more closely on the topic of denuclearization of the peninsula and a plan to 
meet again by June.36  What looked promising, however, again turned sour. After the 
June round of talks, North Korea ruled out any subsequent talks until South Korea comes 
forthright about its own nuclear program. The progression of the Six-Party Talks was 
further complicated by Japanese efforts to raise the issue of the North Korean abductions 
of Japanese citizens that occurred from 1977 to 1983. Pyongyang admitted to the 
abductions, and North Korea and Japan proceeded to hold talks in late 2004 about this 
delicate issue, culminating in North Korea’s return of the cremated remains to Japan. 
However, the remains were later analyzed and did not match the abductees’ DNA.37   
 In February 2005, North Korea officially acknowledged for the first time that it 
had developed nuclear weapons and announced it would no longer take part in any multi-
party talks regarding its armaments.38 Nonetheless, during the summer of 2005, rounds of 
negotiations started again within the Six-Party framework. The open-ended negotiation 
format led to North Korea’s agreement on September 19, 2005 to give up its nuclear 
weapons. However, only a day after signing the statement, North Korea claimed that the 
United States had failed to fulfill its promise to build the light-water reactors, and thus 
demanded that this issue be solved before it would take any further moves regarding the 
dismantling of its own nuclear weapons program.39  
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37 Kyodo News, “Japan, N. Korea discuss abductions on 2nd day of talks,” February 5, 2005.  
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 This brief chronology of North Korea’s involvement in negotiations with the 
United States and others in multilateral formats illustrates just how tense a situation had 
emerged: to the United States, North Korea was seen as a dangerous, inconsistent and 
secretive negotiating partner. To North Korea, the United States was seen as a hegemonic 
power trying to capitalize the world. In light of this history and these perceptions, many 
have questioned whether it is possible or advisable for the United States to deal with 
North Korea and if there is any realistic chance of creating a successful and mutually-
beneficial agreement between the two parties. In order to answer these questions, it is 
necessary to look at North Korea’s behavior within the international system. 
 
d. Overview of the Dissertation. 
 In order to study North Korea’s negotiation strategy in light of Pyongyang’s 
interaction with the United States, it is first necessary to investigate how North Korea has 
been framed in the literature. Thus, the literature review in chapter two presents 
contending explanations of North Korea’s behavior in the international system. A special 
focus is placed on the concept of rogue states. Questions that are explored include what 
this concept means for the international system and whether North Korea can and should 
be considered a rogue. The study also grapples with the question of whether North Korea 
is a rogue that is atypical in the way it has behaved over the years, or whether North 
Korea’s behavior over the past decade only adds up to the villain status it has upheld 
since Pyongyang invaded the South in 1951, thus fully supporting the view that North 
Korea is a rogue. Contending viewpoints on the dynamics in North Korea’s engagement 
in negotiations with other states, as well as competing arguments about the effectiveness 
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and successfulness of its strategic approaches will be addressed. Based on this review of 
the literature, a series of hypotheses about North Korean negotiation styles are developed 
which are tested using the data obtained on negotiation episodes between 1994 and 2005. 
The methodology used to conduct content analysis of archival research and elite 
interviews as well as the selection of cases of negotiation episodes and the selection of 
potential interview respondents are also described in chapter two. Chapter three sets the 
historical context which is essential for understanding North Korea today. Stereotypes 
about North Korea and conventional wisdom regarding the likelihood of North Korea’s 
collapse are also investigated. Seven cases were selected in order to study North Korea’s 
negotiation behavior, spanning from the early onset of Kim Jong-Il’s rule until the 
September 19, 2005 agreement that ended the negotiation rounds of the Six-Party Talks 
process. The cases vary across time, issues, number of participants, as well as format.  
Bilateral cases are presented in chapter four and multilateral cases are presented in 
chapter five.  The presentation of each negotiation episode involves a day-by day 
chronology of events as well as a case-specific discussion, evaluating competing 
hypotheses on negotiation derived from the literature. This analysis is based on in-depth 
content analysis of newspaper coverage and official declassified documents   
 In chapter six, a discussion of North Korea’s negotiation strategy across all the 
cases is presented, and focuses in particular on the linkage between negotiation episodes. 
This discussion is bolstered by knowledge and information acquired during rounds of 
interviews with highly-ranked government officials and experts working closely on North 
Korean issues both in the United States and South Korea. These interviews provide many 
illustrative anecdotes and significant insights into the way North Korea and its elites 
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behave: a dinner with Kim Jong-Il during which a highly-ranked South Korean diplomat 
witnesses first-hand the power of the Dear Leader over the North Korean military; a 
conversation between British diplomats and North Korean farmers reveals the immense 
knowledge gap between North Koreans and the rest of the world; North Korean 
negotiators’ behavior outside the negotiation room leads us to ponder over their 
allegiance to the North Korean regime.  
  North Korea’s negotiation style is analyzed in chapter seven. The chapter shows 
that despite its isolationism, North Korea is far from operating in a fish bowl. It has been 
heavily influenced by its interactions with the international world and especially with the 
United States during the past decade or so of negotiations between Washington and 
Pyongyang as well as China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. Special attention is also 
given to the Koreas’ relationship with their closest neighbors as well as the issue of 
weapons of mass destruction, the changing role of China in the region, and how North 
Korea’s negotiation strategy has changed over time. Finally, chapter eight provides a 
brief conclusion highlighting the theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
dissertation, as well as its implications for further negotiations with North Korea and 









Chapter Two. Theories and Facts: How to Conduct Research on North Korea 
 
 
 North Korea has been classified as a “rogue state”. Interestingly, however, the 
literature does not have a fixed definition of what a rogue state is. The term was created 
and used mainly by the United States. One can trace the appearance of the concept of 
“rogue states” to the Clinton years, when it was first used to talk about the clear danger 
that Iran and Libya presented to Europe. The first commonly accepted definition of the 
term can be attributed to Anthony Lake, Assistant Secretary for National Security Affairs 
under President Clinton, who defined rogue states as “nations that exhibit a chronic 
inability to engage constructively with the outside world”.40 This definition was then 
modified to fit various other situations, such as when Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen used it to justify why the United States needed to create and deploy a limited 
missile defense system. Later on, Madeleine Albright also referred to rogue states in a 
somewhat milder fashion, labeling them “states of concern”.41 President Bush used the 
term “rogue” as he came to power. 
 
a. Framing Rogue into an Contemporary American Context 
 
 Rogue states were initially seen as isolationist states. Lake understood rogue 
states to be states that were isolated from the international community. In the meantime, 
the definition has shifted to encompass many different aspects of a state’s behavior, 
                                                 
40 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs March/April (1994). 
41 Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
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mostly tied to weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. In his book Rogue Regime, 
Jasper Becker ties the notion of the rogue label to a pursuit of weapons such as nuclear 
bombs and to a “dangerous insanity in the diplomatic world” that would also mean the 
lack of understanding of the concept of deterrence.42  Lake’s definition of a rogue state 
only amounts to that of a marginalized state, or a state that does not function within the 
open limit of the international system. This definition is too simplistic to fit the case of 
North Korea, as Pyongyang has been a member of the United Nations since 1991 and as 
it has been interacting with other states on a fairly regular basis, especially with the 
former Soviet Union and China. Robert Litwak presents a similar definition as he states 
that contemporary concerns are now very different from when a Nazi Germany or a 
Soviet Union were threatening to upset the balance of power within the system.43 Litwak 
contends that the focus is now on relatively marginalized states that could threaten the 
stability of their immediate region, but that do not pose a risk to the larger international 
system. This definition does not fit the case of North Korea, however. Instability within 
the region would most likely spill over and upset the international system, since North 
Korea’s neighbors are amongst some of the most powerful nations in the world, as well 
as major trading partners of the United States. Litwak’s definition can, however, be 
complemented by that of Alexander George. George suggests that rogue states fall into a 
specific political category that is used by great powers that have a stake in maintaining a 
specific organization and order within the international system.44 George argues that the 
concept of rogue states did not arise from any international legal tradition, but rather that 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000). 
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it was constructed by American politics. George’s position is supported by the fact that 
the United States started as early as 1979 to develop a list of terrorist and outlaw states. 
Importantly, this list is not recognized by the United Nations or any body of international 
law.  
 Following George’s logic, the United States is partly responsible for singling out 
North Korea and characterizing it as a rogue. It is interesting to note George’s argument 
building-process. He mentions that during the 1970’s, the United States had developed a 
list of diplomatically isolated states that had interest in developing nuclear weapons. 
South Korea was part of this list! This reflected the tense relationship between Seoul and 
Washington and Jimmy Carter’s displeasure with South Korea president Park Chung-
Hee’s policies which raised human rights concerns.   Michael Klare traces the rise of the 
modern “American rogue doctrine” to the late 1980’s, the point in time when the United 
States started to link the notion of rogue states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
and problems of instability usually occurring in third world countries.45 This kind of 
linkage is also found in Jasper Becker’s definition of rogue states as being not only 
unstable and aggressive, but typically failed states.46 
 
 North Korea is also on the United States State Department’s list of nations having 
provided a safe haven for terrorists or having engaged in terrorist activities themselves. 
This is because North Korea was responsible for the 1983 Rangoon bombing (during 
which South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan narrowly escaped a death during a state 
visit in Burma) and the 1987 bombing of Korean Airline flight KAL 858.47  
                                                 
45 Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy. 
46 Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea. 
47 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Basic Books, 2002). 
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 It is, however, problematic to label a state “rogue”, “terrorist” or “pariah” since, 
as Robert Litwak contends, such labeling will “push the United States’ administration 
toward a default strategy of containment and isolation”.48  Whether to engage North 
Korea or to try to contain it without interacting much with Pyongyang has been a 
dilemma for the United States. This problem was very salient during the Clinton 
administration, as it was the first American administration that tried to engage North 
Korea at a different level. The Clinton Administration tried to use confidence-building 
measures (understood here as actions taken by various parties involved in a conflict, and 
which are geared toward reducing tension and providing a sense of security), such as the 
1994 Agreed Framework to promote stability in the Korean peninsula. Litwak contends 
that although the Clinton administration adopted a one-size-fits-all approach to so-called 
“rogue states”, North Korea was excluded from this strategy. Washington kept on trying 
to engage North Korea despite the fact that many thought North Korea was not respecting 
the rules agreed to in Geneva in 1994. North Korea has also been treated differently than 
other “rogue states” by the Bush administration. The Bush administration has not tried to 
pursue regime change in North Korea the way it did in Iraq even though it has been 
clearly established that North Korea possesses weapons of mass destruction. 
 North Korea falls into the categories of an isolationist and unstable states desiring 
non-conventional weapons. However, Washington is now in a position similar to that of a 
Dr. Frankenstein: the United States has labeled North Korea a rogue state, but has not 
treating it as such. Instead, the United States has been engaged in negotiations with the 
North even though Washington does not recognize the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea’s official existence. The United States is therefore stuck in a conundrum: either it 
                                                 
48 Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War. 
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must talk to and negotiate with a regime that it would normally not talk to nor negotiate 
with, or it should try to isolate North Korea even more. However, isolating North Korea 
is no longer possible as we are now in the era of weapons of mass destruction that clearly 
cannot be ignored. Invading, on the other hand, does not seem possible. Michael 
O’Hanlon’s fine analysis underlines the lack of any open or easy access to Pyongyang, 
thus pointing at a major geographical contrast between North Korea and the open desert 
that surrounds Baghdad.49  
Finally, an important refinement has been added to the concept of rogue states, 
especially in the post-9/11 world order. The United States has shifted its focus almost 
exclusively to terrorists, state-sponsored terrorism and states engaged in trading weapons 
of mass destruction to non-state actors, such as isolated insurgency groups. Henriksen 
argues this change started to happen at the end of the Cold War. He discusses the link 
rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya have with terrorism.50 Advocating 
that the United States must take the lead in confronting rogue governments, he supports 
the use of sanctions and the pursuit of isolationist policies to contain rogue states. 
Moreover, he argues for the use of international courts and domestic prosecution, as well 
as for the use of armed interventions to bring rogues down. 
To summarize, the literature tells us that the definition of rogue states has evolved 
over time. At first, rogues were defined as states that did not fit into a traditional pattern 
of regular interactions with other states. Rogues have also been associated with weapons 
of mass destruction and especially the pursuit of nuclear power. The concept of rogue has 
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also been extended in order to incorporate marginalized states, as well as those that can 
threaten the stability of a given region. However, the rogue definition also depends on 
who is doing the defining: great powers have had a stake in deciding which states fit the 
rogue definition, based on how such states would influence the balance of power.   
We will thus consider that North Korea is a rogue if one considers aggregating 
various definitions of a rogue states. As such, North Korea is a rogue because it is a 
marginalized state, it could threaten the stability of the immediate region it is located in 
as well threaten the stability of the world, it has been engaged by powerful states that 
have a stake in reorganizing or maintaining the balance of power, and finally it has been 
associated with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 
 
b. A Peculiar Player 
 
1. To Engage, Or Not to Engage? 
Directly negotiating or even communicating with North Korea is controversial for 
the United States as it does not consider North Korea a legitimate actor in the 
international system. What is the danger for the United Stats to talk to villains? Bertram 
Spector argues that the inherent risk in negotiating with terrorists and with rogue states is 
smaller than is pursuing a no-negotiation policy.51 He also focuses on the need to address 
terrorists and rogues' interests and intentions in order to find whether there might be 
reasonable grounds to enter into negotiations. His approach thus departs from a zero-sum 
approach and leans towards a more cooperative, enlarging-the-pie approach. This 
                                                 
51 Bertram I. Spector, "Deciding to Negotiate with Villains," Negotiation Journal 14, no. 1 (1998). 
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approach is also sponsored by Abba Eban, who argues that leaders have a duty to 
negotiate with villains, no matter how detestable they are, as leaders might be saving 
lives by doing so.52 Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton also advocate talking 
and negotiating with villains not for ethical reasons, but because this is the only solution 
that is available to change a status quo.53  
What kind of actor has North Korea been when engaged by the international 
community? Some advocate that it is almost impossible to deal with North Korea as an 
isolated player, because of its relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Triplett, 
for example, considers North Korea a subordinate of China that is, to some extent, a part 
of the Chinese Communist Empire.54 Bordering along the lines of conspiracy theory, 
Triplett talks about China using a “borrowed knife”, as it bolster the North Korean 
regime by giving it support and money, and thus benefits from North Korea’s defiant 
actions toward the United States and the international community, while appearing as a 
broker and reliant actor in the international system.  Others such as You Ji look closely at 
the relationship between China and North Korea over the past fifty years and conclude 
that Beijing and China have had less and less to agree upon overtime, and have had rather 
contentious points of view when it came to their historical ties as well as their economic 
and diplomatic relations. 55  Finally, some have argued that China has played a 
constructive role in the current stalemate, as it has behaved as a honest broker between 
the United States and North Korea and that Beijing is to be credited for Pyongyang’s 
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return to the negotiation table in 2003 even after the failure of the Agreed Framework. 56 
At the same time, there is a divide in the literature regarding who deserves the blame for 
this failure and the current stalling of more recent rounds of talks. Some of the most 
influential and knowledgeable researchers on North Korea such as Leon Sigal, Selig 
Harrison, and Bruce Cummings blame Washington for the failure of the Agreed 
Framework, while others, such as Richard Perle, the former chairman of Defense Policy 
Board for the Bush Administration, thinks that North Korea blackmailed the United 
States before, during, and after the Agreed Framework negotiations.57 Who is to blame, 
however, remains often tied to political affiliation, especially in the United States as 
many as still polarized by the different approaches taken by the Clinton and Bush 
administrations on the North Korean issue.  
Thus, there is a division within the literature as to whether rogues such as North 
Korea should be engaged or not. Ignoring North Korea, however, is a risky solution that 
the United States has not been willing to experience anymore. From 2000 to 2003, the 
United States has refused to be involved in talks with North Korea mainly because 
Washington was preoccupied with the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the war in 
Afghanistan as well as the war in Iraq. China has acted as a middleman, effectively 
bringing back both Washington and Pyongyang to the negotiation table in April 2003. 
During those talks, North Korea stated it had developed nuclear weapons, and this acted 
as a wake-up call for the United States. Washington realized that it could not longer 
ignore North Korea for large period of times, as Pyongyang’s actions would go 
unchecked, and could possibly upset the balance of power in Northeast Asia as well as 
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around the world. Engagement with North Korea is thus needed, as Michael Klare had 
prescribed back in 1995: containing and confronting rogue states only heighten their 
resolves, whereas engaging them could be more successful.58  
 
2. Effectiveness and solutions 
North Korea was involved in negotiations long before it was labeled a rogue state. 
The first negotiations that took place between North Korea and the international 
community were in 1953, when an Armistice was being brokered between the parties to 
the Korean War. Admiral C. Turner Joy contends that North Korea attempted to disturb 
the negotiations by attracting attention to peripheral incidents outside of the negotiation 
setting in order to delay progress in the hope of offering as little as possible, and 
interpreted and reinterpreted agreements in a different light than first agreed upon.59 Kim 
Do Tae also reaches similar conclusions regarding negotiations between North Korea and 
South Korea.60 He notes that negotiations often do not happen at the said negotiation 
table, but rather outside of official settings, with North Korea trying to pursue an agenda 
that is often not reflected during the negotiations. Kim also notes that North Korea tries to 
prevent South Korea from achieving benefits from the negotiations, thus enforcing the 
idea that North Korea will vie for relative gains (being content only if receiving more 
gains than the negotiation counterpart) rather than absolute gain (being content by just 
gaining are much as possible), at least when negotiating with South Korea.  
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 Contemporary knowledge of negotiations with North Korea can be principally 
attributed to Scott Snyder and Chuck Downs. Both authors present an account of North 
Korean negotiation strategies. Scott Snyder’s approach is based on interviews and he 
presents a chronology of negotiations between the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. from 1989 to 
1997.61 Snyder compares North Korean negotiation style to that of South Korea and 
concludes that while it is possible to negotiate with North Korea, recurring or new crises 
internal or external to the negotiation situation are likely to disturb negotiations. Snyder 
also looks at the effects of North Korean brinkmanship, and contends that North Korean 
negotiation patterns such as making strong, hard-line, inflexible opening statements, 
frequently departing from the negotiating table or asking for concessions are now well 
understood, He states that this could be a downturn for North Korean negotiating teams 
as their counterparts and especially the U.S. can take advantage of such patterns. 
Snyder’s findings are rather striking, as they highlight North Korea’s inflexibility in 
negotiations which is also an element that was seen long time ago when North Korea 
negotiated the 1953 Armistice. This would suggest that North Korea’s negotiation 
strategy has not evolved much, or at least not up until 1997 when Snyder’s book was 
published. Thus, Snyder’s work cannot help us understand how Kim Jong-Il has 
negotiated with two very different American administrations, the Clinton and the Bush 
Administrations.  
Chuck Downs presents a more historical approach to the topic. He analyses events 
dating from the negotiations over the Korean Armistice in 1953 up to 1998 and the 
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beginning of the breakdown of the Agreed Framework.62 Downs identifies three common 
parts to the negotiations. First, North Korea negotiates with other parties until an 
agreement has been reached in principle. Then, North Korea considers the agreement and 
gives its own reading of it, which is often different from the initial agreement of 
principle. Finally, as parties reach a contentious state led by North Korea’s 
reinterpretation of the initial agreement, North Korea blames its negotiating counterparts 
for the failure of the talk. Downs’s findings are also similar to that of Snyder, and 
highlight the fact that North Korea often reinterprets agreements and puts the blame on its 
negotiating counterparts. This finding is also consistent with that of Tuner Joy and 
Snyder. 
The shortcomings from this literature are obvious: they only address the first few 
years of the Kim Jong-Il regime, and are not able to provide a comparison of how North 
Korea’s negotiation strategy has evolved under the Sunshine policy approach and the 
Clinton engagement efforts, and under the preemptive doctrine era launched by the Bush 
Administration.  
More technical and case-based understandings of North Korea’s negotiation 
strategy can be found in Romberg’s 2003 analysis of the Beijing Six-Party Talks that 
provides an interesting view of how the negotiations are likely to impact the region.63 
Romberg is concerned with cooperative patterns and how all parties should gain from the 
negotiations: in this sense, North Korea’s most important concerns should be addressed 
along with the five other powers’ minimal objectives. Romberg warns against following 
dangerous paths such as the one in which the United States would place unrealistic 
                                                 
62 Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy (Washington D.C: AEI Press, 1999). 
63 Alan D.  Romberg, "The North Korea Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for Negotiation," Arms control today: a 
publication of the Arms Control Association 33, no. 4 (2003). 
 29
demands on North Korea, asking for example for an immediate dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons facilities, or paths such as non-reciprocal situations where Pyongyang would 
have to make a first conceding move.  Joel Wit, in his analysis of the negotiations behind 
the Agreed Framework, contends that the United States’ policy should be geared toward 
U.S. objectives instead of North Korean objectives. Wit proposes that the United States 
sets strategic priorities and clearly sticks to them, thus creating a carrot system in which 
North Korea has to comply at different levels if it wants a reward.64 This follows both the 
logic of a sequential-type of game where parties must each take a step one after another, 
and a simultaneous-type of game in which parties will initiate actions at the same time. 
Wit also reinforces the ideas that China must be included as a full negotiation partner 
because of its influence over North Korea.  This contradicts Triplett’s vision that China is 
the United States’ real enemy. Finally, the debate regarding North Korea’s negotiation 
strategy is put into a broader perspective by Gavan McCormack who summarizes the 
difficult relationship between North Korea and the United States by characterizing it as a 
relationship between a porcupine and a tiger.65 McCormack argues that the United States’ 
loathing of North Korea, and its calling North Korea a rogue state have actually provided 
legitimacy to the isolated Kim Jong-Il government at a time when it is pursuing weapons 
of mass destruction. At the same time, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons 
reinforces Japan’s and South Korea’s need for the United States to ensure their security. 
Thus, North Korea’s actions have legitimized American presence in the region. This 
theory is interesting in light of North Korea’s behavior as a peculiar rogue state that has 
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managed to keep the United States as a negotiating partner even though the United States 
has no real desire to negotiate with it. 
 
The literature thus tells us that North Korea has experience in international 
negotiations, but that its strategies have become known to its negotiation counterparts. 
Shortcoming in the literature are numerous: first, there are no studies that deal with more 
than short periods of Kim Jong-Il’s reign or that show implications of the change from 
the Clinton administration to the hawkish Bush administration for the negotiations. 
Moreover, the majority of studies do not consider the post-9/11 time period. Second, 
many studies define North Korea as a rogue state without taking the time to analyze 
clearly what it means for the negotiations. Third, while negotiation techniques are 
discussed at the international systemic level, too few studies analyze negotiations using 
different levels of analysis: they do not look at the more personal characteristics of the 
negotiations or the dynamics of the negotiating teams. As a summary, it is difficult to 
come up with a unified strategy on how a country should be negotiating with a rogue, 
because as Tanter states, different nations perceive risk differently and thus there is no 
single consensus on how those outlaws should be treated.66 Tanter suggests that the 
United States perceived threats from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba and North Korea 
altogether and imposed sanctions on them, but has also engaged them at different levels, 
depending on whether the United States sees its counterpart as a nation-state, or as a 
personification of its leader: for example, Iran is being treated as a state while Iraq was 
above all about Saddam Hussein.67 Thus, it seems essential to investigate negotiation 
                                                 
66 Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). 
67 Ibid. 
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strategies that pertain to the state, but to its leader as well, since we have seen earlier that 
leadership as well as ideology are pillars of North Korea’s behavior in the international 
system. Richard Haas and Meghan O’Sullivan contend that there are various ways in 
which one can engage a rogue state: using ongoing political or economic activities, 
through economy as a more strategic way of dealing with a rogue in order to create 
interdependence, continuing the rivalry but maintaining a small range of agreements, as 
well as full negotiation on any topic possible. They state, however, that there has been 
little evidence over time that such engagement strategies have been successful when 
dealing with rogue states68. Rollback strategies are also considered when dealing with 
rogue states, and especially with North Korea: a rollback strategy means a full-scale war 
against a rogue regime in the hope of deposing its current regime. Such a strategy was 
considered during the Korean War in an attempt to depose Kim Il-Sung69, and has also 
been considered and enacted more recently in light of the war in Iraq.  
The most important factor, however, is that there is no consensus in the literature 
in regards to how rogue states should be dealt with, and more specifically on how such 
rogues have been behaving. The focus is often put on how the United States has been 
defining those states of concerns, and whether it has tried to engaged them or not. Few 
studies look at the situation from the other side, and try to determine how rogues have 
been interacting through diplomatic channels. Thus, the present study can make a 
contribution in determining which factors matter when the United States negotiates with 
North Korea.  
 
                                                 
68 Richard Haas, Meghan O'Sullivan, "Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies," Survival  
(2000). 




1.  Case Selection 
 
 There have been many opportunities for North Korea to talk to other states in 
formal settings since Kim Jong-Il’s inception in 1994. Talks have occurred for various 
reasons: crises that took place on the Korean peninsula and that stemmed out of 
perception issues such as when the United States wanted access to the Kumchang-ri site 
after Washington had gathered suspicious aerial photographs of the location; negotiation 
episodes that occurred because of a perceived danger, such as North Korea’s testing 
missiles over the Sea of Japan; demands of a concert of nations that wanted an 
international forum to discuss a possible alternative to the Korean Armistice; or out of 
concern for the unauthorized build-up of nuclear weapons by North Korea. What is also 
interesting is the type of format used during the negotiations: North Korea has been 
involved in single-shot talks (talks are composed of only one round that last for a 
continuous period of time and break only when an agreement has been reached) such as 
the 1994 pilot negotiations where the situation did not call for ongoing rounds of 
negotiations but ended after two weeks, and in repetitive negotiations dealing with 
nuclear weapons, missile testing and suspected nuclear facilities expansion. There have 
also been a variety of players: the United States has been involved in many cases, and so 
have various regional powers such as China, Japan, South Korea, Russia. The Four-Party 
Talks included the United States, North Korea, South Korea and China and the Six-Party 
Talks involved the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. 
There has been considerable variation in the type of issues that have been negotiated as 
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well as the number of players and the frequency of negotiation rounds. There has also 
been considerable diversity in the level of relative success and failure of the negotiations 
for the parties engaged.  
 Cases were selected according to strict criteria. First, cases had to have occurred 
after the Kim Jong-Il reign started, that is to say from 1994 on. Second, at least both the 
United States and North Korea had to have been involved in case in a full negotiating 
capacity. Third, a negotiation case had to involve actual contacts between diplomats and 
negotiators in a given location, as opposed to cases that are composed of exchange of 
rhetoric from government through media outlets. Those criteria seemed to be the most 
important as they allowed for the study to be limited to comparable units of negotiations 
in a post-Cold War setting.  Based on those three criteria, seven major cases were 
extracted from the chronology of major events that had happened between North Korea, 
the United States, and the Korean peninsula at large.  
 The first case will be referred to as the “Pilot Negotiations”, and took place in late 
1994. An U.S. Army helicopter crossed the D.M.Z and entered into North Korea’s air 
space. The helicopter was shot by the North Korean Army. The United States 
government had to negotiate with North Korea in order to recover the remains of one 
pilot who died, and to obtain the release of the second pilot. The case is noteworthy since 
it was important that it did not intensify in order not to impede the implementation of the 
Agreed Framework.  
 The second case involved bilateral missile talks that took place over eight rounds 
from 1996 to 2000. The United States and North Korea held bilateral talks in Berlin in 
April 1996 in order to discuss Pyongyang’s missile proliferation. North Korea was asked 
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to agree to the Missile Technology Control Regime. It responded by asking for 
compensation from the United States for lost missile-related revenues. Subsequent talks 
took place in Berlin in June 1997 (Round 2), in New York in October 1998 (Round 3), in 
Pyongyang in March 1999 (Round 4), in Berlin in September 1999 (Round 5), in Rome 
in May 2000 (Round 6), and in Kuala Lumpur both in July and in November 2000 
(Round 7 and 8). 
 The third case will be referred to as the “Nodong Launch” and took place in 1996 
when the United States detected North Korean preparations for a test of its medium-range 
Nodong missile.  Washington tried to assert its power by sending reconnaissance ships 
and aircrafts to Japan. Several meetings were held in New York between the United 
States and North Korea, in order to reach a compromise on the missile testing.  
 The fourth case labeled “Kumchang-ri Compromise” took place in 1998 and 
1999, and involved a potentially hazardous construction on a North Korean site. 
American Ambassador to South Korea Charles Kartman visited the D.P.R.K. and 
exposed his concerns regarding underground construction in the Yongbyon area. If North 
Korea was indeed building a nuclear plant at Kumchang-ri, the 1994 Agreed Framework 
could be voided. Pyongyang had to decide, in order to receive food and aid, whether it 
would allow American inspectors to visit the site. 
 The fifth case signals the beginning of multilateral negotiations, and pertains to 
the Four-Party negotiations. The United States, China, South Korea and North Korea met 
in Geneva in December 1997 in an unprecedented move, in order to discuss security 
issues and a nuclear-free peninsula. Subsequent rounds took place in March 1998 (Round 
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2), October 1998 (Round 3), January 1999 (Round 4), April 1999 (Round 5) and August 
1999 (Round 6).  
 The sixth case involves China, North Korea and the United States’ negotiations in 
Beijing in April 2003. No significant negotiations had taken place between the United 
States and North Korea since the summer of 1999 when the last round of Four-Party 
Talks was held. Following the change of administration in the United States as well as the 
September 11 attacks, the Trilateral Talks were an effort to jumpstart a multilateral talk 
process that had died several years earlier..  
 Finally, the last case presents the most recent effort to negotiate a peaceful 
resolution of nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula. Following the Trilateral Talks, the 
United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea met in August 2003, 
February 2004, June 2004 and during the summer of 2005 in order to sign a joint 




 The negotiation history between the United States and North Korea is extremely 
varied. At times talks led to agreements, and at other times, talks proved unsuccessful. 
Parties also broke off agreements, imposed sanctions, decided to trust each other again, or 
positioned themselves very antagonistically towards each other. History shows that when 
it comes to North Korea, there are instances of cooperation, as well as instances of non-
cooperation. A number of competing hypotheses can be formulated based on findings 
from the literature as to how cooperation can be fostered between the United States and 
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North Korea. The hypotheses are based on the three images framework drafted by 
Kenneth Waltz . Waltz’s first image, human nature, seeks to explain the cause of war and 
conflict by drawing on the inherently sinful nature of men, or at least on their 
imperfections. This image means that leaders’ greed and imperfect nature can lead to 
conflict. It also means that human nature should be taken into consideration when 
investigating whether war could be more likely than peace: optimists would say that 
human nature can be modified to make war less likely, while pessimists would say that 
human nature cannot be changed. In other words, human nature is as much a cause of 
conflict as an explanation for peace. This is extremely relevant when considering 
negotiators, diplomats, and other human actors that are involved in negotiations. Waltz’ 
second image, the nation-state, speaks to the concepts of nationalism and the preservation 
of states, elements that are central to realist concepts. It posits that human behavior is as 
much a product of human nature as it is of the society people live in. According to Waltz, 
war can be caused by “bad states”, namely governments that are engaged in external 
conflict in order to justify their internal hold on power. Finally, Waltz’s third image, the 
international system, assumes quite logically that if humans are shaped by their domestic 
environment, they must also be influenced by the international world. Thus, hypotheses 
that fall in to Waltz’ third image will have to do with factors that involved other actors 
besides North Korea, and that pertain to the balance of power. 
 The purpose of this study, however, is not to investigate reasons for war, but 
rather to look at potential explanatory factors that would lead to more cooperative 
outcomes when the United States and North Korea negotiate. As such, Waltz three 
images should not be understood here are factors leading to war, but as broad framework 
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that will lead to a discussion of different characteristics pertaining to both the United 
States and North Korea. Thus, our hypotheses will be divided into three categories: 
hypotheses pertaining to the human nature as a main variable during negotiations, 
hypotheses pertaining to the goals of the states in those negotiations, and finally 
hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between states within the international system, 
and its effect on negotiations.  
 
i. The first image: human nature as a key explanation 
 
 
Human nature is at the basis of the international system since states are made up 
of human beings and are created by them. Studying negotiations puts the emphasis on 
who are the negotiators. The Pilot Negotiations case shows an important disparity 
between the number of actors involved in the negotiations, as North Korea only had a few 
diplomats and officials involved, while the United States’ apparatus for negotiations was 
composed of a much larger number of actors with an array of personnel working directly 
for the President or at the Pentagon, as well as congressmen and scholars. Over the past 
decade or so, North Korea has called for direct negotiations with the United States, and 
has put an emphasis on which American officials are sent to the negotiations. This has 
been true for the United States as well, with the difference that Washington was not 
interested in which Korean interlocutors it had to deal with, but was very careful about 
who it would send as intermediates. The United States first sent Senator Bill Richardson 
and then former Deputy Assistant Secretary of States Thomas Hubbard. This was done 
with the clear intention prove the seriousness of the United States in regards to the 
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negotiations, but with the carefully calculated risk of not sending somebody  too highly 
ranked in order not to ‘give in’ too much to North Korea. We will also assume that 
negotiators who carry messages matter as much as the message itself and hypothesize 
that the face-value and name-value of who is in charge of the negotiations for the United 
States would change the relationship that North Korea has with American negotiators. A 
higher-ranking American actor would prove to North Korea that the United States is 
either respectful, or is worried enough about the situation that it does not want to make 
the error of snubbing North Korea. This can be called the “face hypothesis”. It should not 
be confused with a face-saving hypothesis that would investigate the effect a certain 
action would have on the ego of politicians for example. Hypothesis 1A would therefore 
propose that North Korea’s willingness to negotiate is tied to the level of the 
representatives on the American team, with appointment of higher ranking diplomats 
leading to more avenues for negotiations. 
 Because human beings are socialized by their environment and by the power of 
ideas and knowledge (concepts that relate directly to constructivism), it is also essential 
to consider the nature of the dispute, and the way actors assess its importance.  Disputes 
that arise from deep-rooted values and ideologies are basically zero-sum (meaning that 
one party will give out something that will become a gain to the other party, but no 
additional value will be created out of the negotiations).70 The reason for this is because 
one cannot easily compromise on deeply-rooted values or religious beliefs. In the case of 
North Korea and the United States, most of the conflicts pit the notions of communism 
and North Korean self-sufficiency (Chu’che) against capitalism and the free world. In 
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more interest-related disputes involving low politics (meaning tangibles things) rather 
than high-politics matters (meaning the way things are done), positive-sum resolutions 
(each party get something positive out of the negotiations) should be easier to reach and 
more amenable to conflict management. Daniel Druckman et al. also bring the idea of 
trying to redefine zero-sum games into more manageable and especially negotiable sub-
units of negotiations in order to weight them against one-another in order to find more 
compromise.71 Negotiations involving short-notice topics as well as situations such as the 
1994 Pilot Negotiations have a higher likelihood of being resolved, especially if more 
dramatic topics such as the issue of nuclear development are brought into the 
negotiations. Hypothesis 1B proposes that low politics issues and issues not linked with 
more encompassing and sensitive, on-going crises will have a higher likelihood of 
finding a positive-sum outcome.  
 
ii. The second image: nation-state as a key explanation 
 
 
It is important to understand the constituencies influencing the negotiating states’ 
governments. North Korea functions largely as a monolithic block, although the Pilot 
negotiations showed that there can be disagreements among actors in the North as well. 
The was a  power struggle between the government, and the military chief office U-Jin O 
regarding the release of information concerning the fate of the two American pilots.72 
This leads to hypothesis 2A Negotiations are more likely to lead to compromise 
outcomes when there is a unity of views behind the position taken by the negotiating 
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team (the unity of view will normally come from a decision-making body at the 
governmental level). At the same time, a power struggle when there is disagreement 
among government agents could weaken the image of the negotiating team. This 
hypothesis will also be extremely salient when looking at potential divisions and 
cleavages within the Bush administration, especially between hard-liners and those who 
believe in a softer approach toward North Korea.  
The issue of what is being negotiated is also crucial for the interest of the states 
involved. Jacob Bercovitch et al. show that disputes that involved more material issues, 
as well as issues related to the security of one country are far more amenable to a 
successful negotiated agreement than an issue involving ideology or independence. This 
is tightly linked to what we have discussed earlier when dealing with the first image, with 
the exception that Bercovitch et al. focus on the notion of security of the state instead of 
only human or cultural values. Security and especially the fight against perpetrators of 
terrorist actions are of prime importance to the United States, especially since 2001. 
However, the realist notion of survival of the state and the idea that the system we evolve 
in is anarchical and of a self-help nature is extremely important for our cases. We can 
thus hypothesize, as hypothesis 2B does that both the United States and North Korea are 
highly sensitive to the notion of security, and that negotiations related to their security 
and the security of their citizens and constituencies will be more important than other 
collective security endeavors, such as collective security in Northeast Asia. This 
hypothesis will be highly relevant for negotiation episodes such as the Four-Party Talks 
and the Six-Party Talks that usually focus on broader definitions of security that 
encompass all or most of Northeast Asia. We thus can expect that negotiations involving 
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security matters will be difficult for North Korea, and that compromise is unlikely to be 
achieved given that both mistrust each other and place higher priority than on collective 
security models. This hypothesis seems also very relevant for North Korea as several 
researchers including Kim Do-Tae from the Korean Research Institute of National 
Unification argues that North Korea’s negotiating objectives are to safeguard its political 
system as well as to attempt to achieve unification with the South on Communist terms. 
While mentioned more in the rhetoric of the nineties, it seems that unification under 
Communist terms is no longer as important to Pyongyang’s agenda as is the plain 
survival of its regime.  
Turner Joy used his own experience of negotiating with North Korea during the 
Armistice and studied how negotiations stalled. He put the spotlight on how North Korea 
often sought political agreements that had validity only in name and later disavowed 
them, as well as on how North Korea rather consistently refused to offer concessions. 73 Is 
this still true nowadays, or are those issues hard-to-break stereotypes about North Korea? 
Conventional wisdom would say that there is no reason why North Korea would have 
changed its tactics as the way the regime has been operating since the creation of North 
Korea has changed very little over time. However, Kim Do Tae found that North Korea 
successfully applied the use of alternatives, commitments and controls over negotiation 
processes to increase its negotiating power in relation to the United States. Hence, one 
can hypothesize, as hypothesis 2C, that during the negotiation phase, North Korea has a 
strategy, and is a sophisticated, prepared player, using various techniques and often 
leading negotiations instead of suffering through them. This idea feeds directly into those 
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of Mark Habeeb and his work on the reasons why seemingly powerful states are having a 
difficult time to impose their will on “weaker” states. 74 Habeeb states that the power 
balance between states largely determines the outcome of a negotiation, and he defines 
power as being a function of resources, as well as how those resources are used, thus 
implying that a party having more resource will not necessarily reap larger benefits 
during a negotiation. This idea is parallel to that of the paradox of unrealized power. 
Small states such as North Korea achieve objectives out of proportion to their size and 
aggregate power.  North Korea, as a weaker state, might increase its leverage on specific 
issues because of having a strong Best Alternatives To a Negotiated Agreement 
(B.A.T.N.A.), which basically means that a negotiated agreement might not always be the 
best option for Pyongyang as it might have another option that is more beneficial in some 
ways than signing an agreement.75 North Korea also uses crisis diplomacy in order to 
manipulate the negotiation’s agenda and format and can be seen in the work of In Young 
Chun. Addressing the 1968 Pueblo incident during which a U.S. Navy ship entered into 
North Korean waters and was seized by Pyongyang, Chun argues that North Korea 
routinely used crisis diplomacy and brinkmanship in order to maximize its political 
benefits. In some cases, Pyongyang demanded that counterparts admit to wrong doing 
and apologize.76 Such characteristics were also present in the 1994 pilot negotiation case 
when Pyongyang accused Washington of having sent its pilots on a spying mission, or 
when it required the United States to apologize for that fact. In the end, the United States 
did apologize for the incident, which shows that North Korea does have power when it 
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comes to negotiation. This leads us to Hypothesis 2D: North Korea is more likely than 
the United States to achieve its goals through negotiations, even though this appears 
counter-intuitive given the power relationships in the world and the assumption that the 
hegemonic U.S. should be able to impose its will on the weak. 
 
iii. The third image: international system as a key explanation 
 
Jung-Hoon Lee and Chung-In Moon provide a very clear assessment of the two 
primary contending views of the West regarding how to deal with North Korea.77 Their 
study presents two main opposing approaches, namely the kind of hard-line rejection that 
was practiced by the United States before the death of Kim Il-Sung and the nineties soft-
line accommodation perspective bolstered by the Kim Dae-Jung Administration and its 
‘Sunshine Policy’. The Bush administration has opted for a negotiated settlement through 
the use of incentives and disincentives. During the Pilot negotiations, the United States 
said right away that it did not want to damage the relationship that was established 
between the United States and North Korea through the Agreed Framework, but at the 
same time, the United States mentioned that the Agreed Framework could be in jeopardy 
if North Korea did not “behave”. Hypothesis 3A is that linkage between crises matters, 
and that larger strategic crisis could have a potential effect on a smaller crisis if, for 
example, a negotiating teams try to get concessions in a given negotiation episode by 
threatening to cancel a deal that had been made or was in the making in another 
negotiation episode.  
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According to several researchers, however, a sense of emergency can also 
increase disputants’ motivation to moderate their intransigence and revise their 
expectations.78 Hence a rival hypothesis to 3A is that a sudden crisis, an isolated incident 
or even an independent incident will have a higher likelihood of being resolved or leading 
to identification of a common ground than different rounds of negotiation on a single 
topic. This will be labeled Hypothesis 3B. 
 
Table 1: Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1A:  North Korea’s willingness to negotiate is tied 
to the level of the representatives appointed by its counterpart’s 
teams, with appointment of higher ranking diplomats leading to 
more avenues for negotiation than with lower ranking diplomats 
(especially when a request along this line emanates from North 
Korea). 
The first image: 
Human nature as a key 
explanation 
Hypothesis 1B: Low politics issues and issues not linked with 
more encompassing and sensitive, on-going issues have a higher 
likelihood of finding a positive-sum compromise. 
Hypothesis 2A: negotiations are more likely to lead to positive-
sum outcomes when there is a unity of view in the position of a 
negotiating team.  
Hypothesis 2B: Negotiations related to North Korea’s national 
security will be more important for Pyongyang than any other 
collective security endeavors that would ensure its own security 
as well as the security of other countries in East Asia or around 
the world. 
Hypothesis 2C: North Korea is a versed, sophisticated player 
that is using various techniques and often leading negotiations 
instead of not having a strategy and just suffering through the 
negotiations. 
The second image: 
Nation-state as a key 
explanation 
Hypothesis 2D: North Korea is more likely to achieve its goals 
through negotiations than other negotiation parties will, because 
it manages to derive power from other avenues than from its 
resources. 
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Hypothesis 3A: A larger strategic negotiation episode can 
influence the result of smaller-scale negotiations.  
The third image: 
International system as 
a key explanation Hypothesis 3B: A sudden crisis, an isolated incident or even an 
independent incident will have a higher likelihood of being 
resolved or at least of identifying a common ground than 
different rounds of negotiation on a single topic. 
 
 
The various hypotheses to be tested will help determining North Korea’s negotiation 
strategy which is the dependent variable. It seems that there is a lot of variation on the 
dependent variable: North Korea is known as having backed out of negotiations, signed 
agreements, prolonged negotiations by requesting additional time in order to ask for input 
from its leadership, but has also refused to come to the negotiation table, In this sense, we 
will follow Turner Joy, Scott Snyder and Chuck Brown’s choice of dependent variable 
and pinpoint units in North Korean sets of actions. Those units can then be aggregated in 
order to derive North Korea’s negotiation strategy over time, and in different settings 
such as bilateral negotiations, multilateral negotiations, crises negotiations as well a 




 First, raw data are analyzed using an inductive framework. Raw data refers to 
information that has been drawn from newspaper articles retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis 
Academic database. To the extent possible, bare facts were used; any subjective analysis 
was discarded. Newspapers used were major national publications both in the United 
States as well as in South Korea, Japan and China. A list of those newspapers can be 
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found in Appendix I. This raw data was used to provide in-depth chronologies of the 
seven negotiation cases listed earlier. Once such chronologies were built, the initial set of 
hypotheses was tested for each of the cases, and preliminary conclusions regarding 
potential negotiation strategies, as well as elements that help explain variation in North 
Korea’s negotiation strategies were outlined. 
 Second, in-depth interviews were used inductively as well. Rounds of interviews 
were conducted with people who were involved in or were highly knowledgeable with 
the topic negotiations with North Korea from 1994 to 2004. Interviewees ranged from 
former American ambassadors to the Republic of Korea to American experts working for 
think-tanks related to foreign policy, as well as from former high-ranking South Korean 
officials to academic professors working on issues related to the Korean peninsula.   
 
i. Archival Research 
 
 The  data-set gathered for the research was constructed using the database news 
Lexis-Nexis, and was supplement by other sources such as the K.C.N.A (Korean Central 
News Agency), two South Korean newspapers (Korea Times and Korea Herald), as well 
as archival research of the minutes of meetings, when available. Keywords were used 
systematically, going from a more general approach to a more specific inquiry. Generic 
key terms were used to define the broader context of the negotiations, as well as to 
categorize the different negotiation episodes that occurred during specific years. Generic 
key terms usually involved a combination of two to three terms (For example, “North 
Korea” + “negotiations”, “North Korea” + “talks”, “D.P.R.K.”+ “negotiations”, 
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“D.P.R.K.” + “talks”, “North Korea” + “United States” + “talks”, “North Korea” + 
“United States” + “negotiation”, “D.P.R.K.” + “United States” + “talks”, “D.P.R.K.” + 
“United States” + “negotiations”). For each case, a time-period was entered in the search 
field. The time-period was divided into subsequent smaller units in the case of multi-
round negotiations. 
 Specific key terms were used once the main negotiation cases had been isolated, 
and searched focused on the name of the negotiations as referred to by the press, as well 
as its actors. A combination of both name of the negotiations as well as date of the 
negotiation round was used (for example “Kumchang-ri”, “Missile negotiations”, 
“Trilateral talk”, “4-way talks” / “4-party talks”, “6-way talks” / “6-party talks”). In order 
to identify articles in Lexis-Nexis, the following sections were searched:  “General 
News” + “Major Papers”, “World News” + “Asia/Pacific news”, “General News” + 
“Policy Papers”, “General News” + “Magazines and Journals”. 
 The issues coded for each instance of negotiations were the date when the 
negotiations took place, its venue, the official stances of participants, the function of 
negotiators (whether they were ambassadors, envoys, presidents, citizens, or officials 
from the military for example), the duration of the talks, whether or not an agreement was 
reached, what issues were discussed during the talks, what types of grievances were 
reportedly enunciated by the negotiating parties, what was the climate like during the 





 After a preliminary analysis of the newspaper articles collected, the number of 
relevant articles for each of the negotiation episodes was distributed as follows: 
 
Table 2: Articles Processed 
Cases Articles Processed 
Case 1: Pilot Negotiations 107 
Case 2: Bilateral Talks - Missile Prolif. 126 
Case 3: Nodong Launch 38 
Case 4: Kumchang-ri compromise 56 
Case 5: Four-Party Talks 152 
Case 6: Trilateral Talks 31 
Case 7: Six-Party Talks 191 
Total: 701 
 
The volume of single stances and actions that belonged to each country was distributed as 
follows: 
Table 3: Case Distribution 
Cases U.S. D.P.R.K. R.O.K China Japan Russia 
Case 1 498 125 23    
Case 2 316 126 10    
Case 3 81 16 7    
Case 4 162 48 12    
Case 5 246 248 172 71   
Case 6 87 18 9 9   
Case 7 236 138 115 217 75 53 
Total: 1626 719 348 297 75 53 
 
ii. Interviews 
 Interviews were conducted after the deep content analysis work was completed. 
The purpose of the interviews was to gather more specific information on factors that 
might influence on North Korea’s behavior during negotiations. Interviewees belong to 
different categories, and provide a more subjective type of information that should be 
handled with care. 
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 Interviewees ranged from former American and South Korea diplomats who have 
been involved in a specific negotiation episode with North Korea, current U.S. State 
Department officials who are in relatively direct contact with North Korean officials to 
experts who are involved in negotiations with North Korea outside of official state 
channels, experts who have visited North Korea and have witnessed North Korea’s 
negotiation style outside of the seven specific negotiation cases presented here, and 
experts who have been working on the issue of North Korea. Attempts were also made to 
contact North Korean diplomats through the North Korea desk at the United Nations, but 
ended in a refusal from the mission to set up an interview. The demand to interview 
North Korean, though unsuccessful, did not hamper the validity of this study as 
triangulation made it possible to gather an important amount of data directly pertaining to 
how North Korean officials behaved when negotiating. Interviewees were contacted by 
email, and interviews were conducted in person, through phone, as well as through, in 
certain cases, a voice-over-computer software. Anonymity was respected when 
participants requested it. All interviews were stored in digital format and labeled with a 
number known only to the author in order to ensure anonymity.  
 Questions were asked according to the degree of involvement that the 
interviewees had with North Korea. Interviews with former American ambassadors to the 
Republic of Korea were focused on their understanding of the concept of rationality 
within North Korea. Questions also targeted their own experience meeting with North 
Korean officials. The interview questions were divided into several categories. First, a 
general category of questions inquired about the most important events during the 
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relationship between the United States and North Korea. A second category of questions 
directly address our hypotheses, with questions regarding the linkage between negotiation 
episodes and questions that asked the interviewee to describe negotiation behaviors and 
techniques used by North Korea during talks.  
 A copy of the approved Internal Review Board Consent Form is available in 
Appendix III. A copy of the Interview Request sent to participants is available in 
Appendix IV.  A list of general interview questions is available in Appendix V.  
 
Table 4: List of Interviews 
Date Interviewees Function Location Means 
11/30/2005 Kim Choon-Nam East West 
Center 
U.S. - Hawaii By phone 
12/2/2005 Thomas Hubbard Former U.S. 




1/18/2006 Huh Moon-Young Dir. N.K. Div. 
K.I.N.U. 
R.O.K. - Seoul In person 
1/18/2006 Kim Kook-Shin Dir. N.E.A.S. 
K.I.N.U. 
R.O.K. - Seoul In person 
1/18/2006 Choi Kang I.F.A.N.S. R.O.K. - Seoul In person 
2/17/2006 Donald Gregg Former U.S. 
Amb. To S.K. 
U.S. - New York By phone 
2/22/2006 Robert Dujarric Expert located 
in Japan 
Japan - Tokyo  Through 
Skype 
2/22/2006 Gordon Flake Mans Ctr Pac 




3/14/2006 Don Oberdorfer Historian U.S. – 
Washington D.C. 
In person 





3/15/2006 Robert Carlin K.E.D.O. U.S. - New York By phone 
3/9/2006 Joo Seung-Hoo U. Minn N.K.-
Russia Expert 
U.S. - Minneapolis By phone 















3/18/2006 Bruce Cumings Expert/Historian 
U. Chicago 
U.S. - Ann Arbor By phone 
3/8/2006 KhilYoung-Whan  Expert U.S. - Phoenix By phone 
 
 Interviews were then processed by grouping participants’ comments into different 
categories. First, participant’s first-hand negotiating experiences with North Korea were 
categorized as “anecdotes”. Interviewees’ personal opinions as well as interpretations of 
facts were categorized as “Opinions”. Various other categories were created in order to 
process information given by interviewees on various subjects such as their own role 
within a negotiation process, Kim Jong-Il’s personality and power, North Korea’s general 
and specific characteristics, President Bush and President Clinton’s administrations, the 
topic of nuclear weapons, as well as information pertaining to other countries’ role on the 
Korean peninsula. 
 
 The combination of archival research as well as interviews gathered a wealth of 
data, as well as some surprising findings and sometimes contradictory information 
regarding North Korea’s negotiation behavior as well as the United States’ relationship 
with Pyongyang. The subsequent chapter will present a historical overview of 
Washington and Pyongyang’s relationship, and will open the way to a presentation of 
how the literature has characterized North Korea as a negotiation player. Such a 
presentation will lead to a detailed analysis of the negotiations cases, based on the 




Chapter Three. History of the Peninsula and North Korea’s Estrangement 
 
 In order to understand the contemporary relationship that exists between the 
United States and North Korea, and to a larger extent the geopolitical context of their 
interactions, it is necessary to review the United States’ involvement with North Korea 
since the creation of the two separate Koreas. The relationship that ensued during the 
Cold War has created a specific image of North Korea that is still common today when 
analyzing North Korea. However, the Cold War mentality is not longer an adequate 
paradigm to study North Korea. Is North Korea a threat to the United States, and if so, 
what kind? Is North Korea responsible for the intractable situation that has plagued 
Washington and Pyongyang for several decades? Or was the United States in need of an 
enemy once the U.S.S.R. collapsed, as Colin Powell seemed to have believed when he, as 
the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, said “I’m running out of demons. I’m running 
out of villains…I’m down to Castro and Kim Il-Sung”?79 This chapter will therefore 
provide background information on the type of relationship that has governed the United 
States and North Korea from the beginnings of Kim Il-Sung’s reign to the most recent 
developments of Kim Jong-Il’s dictatorship. 
 At the beginning of the 21st century, North Korea is a very peculiar state plagued 
by economic difficulties, governed by an ironclad leadership, and flirting with dangerous 
technologies such as nuclear weapons. The country has managed to retain many of the 
characteristics that already singled out North Korea during the Kim Il-Sung regime. 
North Korea under Kim Jong-Il is not a collapsing state, but a state that manages to defy 
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international norms of engagement, as well as liberal visions of cooperation and 
economic growth.  
 
a. How Korea Became Two Koreas 
The region formerly called the Far East is now referred to as Northeast Asia, and 
has witnessed many changes over the centuries. At the end of the 1940s, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States of 
America were the major powers facing a destroyed Japan. As stated by Sung-Han Kim, 
the United States’ two main objectives during World War II were to defeat Japan, and to 
create a powerful democratic China.80 In the years following the end of the war and 
Japan’s defeat, China’s loss to the Communists created an uneasy situation for the United 
States: it had to counterbalance two Communist powers, namely the Soviet Union and 
China, instead of only the U.S.S.R. Also, the United States was victorious after World 
War II, but had to change its strategy as its invasion and military occupation of Japan had 
been successful, but the country still needed to be disarmed in order to prevent any other 
outburst of violence from the Japanese power over the Asian region.81 
 Korea was under Japanese occupation from 1910 until the United States 
terminated this domination by dropping nuclear bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 
1945. There was a real technical question on how to reestablish order on the peninsula 
and disarm Japan. The topic had been discussed during the Yalta conference of February 
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1945 by Stalin and Roosevelt. Roosevelt had suggested placing Korea under a joint 
trusteeship between the United States and Russia once Japan was defeated. Therefore on 
August 15, 1945, after a mere thirty minutes of discussion between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R., Korea was officially divided into two parts. 82 The United States established a 
military occupation of the Southern part of the peninsula, and retained a part of the old 
Japanese colonial government. Gerald L. Curtis gives a clear account of the American-
Korea alliance and argues like many other scholars, that by 1948 Korea had lost most of 
the strategic value it might have had to the U.S.83 At that time, the United States was 
involved in the disarmament of Japanese forces in South Korea, and in the creation of a 
legitimate government on the peninsula. But Washington was also greatly concerned with 
the spread of Communism in Europe as the Soviet Union grew stronger. The 1947 
Truman Doctrine stated that Communism should not spread, and the following year, the 
Marshall Plan was designed to aid the war-damaged nations of Western Europe and in the 
process, to try to prevent the rise of pro-Communist forces in the hope of preventing them 
siding with the Soviet Union. The United States was strongly concerned about the 
potential fate that Europe would face, if it fell under the Soviet’s sphere of influence, and 
the implications for the “Free World.” In 1949, the United States put forward its plan to 
remove a sizable part of American troops that had been stationed in the Korean 
peninsula. This decision might be attributed to the fact that Korea was no longer 
perceived as a vital interest to the United States, as well as because of the economic 
problems in Washington that led to a reduction in spending abroad. By June 1949, and 
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amidst widespread protests from the Korean people, more than 45,000 U.S. soldiers had 
already left Incheon.84 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s subsequent June 1950 
speech in which he excluded South Korea from the United states’ Asian security 
perimeter showed a clear will to disengage from the peninsula. However, this move by 
Washington could also be interpreted as being a means not to upset the U.S.S.R. in a way 
that Moscow might want to secure an alliance with Japan and thus challenge the United 
States’ position in East Asia. However, the American retreat from Korea could also be 
seen as a strategic move by Washington in the case of an attack from Pyongyang: by 
removing its soldiers from the Southern peninsula region, the United States would no 
longer face the risk of being entrapped in the tip of Korea, if a U.S.S.R. – D.P.R.K 
alliance had been born.85 Thus, a troop withdrawal might have been the best choice for 
the United States’ security.  
 In the meantime, North Korea had been busy building strong military capacities, 
mainly with the aid of the Soviet Union. North Korea’s military was far more superior to 
that of South Korea, and the North invaded the South on June 25, 1950. The United 
States’ foreign policy towards Asia took a radical turn, as Washington realized that the 
loss of South Korea to the North could then mean that Communism could rapidly spread 
through the region, and threaten world peace. 
 The North Korean invasion of the South came as a surprise to the United States, 
which readily suspected that the attack had been bolstered by the Soviet Union. Truman 
vowed to assure that South Korea’s security would be eventually achieved, and after the 
United Nations voted that the North’s aggression toward the South was a breach of peace, 
                                                 
84 Seunggi Paik, U.S. - Korean Relations since 1945 (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1998). 
85 Kim, "Five Decades After: The Far East in 1950 Vs. Northeast Asia". 
 56
the United Nations decided on military action in order to restore peace on the peninsula. 
General McArthur was nominated as the commander of the United Nations forces in 
Korea which were comprised of a majority of American soldiers, but of more than 
nineteen nations in totality. 86  However, the United States’ prime motive for getting 
involved in the conflict was far more complicated than just liberating South Korea from 
its invaders. Despite its exclusion from the American security perimeter, South Korea 
was now seen as a pivotal actor in Asia, the potential first domino of America’s Domino 
Theory.87 This theory presupposed that weak nations located in strategic geographical 
locations around the world such as in Asia and in Europe were more likely to become 
subject to the power and influence of a neighboring communist power. Greece and 
Turkey, for example, were threatened by Russia’s expansionism as early at 1947.88 It was 
feared that the loss of Korea to the U.S.S.R. could lead to a dramatic shift in power 
balance in Asia. If most of Northeast Asia was under the influence of the Soviet Union, 
then Japan could potentially become a part of the Communist block as well. The United 
States had defeated Japan during World War Two and had rendered it tributary of 
American military protection after the Japanese Constitution was modified to prevent 
Japan from developing any offensive forces. Thus, the potential “loss of Japan” could 
leave the United States with neither a foothold, nor a strong influence in Asia.  
 The Korean War marked the beginning of longstanding military and economic 
American support towards South Korea. Upon realizing that East Asia’s security could be 
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upset if South Korea was to become part of the Communist Empire, President Truman 
decided to reverse his strategy of non-involvement in Korean affairs as Seoul was now of 
vital importance to the United States. It was recognized that Japan’s stability and political 
polarity could also be affected by the loss of South Korea. 89  The extent of this 
commitment was large: the United States committed more than 350,000 soldiers to the 
United Nations force in order to defend Seoul.90 The total cost of the Korean War for the 
United States amounted to already more than 115 billion dollars then.91  The war was also 
costly in terms of human lives: it is estimated that more than 400,000 United Nations 
Command troops died, two-third of them being South Koreans and American casualties 
were about 54,000 with more than 100,000 wounded.92 China entered the conflict in 
October 1950, just as American troops crossed the 38th parallel going north. However, 
Chinese support was not enough to secure the end of the conflict, and Beijing suffered 
terrible losses in the war, with more than 300,000 casualties as well. The United Nations, 
North Korea and China signed an armistice agreement in 1953. That same year, the 
United States decided to sign a Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea. South Korea 
president Syngman Rhee did not want an armistice to end the Korean War, but had to 
agree to it to obtain a mutual security treaty with the United States. The treaty reaffirmed 
both countries’ strong desire to live peacefully. Article III stressed that an armed attack 
on one of the parties would be considered as a dangerous attack to the other party’s 
security.  The treaty thus felt short of saying that an attack on one party would be 
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considered as an attack on the other; nevertheless, South Korea still considered itself as 
belonging to the United States’ security sphere in East Asia. The Mutual Defense Treaty 
also provided South Korea with a strong American military presence, as well as 
significant economic assistance. It is significant the United States kept on assisting South 
Korea despite President Park Chung-hee’s military regime of the 1960’s and 1970s, 
mostly because Park was clearly anti-communist. The U.S.- South Korea commitment 
was also bolstered by the potential risk of Japan trying to develop its own nuclear 
weapons if South Korea was to become communist. American entanglement in Vietnam 
swallowed an enormous amount of money for military operations, but South Korea 
participated actively in the war by sending an important contingent of soldiers to aid 
Washington in Vietnam, thus showing that the nation was modernizing, and was able and 
willing to start repaying the United States for the help Seoul had received a decade 
earlier.  
The Vietnam War showed that the United States needed to adapt its policy to a 
changing world. The 1969 Nixon Doctrine clearly expressed the fact that Asian countries 
had to be less dependent on the United States for their security, and that the United States 
would reduce its troops’ deployments in the Far East.93 Because of the changing nature of 
the Cold War, and as China and the Soviet Union did not support North Korea as much as 
they had done in the past President Carter started to remove troops from South Korea in 
the mid 1970’s. As a result, South Korea realized that it had to start pursuing its own 
military build-up in order to rely less on the United States for its security. South Korea 
tried to open diplomatic relations with other Asian powers in order to stabilize the region. 
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By the end of the 1970s, South Korea was able to cover more than ninety percents of its 
own defense costs.94 
 At the beginning of the 21st century, there are still 37,000 American troops in 
Korea. However, South Korea’s army is now nearly self-sufficient, and though it still 
cannot match North Korea’s capabilities and especially its number of military personnel, 
it is modernizing and growing. 95 The United States has also allowed South Korea to 
produce weapons and military arsenal, under American license. Even though it is still 
dependent on foreign countries regarding specific military items such as jet fighters, 
South Korea is growing into a reliable military force. It has also remained willing to 
assist the United States such as with the War in Iraq. Finally, South Korea is a modern 
nation that produces hi-end technical goods, and has an important economic place in 
Asia, and as a trading partner of the United States. Furthermore, a large amount of 
Korean nationals have immigrated to the United States, thereby strengthening the cultural 
relationship between the two countries. The U.S.-R.O.K. interaction, which had started as 
a savior/needy relationship, has now evolved into a patron/client relationship as well as, 
in some instances, into a full partnership.  
 
b. Pyongyang’s position in the international system 
 
 Because North Korea is a hermetical country from which very little information 
can flow, the nature of the regime and the intentions of its leaders have come under a lot 
of scrutiny, but nevertheless retain a mysterious character. Since it is not possible to 
easily gather first-hand data about North Korea, as well as to communicate through open 
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channels with its government, there exist multiple portrayals of Pyongyang. The end of 
the Cold War has challenged traditional understandings of North Korea and the 
Communist threat and given rise to new concerns. Today, the dominant concerns 
regarding North Korea are its development of dangerous weapons, famine, as well as its 
political brinkmanship.  
 
1. Stereotypical views of North Korea 
 
 
i. State and ideology 
 
 
 One of the most common words used to describe North Korea’s system is 
communism. North Korea was introduced to Communism when it was placed under the 
U.S.S.R. zone of influence in 1948, when the peninsula was initially divided. Since then, 
North Korea has been considered as a Communist state, and thus placed on the side of the 
“other” by the United States during the Cold War. Even though the Cold War is now 
over, North Korea is still a Communist state and unlike other Communist nations such as 
the ex-Soviet states, or even China, it has not shown much opening to more capitalist 
ideas.96 Moreover, North Korea’s regime also carries the image of its founding father, 
Kim Il-Sung. By many accounts, however, and even up until recent years, North Korea’s 
regime was seen as being on the verge of imminent collapse. Economic difficulties due to 
the apparent failure of centralized planning coupled with difficult weather conditions led 
to famines especially after 1995. Many have predicted and still predict that North Korea 
is on the verge of collapse. General Gary Luck commander of United States Forces in 
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South Korea said in 1996 that “North Korea is already in a state of economic collapse”97 
Such a view was stated again by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in June 
2003 (“North Korea is teetering on the edge of economic collapse”98). Theories regarding 
what kind of collapse, a hard-landing or a soft-landing have thus emerged over time. The 
idea of a soft-landing was privileged by the United States and the Republic of Korea in 
the 1990’s: the Sunshine policy, enacted by South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung 
embraced the idea that bringing slow reform to North Korea, and acting in a diplomatic 
way rather than in an aggressive fashion would reduce the risk of North Korea acting 
desperately by invading the South, for example. The assumption regarding the North’s 
regime was that upon the death of Kim Il-Sung, his son Kim Jong-Il would have 
difficulties imposing himself as the new leader after his father had ruled more than forty 
years over the country.99 The idea was that the North Korean people were probably 
servile to the regime, but could also be expected to be strong enough to launch a revolt 
against a state which had failed to provide them with the bare minimum to survive.  
 North Korea’s future was also viewed as tightly linked to that of South Korea. In 
the competition between the two countries in the 1970s, South Korea emerged as one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world. The fact that South Korea became a 
democratic country and was able to overcome the 1997 financial crash led many to 
believe that Seoul would absorb North Korea in a near future. Such belief was based on 
the fact that reunification was the only option for the two Koreas, and that the United 
States could not let North Korea take over the South, especially after committing an 
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important number of troops to defend the South in case of an attack from the North, and 




 The North Korean regime is believed to be spending an enormous part of its 
budget for its armed forces, with some analysts suggesting that more than thirty percents 
of the North Korean gross domestic product is spent on its military. However, it is still 
difficult to properly evaluate the strength of the North Korean army, as many documents 
stay classified, and as it is extremely hard to retrieve information from the government 
itself. At the end of the Cold War, information were really scarce, but researchers such as 
Nicholas Eberstadt managed to uncover some discrepancies in the figures given by the 
North Korean regime, and by using sets of reconstructed population data.100 Joseph S. 
Bermudez Jr. provides very a precise estimate of the number of soldiers as well as 
military capacities of North Korea. Still, Bermudez is very cautious in laying down these 
numbers, and warns readers to consider the numbers carefully.101 The difficulty of getting 
proper estimates should not, however, preventing from seeing that the North Korean 
army is larger than the South Korean army.102 Especially during the 1970s, North Korea’s 
ideology and propaganda insisted on depicting the South as a poor country, and 
capitalism as being an evil doctrine. Therefore, a strong army could be logically seen as a 
tool to reunify the two Koreas under the North’s rule. The idea that an attack from the 
North could happen at any moment prompted the United States to help Korea financially 
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and militarily. At the beginning of Kim Jong-Il’s reign, the D.P.R.K. had about twice the 
number of active armed forces than that of the R.O.K103 . Since then, however, the 
conventional wisdom that the North Korean army is as able as some say has been 
challenged by many, including Kang who states that “to view the North as superior in 
military terms is a mistake” 104 , especially in light of South Korea’s military 
modernization and the United States’ technical support.  
 Finally, militarism is also accompanied by weapons development: according to 
many, North Korea has developed weapons of mass destruction and possesses all the 
capabilities to manufacture nuclear bombs which could compare to America’s first 
generation nuclear weapons. Such weapons could not be a direct threat to the United 
States, but could very well be propelled over South Korea and Japan or could even reach 
the United States Recent developments regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons’ 
program show that North Korea possesses a technology that South Korea is also not 
allowed to develop: the United States prevented the South from building its own nuclear 
forces and instead has been opening its own nuclear umbrella over the peninsula and over 
Japan as well. 
 
iii. Position in the international world 
 
 North Korea is one of the reasons for most of the instability that still hangs over 
Northeast Asia. The American Force presence in South Korea since the 1950s has been to 
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deter a possible Communist attack on Seoul, and a potential chain reaction that could lead 
to the loss of East Asia to Communist China, or to the U.S.S.R.. Such a view was 
dominant during the Cold War era, although it has been modified since the breakdown of 
the Soviet Union. The idea of a power vacuum emerged to the extent the United States 
would no longer be needed in East Asia because of reunification of the two Koreas, or 
removal of the Communist regime in Pyongyang. Therefore, much of East Asia’s 
stability is seen as depending on North Korea’s behavior. However, because of the nature 
of the 1953 Armistice, North Korea and South Korea are not technically considered to 
have been at war with each other, and this fact has created a difficult situation for 
promoting direct exchange between the two countries.105 The United States was a party to 
the treaty: it often bypasses South Korea in negotiations with the North. 
A game of brinkmanship has taken place over the past decade, in which North 
Korea has managed to receive economic aid and international favors in exchange for 
promises of demilitarization. Most of the 1990s’ politics towards North Korea were 
fomented by South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung, as well as by Bill Clinton. Kim’s 
Sunshine Policy, often dubbed Engagement Policy was implemented to induce North 
Korea to change slowly and to open to the world, but was also envisioned as contributing 
to an eventual collapse of the Communist state. The Sunshine Policy was supposed to 
privilege the idea of a soft-landing collapse, therefore leading to a reunification under 
Seoul’s terms.106 Moreover, many of the investments and programs geared towards North 
Korea were negotiated with the thought that North Korea would eventually be absorbed 
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by South Korea. Thus, helping the North with renovating and building new 
infrastructures would most likely be beneficial to the South in the long-run. The 1994 
Geneva Agreed Framework was implemented with the hidden assumption that the two 
light-water reactors that the American consortium was to build in the North would bring 
power in the future to a completely unified democratic Korea. 
However, economic aid to North Korea has always suffered from the lack of 
transparency its distribution. Many were skeptical about the real destination of food and 
other supplies, as it was believed that the North Korean elite was not distributing the aid 
to the people who needed it the most.107 Many were thus reticent to provide the North 
with aid.  
Finally, North Korea holds a dreaded space in the international community, as it 
is considered a rogue state. This classification can be attributed to heavy militarism inside 
the country, as well as the manufacturing and the export of dangerous weapons. Such 
actions led President Bush to declare North Korea as part of the axis of evil, a club of the 
most dangerous states which also included Iran and Iraq. This notion is also tightly linked 
with that of terrorism, as North Korea had engaged in terrorist-type acts such as the 
bombing of a the South Korean flight K.A.L. 858 on October 7, 1987 and thus became 
part of the United States’ list of countries that were using state terrorism.108 Most of 
North Korea’s exports are related to military weaponry and North Korea has provided 
other rogue states with weapons, and most of those weapons are feared to be chemical 
and biological ones. Because of its involvement in supporting international terrorism, as 
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well its apparent lack of understanding of American policy in the world, the United States 
has put forward the idea that “substantial irrationality prevails in Pyongyang”.109  
 
2. Reassessment of Contemporary North Korea  
 
 
 The previous analysis has presented the conventional, Cold-War understanding of 
what North Korea is. However, North Korea has evolved over the past two decades, and 
it is necessary to present here an up-to-date view of Pyongyang in order to further 
analyze its negotiation behavior. 
 
i. Everlasting Communist Regime 
 
Because of the secretive nature of the North Korea regime, many journalist, 
academics and politicians predicted there would be regime change in Pyongyang. The 
world waited to see how North Korea would handle the death of its four-decade leader 
Kim Il-Sung, just as many now awaits how Cuba will change once Fidel Castro dies. Kim 
Il-Sung is widely believed to have masterminded Pyongyang’s partition of the two 
Koreas in 1948. He is also the founder of North Korea’s Chu’che ideology of self-
reliance and pride but that is characterized by McCormack, for example, as having led 
“society and state to become a large-scale mass game, in which the circuits of politics, 
language and economy came to be closed, controlled, and so incapable of dealing with 
the unexpected or unprogrammed.”110 Transition in the regime is believed to have started 
many years before the Great Leader’s death. Kim Jong-Il, his son, was made the head of 
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several important North Korean agencies.111 When Kim Il-Sung died in 1994, Kim Jong-
Il assumed his succession immediately. Many thought that such a change meant the end 
of the North Korean Communist and isolationist regime, as it was assumed that the North 
Korean people would resist a monarchical succession. Moreover, some predicted that 
North Korea would collapse shortly due to, as Nicholas Eberstadt noted, the lacking 
number of farmers, thus concluding that North Korea would not be able to sustain itself 
and feed its people, especially in light of the 1997 floods and famine.112 The potential for 
internal shake-up was also real. However, more than twelve years after Kim Il-Sung’s 
death, the country shows no sign of apparent uproar and revolution, and it seems that 
high party officials are, if not as loyal to Kim Jong-Il as they were to his father, are at 
least working alongside the Dear Leader.  
 North Korea also had to survive through economically difficult times.  Pyongyang 
clearly realized that its economy could no longer compete with that of the South. 
Technological progress as well as foreign aid had made South Korea emerge as a 
dynamic and robust country. North Korea, however, was plagued by extreme climatic 
conditions. It suffered droughts and floods that devastated rice paddies in 1995 and 1996. 
An estimated two to three millions people died from starvation that was the consequence 
of those natural disasters.113 Growing numbers of North Korean defectors to China and 
South Korea who recounted their narratives of the living conditions in the North brought 
to light more and more evidence that people had been enduring extreme conditions. 
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Despite those difficulties, the regime has not showed signs of weakening. There has been 
no evidence of internal revolution. 
 Finally, despite South Korea’s engagement policy as well as outreach from the 
United States and to a larger extent, the international community, North Korea has shown 
no sign of clear opening. Cultural events organized between South and North Korea were 
meant to bring a breeze of change in Pyongyang, but they have not sufficed. The 
economic aid and economic projects that were expected to exert foreign influence on 
North Korea did not have any effect on Kim Jong-Il’s foreign or economic policy. 
Therefore, North Korea has not so far achieved what China and some former Soviet 
republics have, that is the opening of their doors to foreign ideas and the slow reform of 
their economies. 
 The most blatant characteristic and characterization of North Korea is as a 
communist state. Upon its creation in 1948, North Korea embraced Marxist values, but 
slowly modified them in order to create its own communist system. Its leaders, Kim Il-
Sung and his son Kim Jong-Il, elevated the cult of personality to levels surpassing that of 
Fidel Castro, Stalin, or Mussolini. It is therefore no wonder that an important part of the 
literature on North Korea has been devoted to analyzing its regime, and especially 
dissecting the flamboyant personalities of the Great Leader and the Dear Leader. Bruce 
Cumings, for example, describes Kim Il-Sung as “a cross between Marlon Brando 
playing a big oil mogul in a film called The Formula, walking with feet splayed to handle 
a potbelly and hands amidriff thus to pat the tummy, combined with the big head on 
narrow shoulders, and the blank, guttural delivery of Henry Kissinger.”114  The main 
difficulty in pursuing scholarship related to Pyongyang’s regime, however, is how to 
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collect accurate data, since the regime is almost impermeable to any foreign news media, 
reports, and even most researchers. There are several scholars that have gained access to 
North Korea. They have had different levels of success in learning about the regime, 
however. Most of the time, their works recount personal experiences in the country. 
Harrold, for example, recounts his memories as a Briton who lived in North Korea for 
more than seven years, and who worked as an English translating advisor for Kim Il-
Sung and Kim Jong-Il’s speeches. 115  Harrold’s recounting of his experience in 
Pyongyang, however, focuses mainly on his own encounters with North Korean people. 
His volume fails to provide many insights into the nature of the regime.  Harrold’s book 
had the misfortune of being overshadowed by a much more compelling analysis of the 
insides of North Korea by Bradley Martin’s book, which was released the same year.116 
Adopting a very rigorous inquiry method involving an impressive amount of official and 
declassified documents, speeches, as well as numerous interviews of experts, political 
figures as well as North Korea defectors, Martin presents in great details North Korean 
society  and its leadership. One of the most important themes generating scholarship 
regarding Pyongyang is the nature of the regime, and especially the first “Communist 
Monarchy” put in place by Kim Il-Sung in order to ensure the succession of his son, Kim 
Jong-Il. Several questions come to mind when looking at this succession, and especially 
regarding why Kim Il-Sung decided, going contrary to Communist principles, and 
especially Stalin’s loathing of hereditary succession, to foment a system that would 
slowly put his son in the spotlight. Martin’s understanding of why Kim Il-Sung decided 
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to pursue hereditary succession points to Nikita Krutchev’s de-Stalinization of the Soviet 
Union in the 1950’s. Martin contends that Kim Il-Sung decided that a hereditary 
succession would be the only way for him to preserve his own historical legacy, and to 
preserve North Korea’s independence as well. According to Martin, partisans of the ideas 
were elevated to higher ranks while those who were against such a succession were 
purged, and by the 1970’s, a strong system had been put in place to elevate Kim Jong-Il 
to replace his father in due time. This theory, however, is disputed by Michael Breen’s 
North Korea’s Dear Leader that focuses almost exclusively on Kim Jong-Il’s reign.117 
According to Breen, there are two different schools of though regarding hereditary 
succession, even though he himself shares the common understanding that such a 
succession was not to ever happen according to the early prescription of what a 
communist regime should be according to Stalin (this idea is bolstered by Gavan 
McCormack’s observation that the North Korean Communist Party has not held a single 
conference in the past decade).118 The first school of thought contends that the idea of 
such a succession came from Kim Il-Sung’s partisans, while the second school of thought 
contends that Kim Jong-Il himself manipulated his father’s partisans and is an example of 
skillfulness and his vision of long-term power play. Breen also investigates Kim Jong-Il’s 
eccentric personality hoping to determine whether Kim is rational. Breen reaches the 
conclusion that the Dear Leader is neither insane nor evil, but that he benefits from being 
at the top of a system that is insane and evil.  
 The discussion regarding the reasons why the North Korean system is so vile is 
naturally linked to questions about the nature of the regime as well as the secrecy and 
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mystery regarding Kim Jong-Il’s personality. Perhaps one can theorize that Kim Il-
Sung’s decision to opt for a hereditary succession in the 1960’s and 1970’s is linked to a 
shift in the economic race that was taking place between Seoul and Pyongyang. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War as well as the China’s move 
towards Western capitalist countries might have pushed North Korea to reevaluate its 
foreign policy and long-term goals. North Korea, thus, appeared to have been caught in a 
downward spiral because of its adherence to central planning, as Paul French proposes, 
contending that North Korea had moved from parity with, and even superiority over 
South Korea to a precarious economic situation that lead to millions dying of famine.119 
Such a theory is developed even further by Hy-Sang Lee, who presents Pyongyang and 
its top leader pursuing regime survival rather than the long-standing goal of socialist 
unification of the peninsula, or what Pyongyang refers to as “liberating” the South from 
“Western dogs”.120  Lee talks about whether North Korea would be capable of realizing 
the “Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea”, and achieving hegemonic unification of 
the peninsula. He concludes that this strategy is not viable given the strong presence of 
the American troops in the region. Not dwelling on issues of whether Kim Jong-Il is 
rational, or whether he is just a madman fond of Hollywood movies, Lee contends that 
Pyongyang is genuinely averse to the idea of launching a military campaign in pursuit of 
unification of the peninsula. He characterizes North Korea as fundamentally different in 
its behavior from the way it behaved in 1951 when it launched its attack on the South. 
Lee focuses on the level of duplicity and rational planning found in the North Korean 
thinking, an example being Seoul asking American troops to leave so that greater national 
                                                 
119  Paul French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula -- a Modern History (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). 
120 Hy-sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress (Wesport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001). 
 72
unity can be achieved. Once American troops are gone, the reasoning goes, unity can 
then be achieved through North Korean hegemonic unification. The idea of this 
hegemonic unification threat sparks most of the debate regarding North Korea’s 
militarism, its aggressiveness towards South Korea and its pursuit of nuclear weapons 
presumably in order to deter the United States from a potential preemptive strike. 
 
 The stereotypical view of North Korea thus tells us that the Pyongyang regime 
has remained as hermetical as it has always been. Kim Jong-Il has managed to 
successfully uphold his power without giving in to foreign pressures, this despite the 
North Korean’s population deep and widespread suffering, as upon his return to North 
Korea where he had lived more than seven years, Michael Harrold, comments that “the 
obsession with the great leader that had once seemed harmless, even beneficial as a 
unifying factor, now looked like the self-serving manipulation of an entire society’s 
thinking aimed at preserving, through the exaltation of its figurehead, a political system 
lacking a sound moral basis”.121 
 
ii. Militarism and the Agreed Framework 
 
 The 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework was negotiated in order to ensure a nuclear-
free Korea. The United States’ involvement with the Agreed Framework was tightly 
linked to the military threat posed by North Korea. Pyongyang could have used its 
nuclear reactors in order to produce peaceful energy. However, such reactors could also 
have been used to produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, the urgency of preventing North 
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Korea from building atomic bombs was an important reason for the United States to 
secure the Agreed Framework. According to the treaty that was signed under the auspices 
of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and a consortium represented by the United States agreed to secure 
peace and security over the Korean peninsula: North Korean nuclear development and its 
facilities shut down in exchange, amongst other things, for two light-water reactors given 
to North Korea and financed by the consortium.122 The completion of the project was 
fixed for 2003 but as of today, little more than the concrete foundation for the light-water 
reactors has been powered and the agreement has been officially cancelled. Despite North 
Korea’s freezing of the above-mentioned facilities, there were delays in the project and 
disagreements. North Korea withdrew from the Non Proliferation Treaty, and said that it 
was using its Yongbyon plant for reprocessing. Following these actions, the K.E.D.O. 
decided to keep on suspending heaving fuel oil (which had been suspended since 2002), 
and the Light Water reactor project was officially suspended in 2004.123 The failure of the 
Agreed Framework is critical to understanding North Korea today.  Pyongyang openly 
declared that it would resume nuclear development in a Soviet-designed Yongbyong 
plutonium reactor, and build new nuclear facilities. This move came as a direct response 
to the United States suspending oil shipments to North Korea after Pyongyang’s 
admittance of its nuclear weapons programs. The whole nuclear issue is therefore far 
from being resolved, and the idea that the Agreed Framework solved many of the nuclear 
issues over the peninsula should therefore be discarded and replaced by a more careful 
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assessment of the situation. In 2003, a multilateral process of negotiations involving the 
United States, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia and Japan was launched with the 
goal to secure the denuclearization of the peninsula. More than two years after its launch, 
the Six-Party Talks saw the conclusion of an agreement on September 19, 2005 stating 
that North Korea would renounce to its nuclear weapons program. The agreement also 
contains a provision reminiscent of the Agreed Framework, regarding two light-water 
reactors that would be given to North Korea “in due time”. This has been one of the main 
bones of contention between the United States and North Korea, and an apparent reason 
why both parties reneged on the accord just a day after it was signed.  
 
iii. Position in the International World 
 
 North Korea and the United States are at a diplomatic crossroad. Despite 
Washington’s reluctance to accept North Korea as a legitimate government, the United 
States has to recognize the fact that Pyongyang should be treated as a permanent 
problem, and thus not wait for North Korea to collapse or for Kim Jong-Il to die or be 
replaced. Numerous attempts were made by North Korea to get official recognition from 
the United States. Even if this recognition does not come in a diplomatic way, the very 
fact that the United States negotiates with North Korea on many issues is already a factor 
leading to a certain form of recognition.  
 North Korea has been challenging the international community by showing that 
brinkmanship can work. Pyongyang has been able to receive favors and aid from many 
organizations as well as countries The Sunshine Policy was aimed at engaging the North 
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slowly, but steadily by providing a wide array of carrots. However, North Korea did not 
open up, and most of the diplomatic efforts between the two Koreas such as reunions of 
families separated by more than fifty years of conflict, or the construction of a railroad 
linking the two Koreas for the first time since the Korean war, did not bring any 
assurances regarding North Korea’s foreign policy. The reality of what the future will 
bring for the two Koreas is exemplified by the Dorasan station that stands between newly 
connected train lines going to Pyongyang and to Seoul, but without any activity. 
 The idea that the peninsula would unify under the South’s government in the near 
future is not as probable as many might have thought. South Korea’s 1997 economic 
crisis weakened the country. While Seoul managed to re-establish its international 
economic status with deep restructuring, many South Koreans lost their jobs. But the 
South Korean population now enjoys a quality of life far superior to that of the North. 
But Seoul’s economy might be too weak to accommodate more than twenty million 
North Koreans in the event of a reunification led by the South. Moreover, the United 
States’ military troops would be needed for logistic planning and support during the 
reunification phase. Finally, it is worth noting that North Korea’s discourse regarding 
unification, if it can be believed, seems to have changed from a strong desire to bring the 
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c. Nature of North Korean threat to the United States 
 
 Is North Korea a real threat to the United States or more of a “looming threat” as 
Becker contends?125 Is the fact that Pyongyang is insisting on developing its own nuclear 
weapons a factor in Washington’s war on terrorism? Or is North Korea an embarrassing 
problem for the Bush Administration, as the United States is having a difficult time 
negotiating a secure deal with Pyongyang, and is also militarily overextended in several 
regions because of the recent Iraq military intervention? There are three broad lines of 
thought to consider when analyzing the current level of threat that North Korea projects 
the possibility of military confrontation, instability in the East Asian region, and a 
political threat to Washington.  
 
i. Possibility of conflict 
 
 The most obvious form of threat from North Korea is the possibility of an armed 
conflict over the Korean peninsula. Also possible is the ignition of a conflict that would 
sweep across Northeast Asia. Because the Pyongyang regime’s hold over the country has 
not weakened despite the change in leadership, its problems associated with the failed 
Agreed Framework, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang is not a harmless 
state. However, it should be noted that a Manichean approach to international relations 
often does not provide accurate and unbiased views. If North Korea is really developing 
nuclear weapons, or is in possession of atomic bombs, the purpose may not be to use 
these weapons to destroy South Korea or Japan. The North Korean regime, although it 
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sometimes shows erratic behavior when taking decisions, exhibits an inner rationality. 
Pyongyang’s main objective is state survival. This explains its desire to have deterrent 
nuclear weapons, or weapons powerful enough to defend itself in case of aggression.126 
Kim Jong-Il probably knows that any North Korean attack on South Korea would trigger 
an American response, which would most likely be lethal for North Korea, and its 
regime. The strong American presence in the Demilitarized Zone may also be interpreted 
by Pyongyang as a threat from Washington. 
 There is also the possibility, however unlikely, that a conflict could be triggered 
by the United States.  George W. Bush trapped in his own preemptive doctrine, and the 
War on Terrorism motto, and striving to be coherent could strike first if North Korea 
somehow convinced Washington it was a real and immediate danger to the United States’ 
national security. Washington’s willingness to prevent terrorism from spreading and to 
monitor regimes responsible for building and trading weapons of mass destruction is 
pushing the American government to act on many fronts. It is then legitimate to wonder 
whether North Korea might be the next target after Iraq. Should the United States 
intervene in North Korea, Northeast Asia’s stability would be greatly affected, partly 
because of Seoul’s un-readiness to accommodate North Korean refugees, but also 
because of the new role the United States would have to play in winning the peace over 
the peninsula.  
Because of the nature of the North Korean regime as well as the historical events 
that led to the separation of the country, Pyongyang has been seen as an aggressive nation 
that tests missiles over Japan, bombs commercial aircrafts, purchases military arsenal 
from Middle Eastern countries and often refuses to participate in international forums 
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with other nations. Is North Korea an aggressive state because of the nature of its 
leadership, or does acquiring nuclear weapons as a nuclear deterrent make sense for Kim 
Jong-Il? Experts sharply differ in their views of Pyongyang’s militarism and 
aggressiveness.  
 Victor Cha, in Lee’s vein, supports the idea that North Korea’s goal has changed 
from achieving hegemonic unification to avoiding collapse and domination by the 
South.127 Cha argues, however, that the change of strategy regarding long-term goals is 
exactly what might lead Pyongyang to try a preemptive-type of action toward the South:  
“each provocation is too minor to prompt all-out war, but serious enough to raise the 
incentive for Seoul and Washington to give ground and negotiate a peaceful resolution to 
the crisis”, Cha writes.128 The assessment that North Korea cannot be completely trusted 
to be deterred is especially important in light of North Korean military development, and 
many also argue about the real orientation that Pyongyang has been taking since Kim 
Jong-Il came to power, and following the devastating floods and droughts of the mid-
1990’s. Paul French argues that since 2003 there seems to have been a change in 
Pyongyang’s priority regarding potential economic reforms and diplomatic engagement; 
North Korea has started to reassert its military first-line policy.129 Other experts contend 
that North Korea’s behavior stems from its economic needs; North Korea, nearing the 
state of economic collapse, has become more aggressive. They suggest that creating 
economic incentives for North Korea to accept a denuclearization bargain with 
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Washington could be a potential solution to the uncertain situation.130 For example, Paul 
French claims that North Korea’s food shortage situation could be resolved by simply 
reducing its defense budget by five percent.131  
 Others hold a more liberal view than the more realist perspective of Victor Cha. 
David Kang, for example, asserts that the concept of deterrence is understood and 
respected by North Korea.132 Kang argues that North Korea also understands that nuclear 
weapons are political weapons and should not be used as offensive arms, and that Kim 
Jong-Il is essentially a rational thinker. One could, however, make a logical argument 
based on historical events on the peninsula that North Korea militarized and isolated 
itself in order to survive, and does not have many options in light of the united States’ 
military presence in the region, and its role bolstering South Korea’s security while being 
one of its most important trading partners. The United States and the international 
community are divided in their thinking about how to best deal with North Korea. Cha 
presents an approach that he dubs as “hawk and dove” engagement.133  Stating in a 
convincing manner that North Korea does not belong to the Axis of Evil, Cha moves on 
to state that Kim Jong-Il operates under a rational and calculating framework, he rejects  
criticisms about Kim’s supposedly crazy and impossible-to-deter nature.  For him, 
Pyongyang has the capability to launch an attack on the South, and to smuggle weapons 
in Japan but has not done so, thus proving that North Korea has been deterred. However, 
he is also cautious in assessing Pyongyang’s regime as he notes that North Korea has 
often defected from international agreements. Framing the current debates in American 
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foreign policy in terms of Hawks and Dove, Cha supports the claim that the Clinton 
administration managed to delay North Korean atomic development, even though it did 
not manage to stop it. Cha’s accounts provide rich guidelines to explain contentious 
points plaguing the situation. He presents a balanced vision of the ongoing conflict, but 
does not provide any theories for testing nor any alternate hypotheses to explain North 
Korea’s actions. 
 
ii. Stability in East Asia 
 Perhaps one of the most direct threats to the United States is the relative position 
of its military within East Asia. The important number of U.S. soldiers dispatched over 
South Korea, and largely in Asia as well as their security is of prime importance to the 
United States. Removing troops is not an option, as the possibility of an attack from 
North Korea to South Korea, and possibly Japan is still a reality, though not a strong 
possibility as such attack would most likely be swept away by an American retaliatory 
strike over North Korea. However, damages the United States army could suffer if there 
was a military confrontation would probably be smaller in comparison to the whirlpool, 
which would sweep Asia, and by repercussion the rest of the world. Because of the strong 
economic ties the United States has with Japan, as well as the economic importance of 
Asia, the world’s stability depends in large part on a peaceful situation in East Asia. It is 
therefore possible that the United States’ interest is to prolong its presence within East 
Asia, by maintaining a status-quo.134 Of course, such a situation does not resolve the 
threat posed by North Korea’s military capabilities, but at the same time, limiting the 
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risks of a confrontation and still continuing a distant engagement policy towards North 
Korea is the only known option that has worked before, and that did not lead to a major 
crisis. 
 Finally, a direct attack from North Korea to any facilities in the South, in Japan, 
or in the sea bordering the Korean peninsula could trigger a military response from the 
United States, but as seen before, a deliberate attack from Pyongyang seems less than 
probable, providing that the North Korean regime understand the logic of nuclear 
deterrence as well as legitimate retaliation, similar to that of the United Nations upon 
Pyongyang’s invasion of the South in 1951. However, the United States’ military forces 
could be put at risk in the event of a mishandling of nuclear weapons, or weapons of mass 
destruction in North Korea. The risk associated with building arms stocks is that some 
weapons might end up in the wrong hands, or the mere fabrication process could lead to 
serious consequences if an accident happened. Because of North Korea’s poor economy, 
it seems hardly conceivable that its weapon-building facilities would include state-of-the-
art machineries and security devices. The risk of a nuclear accident in Northeast Asia 
exists, and is also somewhat of a concern, if not a threat to American troops in the region, 
and to the world’s stability as well.  
 
iii. Political threat 
 
 North Korea has managed to create a brinkmanship system with many countries 
around the world, but especially with the United States. One of George W. Bush’s 
campaign messages was his willingness to restore America’s pride abroad. However, two 
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years into his second presidency, the Middle East, Europe, as well as Asia hold many 
anti-American views. This also applies to South Korea, where frequent protests are being 
organized in order to denounce Bush’s erratic foreign policy towards North Korea. Cha’s 
analysis of what he refers to as the Hawk policy is quite compelling, and demonstrates 
the rational behind what seemed to be a series of unbalanced political maneuvers.135 
George Bush’s Axis of Evil discourse showed a departure from the Clinton 
Administration’s engagement policy, despite Bush’s claims that he would follows most 
of Clinton’s line towards Pyongyang. The new policy also seems strangely opposed to the 
recommendations given in the 1999 Perry report, which was commended by the U.S. 
administration, and resulted in a yearlong investigation of North Korea and its 
relationship with the United States. The Perry report warned about the terrible 
consequences a military conflict over the peninsula would create, despite America’s most 
likely victory. It stressed the importance of dialogue with Pyongyang as well as the 
importance of completing the Agreed Framework. It also delineated cooperation with 
South Korea and Japan as being of uttermost importance in dealing with the North 
Korean situation.136  
 George W. Bush now faces a tough challenge when trying to apply a consistent 
approach to North Korea. According to Cha’s analysis, Washington’s attempt to 
transform carrots into sticks is a compelling approach and could not have been attempted 
before the Clinton administration, as no relationship had previously been initiated 
between the United States and North Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship is a 
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political threat or a security to the Bush administration and thus the administration 
seemed to have tried to counter this threat, no matter its real nature. 
 
 Moreover, North Korea as a weapons provider poses an integral threat to the 
United States as well. The interception of weapons shipments from Pyongyang to Yemen 
suggests that North Korea’s economy is extremely reliant on its military exports. Selling 
weapons of mass destruction to other rogue states could make North Korea an 
accomplice of terrorism, therefore giving reasons for the United States to eliminate such 
practices. 
 

























Chapter Four. Bilateral cases 
 
 
 There are four cases of bilateral negotiations that have occurred since 1994 
between the United States and North Korea: the stand-alone 1994 Pilot case, the multi-
round Missile Talks case, the Nodong launch case, and the Kumchang-ri case. The goal 
of this chapter is to piece together evidences in order to present a detailed chronology of 
events. Preliminary hypotheses will then be tested on each of these cases. 
a. “1994 Pilot Negotiations”. 
 
The 1994 Pilot Negotiations exemplify a case of sudden negotiation episode that 
develops from an unforeseen event, a technical mistake, or a communication blunder. 
 
1. The Premises 
In December 1994, an American helicopter flew over the Demilitarized Zone 
between North and South Korea. It was shot down by the North Korean army. U.S. 
officials were set on recovering the two pilots, and described the incident as an apparent 
navigation error. North Korea, however, maintained that an internal investigation would 
have to take place first before any talks could be held regarding the pilots’ release. The 
United States had to step up its rhetoric as well as its official representation in the 
situation, and decided to send a high-ranking U.S. official in order to negotiate the release 
with the North. After more than three weeks of negotiations, the pilot and the remains of 
the deceased one were finally released after North Korea produced a confession from one 
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of the pilot, and after the United States provided the closest statement they could come up 
with short of an apology for intruding in North Korea’s aerial space. 
 
2. Case Timeline 
 
December 18, 1994: The North Korea radio officially declares that an enemy plane has 
illegally entered its airspace and thus was shot down.137 Both the United States and South 
Korea, although unable to provide details about the incident, are quick to say that the 
incident is in no way going to start a military crisis. Defense Secretary William J. Perry is 
still unaware of the conditions of the two pilots138, while other officials, including from 
South Korea believe that the pilots are in the custody of the North Korean government.139 
The U.S. asks right away for the safe return of the pilots and makes it clear that its does 
not want this unfortunate incident to create a rift between Washington and Pyongyang. 
Conflicting reports as to what really happened to the plane (i.e: being shot, mechanical 
problems, or even accidental landing in North Korea due to the snow) are also advanced 
by South Korea. The U.S. government contacts the North Koreans through the Military 
Armistice Commission, which is a United Nations liaison that was created in order to 
monitor the 1953 Treaty.140 North Korea officially states that the two pilots are being 
held for questioning. Other organs such as the Pentagon also respond to the incident by 
placing U.S. troops in South Korea under alert in order to prevent any irrational actions 
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from North Korea, but the troop status reverts to its previous level when no aggressive 
signs are noted.141 Senator Richardson, who is on a previous, unrelated visit to North 
Korea, is entrusted with the mission. He is designated as the primary point of contact 
between the United States and North Korea on this matter. The United States maintains a 
very tough stance. It reveals through State Department Officials that a North Korean 
failure to provide prompt information about the pilot would be detrimental to 
Pyongyang.142   
 
December 19, 1994: News come that one of the pilots, David Hilemon, died during the 
shooting. North Korea reassures the United States that the second pilot is alive. At the 
same time, North Korea airs a radio broadcast that calls the U.S. helicopter action a 
hostile air exercise, while the United States clearly dismisses this stance.143 The North 
Korea government is told that the United States wants prompt access to the second pilot 
as well as to Hilemon’s remains. An official meeting takes place at the D.M.Z., in the 
truce village of Panmunjon, for about thirty minutes, but no substantial decisions or 
agreements come out of those negotiations that are described by the United States as 
being a fairly low-level meeting amongst messengers. North Korea communicates that it 
wants to complete its investigation of the incident before releasing the second pilot. 
President Bill Clinton then calls for an immediate release of the pilot and the body of his 
comrade.144 Moreover, the United States refuses to confirm whether the plane had gone 
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down because of enemy fire or because of other reasons.145 North Korea broadcasts 
through the radio that both pilots are under interrogation. But news that one of the pilots 
is dead had surfaced earlier, leading North Korea to acknowledge that its previous 
broadcast was untrue.146 As Richardson delays his departure from Pyongyang in order to 
pursue the negotiations, the United States has troubles assessing the situation as it seems 
the contradictory information coming from North Korea stems from a possible non-
sharing of information between the North Korean military and foreign ministry. Several 
Senators in the United States start to raise concerns and threaten that North Korea had 
better cooperate if it does not want the Agreed Framework to collapse.147 Discussions 
also resume at the United Nations where United States officials are allegedly talking with 
North Korea at the mission in New York, as well as talking to China.148  
 Several foreign-policy advisors in the United States analyze the situations and 
publicly declare that as long as North Korea returns the pilots, there should not be any 
harm done to the nuclear deal, hence giving the benefits of the doubt to North Korea.149 
North Korea, however, keeps on saying that the mission was carried out with the 
intention to spy on North Korea. This statement is vehemently rejected by the United 
States, with William Perry qualifying the mission as only a “terrain-familiarization 
mission” and not a spying mission at all.150 
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December 20, 1994: Threatening again that not releasing the pilot in a prompt fashion 
will lead to serious consequences, the Unites Stated sends a message to the North Korean 
Vice Foreign Minister Song Ho-Gyong questioning the delay in releasing the remaining 
pilot. This message is transmitted to Songby Ambassador-at-large Robert Galluci. At the 
same time, North Korea calls off a scheduled meeting at Panmunjon, citing the fact that 
the investigation is not over yet, and that North Korea is not ready yet to discuss the 
return of Bobby Hall, the surviving pilot.151  The United States, insisting that the aircraft 
has strayed from its course inadvertently, restricts its military flights over South Korea. 
North Korea maintains that the helicopter was shot after it ignored warning fires while 
crossing the border and refused to land.152  
Secretary Warren Christopher spends a lot of time on the issues, and several 
countries including China, are asked to negotiate with North Korea on the behalf of the 
United States. Finally, a North Korean diplomat says that the pilot will be released only if 
it is proven that the incident stemmed from a navigation error. 153  United States’ 
administration officials cast serious doubts on the future of the Agreed Framework, 
suggesting it will not survive if the pilots are not returned.154  
 
December 21, 1994: The Pentagon acknowledges that the plane had unintentionally 
strayed into North Korea but refuses to issue an apology, hence not giving in to the 
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request for an apology from North Korea.155 Secretary of State Warren Christopher warns 
that the $4 billion Agreed Framework could be in jeopardy if the crisis continues this 
way, as U.S. inquiries through three channels of diplomacy with North Korea have 
apparently failed to gain the release of the pilot.156 Christopher’s comments come after a 
thirty-minute fruitless meeting at Panmunjon. 157  However, the United States says it 
displayed candor and openness in the meeting since it did not try to hide that the 
helicopter went down because of the U.S. piloting error. The U.S., in other words, was 
admitting its mistake.158 China, prompted by the United States to try get involved in the 
dialogue pressures North Korea by saying that further delaying the release of the pilots 
could be dangerous.159 Finally, North Korea, citing humanitarian principles, agrees to 
release the body but not Hall.160 
 
December 22, 1994: The body of U.S. Army pilot David Hilemon is returned to 
American forces not far from Panmunjon. North Korea stresses again that it will release 
Hall, the surviving pilot, upon completion of its investigation. Washington, through 
Christopher, is pleased with the return of the remains and defends itself against 
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December 23rd, 1994 
 North Korea reiterates that Bobby Hall will be released ‘soon’, possibly on 
Christmas day.162 
 
December 24, 1994: Senator Richardson confirms that Hall will be released on Christmas 
Day.  However, other reports deny that such a compromise has been reached.163 
 
December 25, 1994: The White House sends a letter of apology to North Korea, even 
using the word ‘regret’ regarding the navigation error over Korea. The two parties are 
supposed to meet at Panmunjon, but North Korea does not consent to a meeting. The 
possibility of a subsequent meeting, however, is left open.164 
 
December 26, 1994: Mid-level officials from the United States and North Korea meet in 
Panmunjon in the morning.165  
 
December 27, 1994: The United States decides to send a high-ranking diplomat to North 
Korea in an effort to gain the release of Bobby Hall. Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas 
Hubbard is sent to Seoul after North Korea reiterates its accusation of spying, and after it 
asks the United States, through its United Nations offices, to send a representative to 
Pyongyang. Contradictory statements then follow, with North Korea calling for 
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acknowledgment from the United States that the mission was indeed of a spying nature, 
then saying Hall will likely be released following Hubbard’s visit. Hubbard is apparently 
not sent to apologize, but rather to negotiate the terms of Hall’s release.166  
 
December 28, 1994: North Korea releases a photo that is supposedly that of Hall.167 At 
the same time, some members of the U.S. Congress are already planning on taking 
retaliatory actions towards North Korea and delaying oil shipments to Pyongyang.168  
 
December 29, 1994: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hubbard meets for more than 
two hours with North Korean foreign ministry officials, but no progresses are reported.169 
North Korea produces a ‘confession’ signed by Bobby Hall.170  
 
December 30, 1994: North Korea agrees to return Bobby Hall after the United States 
agrees to sign a statement saying it is expressing sincere regrets for its intrusion into 
North Korean skies. Hall is finally released.171  
 
Subsequent investigations clear Bobby Hall from any fault from the U.S government. 
North Korea receives more than 50,000 tons of oil about a week after Hall’s release.172  
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3. Discussion 
The 1994 Pilot Negotiations is a very interesting case as it is the first international 
negotiation situation that North Korea faced after the death of Kim Il-Sung. Hence, it 
could be considered as a test for Kim Jong-Il in relations to his ability to assert his power 
over his own country and to some extent to show the world that he now is the leader of 
North Korea. What is obvious from those negotiations is that all of our hypotheses are 
represented and help us understand the initial position of North Korea in a foreign crisis. 
First, it is clear that the succession of negotiators for the United States shows an 
organized scheme in Washington’s approach to negotiating with North Korea. Senator 
Richardson happened to be traveling in North Korea for reasons totally unrelated to the 
situation, and suddenly got sucked into the negotiation mechanism and he perhaps did not 
have the skills nor the training, and even perhaps not the will to be involved in such high-
level negotiations. The United States’ decision to use Robert Galluci’s Ambassador-at-
large capacities in order to send a letter to North Korea very early on (Day 3 of the 
negotiation episode) showed that the United States did not take the negotiations lightly, 
and was willing to invest time and effort in order to win the release of the pilot. Finally, 
the intervention of Hubbard, at the request of North Korea which wanted an envoy to 
discuss the situation shows careful planning by the United States. The U.S. did not send 
the Secretary of State directly, but somebody who was knowledgeable about East Asia, 
and who later would be promoted to the rank of Ambassador to South Korea. The 
American gradation of power must have pleased North Korea, as the negotiations quickly 
came to fruition once Thomas Hubbard was sent.  It appears that North Korea did not 
want to deal with Richardson only, as he was not chosen to deal with North Korea 
 93
primarily for this reason but rather because he was in North Korea for other purposes. 
Based on the archival research, Hypothesis 1A is therefore supported for this first case. It 
appears that the higher the diplomatic level chosen, the more avenues there are for North 
Korea to be amenable to discussion and to concessions.  
The way different negotiators were selected on the American side show a rather 
deep understanding of the situation, as well as a well-connected system between the 
different constituencies of the government. Official White House speakers, as well as 
different actors close to the President all kept similar positions regarding the negotiations, 
and the only difference in viewpoint and analysis came from actors more distant to the 
negotiations especially Senators from both parties. While the United States’ decision-
making and communication systems were well-tuned, this was not the case for the North 
Korean side. Blatant miscommunication issues occurred very early on between the 
official agency responsible for propagating the regime’s policy and other actors, such as 
the North Korean diplomatic representatives at the United Nations.  The most salient rift 
was between the clashing personalities of Kim Jong-Il and the head of the military, O Jin 
U. Press releases gave different and often contrary reports on the condition of the pilots, 
even advancing that both pilots were being interrogated when at the same time, another 
organ had already officially specified that one pilot had died during the crash. This 
situation might have arisen from the fact that Kim Jong-Il was inexperienced, having only 
been appointed to the North Korean “throne”. It also leaves open the possibility that 
North Korea is not a realist, unitary actor after all. One stereotype about North Korea is 
usually that Kim Jong-Il has full control over the whole country and its constituencies. 
The 1994 Pilot Negotiations demonstrate that this might not have been true at least back 
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then. Thus, it appears that there were some power struggles within the North Korean 
decision-making body which leads to validate hypothesis 2A for this case. 
While North Korea might not have been a unitary actor during the negotiations, it 
surely was a versed, sophisticated player. It used different techniques including lying 
regarding the condition of the two soldiers, prohibiting for the United States from seeing 
the soldiers until the investigation was over, as well as attacking the United States over 
spying claims in order to make the United States more uncomfortable and force it to send 
a special envoy. North Korea was bright enough to exploit the Western culture of 
Christmas: the United States was extremely focused on trying to bring Bobby Hall “home 
for Christmas”. Assuming North Korea had access to foreign news and considering Kim 
Il-Sung’s Christian faith, it must have been aware of this fact, yet it did not choose (or 
was not able, if it had to wait for the investigation to end) to liberate the pilot in time for 
Christmas. This showed the world that Pyongyang would not function under a specific 
calendar dictated by the United States. It seems the United States was not able to gain 
much in those negotiations except the release of the pilot and the remains of the second 
pilot. Rather, Washington ended up sending its apologies regarding the incident, which 
could show that the United States wanted to prevent the situation from escalating to a 
military stand-off. Hypothesis 2C is supported for this case, as North Korea did not show 
signs of being forced to stay in the negotiations, but rather took the lead, scheduling 
appointments at Panmunjon, and taking the liberty of canceling them at its own 
convenience, without severe repercussions. 
North Korea achieved substantially more than the United States in the 
negotiations, confirming the hypothesis that North Korea usually gets more than other 
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players when negotiating. After all, the United States did apologize for the incident, 
Bobby Hall did sign a confession that he was spying, and oil shipments to North Korea 
kept on being sent. North Korea also gained credibility, as from its “humanitarian” 
gesture to release the remains of David Hilemon as well as from its general attitude 
towards the negotiation. Despite the United States’ impatience with the situation, the 
whole episode took only nine days to be solved which, compared to years of negotiations 
for the multi-party talks, is relatively short. North Korea and the United States were also 
faced with a very specific type of stand-alone negotiation. Because this episode was the 
first one to occur under Kim Jong-Il, we do not have comparisons with other cases or an 
ability to assess whether a sudden crisis has a higher likelihood of being resolved than 
ongoing rounds of negotiations about matters such as weapons of mass destruction for 
example. 
It is also possible to see the influence of a larger crisis on the outcome of a 
smaller crisis. In the 1994 Pilot Negotiation case, one can strongly feel the influence of 
the 1994 Agreed Framework on all of the decisions made during and after the 
negotiations. The importance of the Agreed Framework, however, did not frame the Pilot 
Negotiation, per say. Several American senators made the link between the negotiations 
and the Agreed Framework. They argued that if the negotiations did not work out 
properly, the Agreed Framework would be nullified. However, this did not occur. Thus, 
although we cannot say for certain that a larger crisis will act as a pacifier for lesser 
crises, the possibility remains open. 
This negotiation involved primarily low-politics matters such as the liberation of 
the two pilots. For the United States, the stakes were small in the big scheme of 
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international relations. Recovering Hilemon’s body and also saving the second pilot were 
important primarily for the families. For North Korea things were a little different since it 
did not have anything much that it wanted to talk about at first. But then, North Korea 
realized that it could probably get an apology, if not a confession, and perhaps more 
rewards for releasing the pilot as well. There is also the possibility that North Korea 
could have genuinely believed that that United States was spying on them. 
Finally, it seems that both states were interested in international security as they 
did not want a military conflict to ensue. However there was no clear mention of that 
interest during the negotiations so we will reserve our judgment on that matter. Hence, 
we can reject by default the proposal that national security is more important at this point 
than collective security. 
 
 b. “Bilateral Talks: Missile Proliferation”. 
 
 
1. The Premises 
 During the second part of the 1990s, North Korea suffered from tragic climactic 
conditions in 1995 that led to a food shortage. North Korea had also pursued a policy of 
planting corns in every possible arable land, and had proceeded to deforestation in many 
areas in order to increase the land available. As a result, floods led to mud slides as well. 
North Korea started to receive economic aid from the international community. However, 
North Korea seemed to have been involved in missile production as well as export with 
several Middle Eastern countries. 
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 The United States started to be worried about North Korea testing its missiles as 
well as Pyongyang sending its technology to areas of the world that were not the most 
stable, such as in the Middle East for example. North Korea, however, contended that 
conducting technology deals with other nations was purely and simply North Korea’s 
right as a nation. North Korea’s desire to remain a sovereign nation is thus shown through 
its long-lived effort to develop ballistic missiles. In order to prevent North Korea from 
testing its missiles over the Sea of Japan, the United States tried to organize different 
negotiation rounds in order for Pyongyang to come to the discussion table, and hoped to 
find the right incentives (either monetary reward, or sanctions) in order to curb North 
Korea's missile production. Thus followed a painful, four-year long struggle to bring 
North Korea back into the Missile Technology Control Regime, while trying to 
accommodate its demands for compensation from lost missile-related revenues. 
 
2. Case Timeline 
 
ROUND 1 
April 8, 1996:  The United States and North Korea are reportedly scheduling talks in 
Berlin for late April to discuss North Korea’s missile technology. South Korea asks that 
Washington limits the scope of the talks to the missile issue.173 
 
April 14, 1996: North Korea reportedly asks the United States not to publicize the content 
of the talks, citing differences between its Foreign Ministry and its Military.174  
                                                 




April 15, 1996: The United States, South Korea and China propose to North Korea to 
hold joint negotiations to discuss a formal treaty officially end the 1950-1953 war. North 
Korea does not indicate it is against such a plan, but does not embrace it either.175  
 
April 19, 1996: The talks are set to begin but Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert 
Einhorn has to take part in discussion in the Netherlands with China about unrelated 
matters. Information about the negotiation schedule reveals that North Korea does not 
want to limit the agenda to the issue of weapons only.176  
 
April 20, 1996: Parties arrive in Berlin where the talks will take place both at the 
American embassy and at the North Korea diplomatic representation. The United States 
wants to press Pyongyang to stop exporting missiles to the Middle East. South Korea’s 
Defense Ministry also reveals that two North Korean patrol boats briefly crossed the 
maritime demarcation a day before and were escorted back by South Korean navy 
vessels.177  North Korea and the United States hold discussions for about four hours, but 
cancel a scheduled afternoon session.178  The talks continue for two days, and both the 
United States and North Korea say that the first round was a good beginning.179 North 
Korea’s report is one of the first on a sensitive issue.180  
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ROUND 2 
May 6, 1997: North Korea cancels the new round of bilateral missile talks that was 
supposed to start. State department spokesman John Dinger says the talks have been 
postponed for a few weeks. North Korea asked for the postponing for technical reasons 
but this adds to the recent breakdown of talks with the Red Cross and those regarding 
four-way negotiations.181  
 
May 23, 1997: North Korea accepts a proposal to get back to the negotiation table in the 
middle of June in New York.182  
 
June 11, 1997: Missile talks resume, and Washington announces, aside from the talks, 
that it has offered to sell shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to South Korea, although 
South Korea says the deal is not yet done183. Progress is reported by North Korean 
Deputy Ambassador to the U.N. Ri Gun, but he denies that North Korea seeks food aid in 
return for taking part in the missile talks.184  
 
June 13, 1997: The United States urges North Korea to restrict its missile production as 
the talks end with no agreement. The United States declares after the talks that no 
agreement was really expected to be reached, that the tone was businesslike, and that 
further talks would take place during the summer in New York.185 According to the 
United States, neither the topic of food nor the question of aid or a four-way talk were 
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discussed.186 North Korea, however, states that it asked that the United States eases 
economic sanctions in return for a suspension of missile development and export. The 
United States expects the discussion not to be limited to ballistic missiles only, but to also 
include biological and chemical weapons.187  Washington asks for North Korea to join 
the Missile Technological Control Regime.188 
 
ROUND 3 
August 28, 1997: The United States agrees to give assistance to two North Korean 
diplomats who defected from Pyongyang, hence compromising the relationship with 
North Korea. North Korea refuses to participate in the new round of talks. North Korea 
asks for the repatriation of the defectors in exchange for coming back to the missile 
negotiation table.189 The United States refuses.190 
 
October 1, 1998: North Korea and the United States resume missile talks more than a 
year after the last round. Meanwhile, Bill Clinton authorizes the use of $15 millions for 
the purchase of heavy fuel for delivery to North Korea under the 1994 Agreed 
Framework. The United States also qualifies of “unfortunate” the decision by Doctors 
Without Borders to leave North Korea (Pyongyang decided that it no longer wanted to 
give access to the N.G.O.), but reiterates its commitment to going ahead with 300,000 
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tons of food aid to be given to Pyongyang.191 During the talks, the United States steps up 
its rhetoric and warns of “very negative consequences” if Pyongyang tests or exports 
missiles. 192  North Korea defends its right to launch satellite as a right recognized 
internationally, and tells the United States that it will continue to launch “satellites”, for 
the purpose of peaceful space exploration, thus using a different word than “missile”.193 It 
later comes to light that North Korea requested that the United States grant 1 billion 
dollars each year in return for regulation of missile export.194  
 
ROUND 4 
March 27, 1999: The United States Department of State spokesman James Rubin says the 
United States will keep on applying strict constraints to North Korea during missile talks. 
At the same time, South Korea asks the United States to extend South Korea’s missile 
range from the current 180 kilometers to 300 kilometers during a meeting aimed at 
preparing bilateral missile talks.195  
 
March 29, 1999: The United States denies reports that it will drop North Korea from its 
list of terrorism sponsors if Pyongyang promises to stop exporting missiles.196 During the 
11-hour talks, North Korea demands $1 billion per year over three years in compensation 
for stopping its missile program. The United States refuses the offer197, but responds by 
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saying it would ease, in stages, its economic sanctions.198 At the same time, reports 
emerge claiming that North Korea has deployed ballistic missiles capable of hitting most 
areas in Japan.199. Washington considers suspending heavy-oil shipment as well as food if 
North Korea does not suspend its missile-test firing.200  
 
ROUND 5 
August 3, 1999: Talks are supposedly scheduled between North Korea and the United 
States on the sideline of the four-way talks, but North Korea reiterates its stance that 
launching missiles is a matter of sovereignty, and that it do not need the United States’ 
permission to launch them.201  
 
 
September 12, 1999: After six days of talks, the United States and North Korea issue a 
joint statement saying they now understand each other’s positions better.202  
 
February 8, 2000: North Korea accuses the United States and South Korea of preparing a 
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ROUND 6 
May 24, 2000: Talks resume in Rome, and both parties say that discussion could last for a 
very long time.204 Talks end six days later with the agreement to resume talks regarding 
the missile development programs. North Korea says the United States acknowledged the 
need for compensation.205  
 
ROUND 7 
June 8, 2000: North Korea and the United States hold secret talks in Kuala Lumpur to 
solve the problems of recovering remains of missing American soldiers.206  
 
June 16, 2000: Praising North Korea and South Korea for their recent head of state, the 
State Department announces that the United States would provide an additional 50,000 
tons of wheat to Pyongyang, while denying that the food is linked to the summit.207  
 
June 20, 2000: The Clinton administration declares that “rogue states” no longer exist but 
that there are, instead, “states of concern”.208 The United States also eases economic 
sanctions against North Korea by authorizing imports and exports of most consumer 
goods as well as trade and investment operations, but does not unfreeze North Korea’s 
assets blocked in the U.S.209  
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June 22, 2000: North Korea extends its ban on missile flight-testing, following the 
announcement of a relaxation of economic sanctions by the United States towards 
Pyongyang.210  
 
June 28, 2000: Talks between the United States and North Korea reopen early in July to 
discuss North Korea’s missile testing and development program. The U.S. team is led by 
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn, and the North Korean one by director 
general for U.S. Affairs at the Foreign Ministry Jang Chang Chon.211 The talks take place 
in Kuala Lumpur, at North Korea’s request.212  
 
July 10, 2000:  Robert Einhorn notes a dramatically improved atmosphere at the missile 
talks. The discussion centers on North Korea’s exports of missiles.213 
 
July 11, 2000:  The talks concentrate on Pyongyang’s demand for compensation for lost 
earnings for stopping its export of ballistic missiles.214 The United States does not reject 
this demand at this point, instead appearing to show understanding for the situation.215  
 
July 12, 2000:  The United States rejects North Korea’s demand for $1 billion per year in 
cash for the next three years to compensate it for stopping exporting its missile.216  
 
                                                 
210 St. Petersburg Times, “N. Korea extends ban on missile tests,” June 22, 2000.  
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July 13, 2000:  North Korea refuses to stop developing and exporting missiles.217 
 
July 20, 2000: Russia’s president Vladimir Putin says North Korea would abandon its 
missile program if other nations would provide Pyongyang with rockets to launch 
satellites into space.218 The United States says that such a statement is unclear and would 
thus require much clarification.219   
 
ROUND 8 
October 24, 2000: After a North Korean general visits the White House and delivers a 
letter from Kim Jong-Il to President Clinton, Madeleine Albright visits North Korea.220 
Attending a ceremony with young performers, Kim Jong-Il promises Madeleine Albright 
that there will not be any more missile launches.221  
 
November 1, 2000: A new round of talks opens up in Kuala Lumpur. North Korea offers 
to give up its plan to develop missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers if the U.S. 
launches North Korean satellites in China or in Russia.222  
 
November 4, 2000: The talks end with no agreement, casting doubts on whether Bill 
Clinton will visit North Korea after all. 223  North Korea also fails to normalize its 
relationship with Japan.224 
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3. Discussion 
The Bilateral Talks regarding missile proliferation are the first case of multi-
round negotiations regarding a single issue. The talks spanned five years, and occurred 
with Bill Clinton heading Washington D.C, and South Korea being led by Kim Dae-Jung. 
Those administrations were willing to try to engage North Korea into a dialogue instead 
of imposing sanctions. The chronology of events illustrates the difficulty of bringing 
North Korea to the negotiation table. This is a pattern that is present at almost every 
round, with North Korea either being reticent to come to the negotiation table, refusing to 
come, or postponing the talks for one reason or another. In the earlier rounds of talks, 
North Korea does not asks for favors to come to the negotiation table, but later, beginning 
in 1997, it modifies its strategy and starts linking different issues to the ongoing 
negotiations in order to maximize its returns. For example, North Korea tries to leverage 
its participation in a third round of talks in the summer of 1997, demanding the 
repatriation of two defectors in exchange for its return to the negotiation table bargain. 
The United States, however, holds a firm position that it is not willing to give into this 
pattern of behavior. The eight rounds of talks can be divided into three distinct periods: 
first, the “tentative” period, where parties tried to set up a discussion forum; second, the 
“compensation” period; and third the “export” period.  
During the “tentative” period, the come-and-go attitude of North Korea is the real 
focus, with parties having a hard time scheduling talks, and agreeing on the basic concept 
of having talks. During this period, North Korea is the most reticent to come to the 
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 107
negotiation table and tries to win money in exchange for its participation. During the 
“compensation” period, the topic of sovereignty as well as compensating North Korea for 
a potential dismantlement of its missile program is discussed. During those rounds, 
parties get to know each other’s positions, and come to an understanding of where they 
both stand (as is communicated at the end of Round 5, with both parties issuing a joint 
statement stating that they now understand each other’s positions better). During this 
time, the two parties also broach the topic of sovereignty, thus leaving the realm of a very 
practical and low-politics-oriented discussion regarding production of missile, to a high-
politics discussion regarding the inherent rights of sovereign nations to develop missiles 
(as the United States calls them) or satellites (as North Korea calls them). Finally, the 
“export” period is developed during Round 7 and Round 8, when both the United States 
and North Korea make positive steps toward cooperation, with the United States 
removing some trade barriers towards North Korea and allowing Pyongyang to export 
and import more consumer goods while North Korea also extends its ban on missile 
flight-testing. Discussion also centers on North Korea’s potential export of missiles to 
other countries.  
 The gradation in terms of issues (from low-politics to high-politics) can also be 
seen when looking at who North Korea negotiated with. During the first rounds, North 
Korea deputy ambassador to the United Nations Ri Gun as well as Assistant Secretary of 
State Robert Einhorn were the main negotiators. However, the missile talks culminate in 
2000 with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit of Pyongyang, and her 
conversation with Kim Jong-Il who promised her there would be no more missile launch. 
While North Korea did not manifestly ask for higher diplomats to be sent during the 
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different rounds of talks, it is obvious that Madeleine Albright’s presence was felt as 
extremely positive. Moreover, the discussion of a potential visit by Bill Clinton to North 
Korea showed a degree of commitment by the United States to the situation, that North 
Korea surely appreciated, and definitely did not denigrate. Thus, we can support 
hypothesis 1A, since a commitment to high profile negotiators and counterpart seems 
very important in this case. However, regarding our hypotheses that are related to human 
nature, it is not really possible to support hypothesis 1B that pertains to low and high-
politics issues. The negotiation episode involved low-politics issues, namely the export of 
missiles by North Korea in order to obtain cash. Even though North Korea advocated that 
this was a sovereignty issue, the discussion mainly focused on very practical matters such 
as exports, imports, compensation and satellite launches. However, the situation was not 
resolved, thus making it impossible to confirm the hypothesis that a negotiation that 
pertains to practical and material aspects and not involving a drastic change for North 
Korea and its people, are more likely to find a positive-sum compromise. In this case, 
neither the United States nor North Korea gained direct benefits from the negotiations. 
However, it is possible to argue that hypothesis 2D can be supported: North Korea did 
not want to dismantle its missile production chain, and did not want to stop exporting 
them. After eight rounds of negotiations that spanned over the five years, North Korea 
received some clemency regarding its imports and exports of consumer goods, and also 
saw the United States abolishing the notion of “rogue states” and replacing it with the 
less threatening term of “states of concern”. The United States, however, did not achieve 
its goal of curbing North Korea’s missile production and export, even though it might 
have reduced the speed at which the missiles were produced and exported. Thus, it is 
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possible to accept hypothesis 2C, as well as hypothesis 2D regarding North Korea’s skill 
level during the negotiations. North Korea was once again able to determine when they 
would take place. They were not being threatened to come back to the negotiation table, 
and to accept an agreement.  
 The missile proliferation case, however, provides some insights regarding North 
Korea’s understanding of partnership and confidence – if not trust – in the international 
system. Russia’s claim that North Korea would abandon its missile production if 
Pyongyang could use some other countries’ satellite-launching capabilities could be seen 
as a step by Pyongyang towards collective security, or at least promoting its national 
interests through collective endeavors: North Korea’s willingness to curb its program 
would mean that selling its missiles to other countries would not be the sole reason for 
the existence of the program, but would rather show that North Korea is more interested 
in the technology to use it for its own advancement. Here, we can thus say that the 
relevance of hypothesis 2B regarding North Korea’s willingness to preserve its national 
security and reluctance to engage in activities that might promote collective security is 
unclear. North Korea’s supposed willingness to use another country’s technology and 
stop its missile production and missile exports looked like North Korea might be taking a 
step toward some level of collective security arrangement with Russia. In any case, 
Pyongyang was being more cooperative with the international system than it had ever 
been. 
 At the international system there are few signs of linkage between crises. During 
the earlier rounds, discussions were centered on which issues to incorporate into the talks, 
and both North Korea and the United States agreed the talks should not go beyond 
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missile discussion. The only ties to the Agreed Framework come around Round 4, when 
the United States threatened to cancel some heavy-oil shipments if North Korea did not 
suspend a potential missile-test firing. However, this did not come into play regarding 
North Korea’s missile exports are there is no evidence of the United States threatening 
North Korea with the cancellation of the Agreed Framework based on Pyongyang’s sales 
of missiles abroad. Thus, we can reject hypothesis 3A.   
 Finally, it might be possible to explain North Korea’s difficulty to commit to the 
multitude of rounds by speculating that hypothesis 2A might be valid. Early on in the 
negotiations, North Korea asked the United States not to publicize the talks because of an 
internal discord between the North Korean government and the military. Either North 
Korea was bluffing, trying to appear weak and divided in order to garner some 
concessions from the United States, or North Korea did have a genuine split within its 
decision-making bodies. Evidence of such a split from other cases reinforces the notion 
that North Korea is not a unitary actor with a central, seamless command, and thus helps 
support hypothesis 2A, namely that it is harder to reach an agreement when a party is 
internally divided.  
 
c. “Nodong Launch Case”. 
 
1. The Premises 
Early 1996, the situation on the Korean peninsula was rather tensed, as North 
Korea had stepped up its rhetoric towards the South and the United States225, and as 
                                                 
225 The Australian “South Korea asks US to send spy aircraft,” April 9, 1996. 
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North Korean soldiers had entered the South Korea territory through the Demilitarized 
Zone several times in only a few days.226  North Korea was also trying to develop a 
missile that could have a longer range than its previous missiles had, and thus new steps 
in the potential development of a North Korea missile able to reach Japan alarmed the 
United States as well as other powers in the region. Intelligence reported that North 
Korea was about to test one of its missile in order to demonstrate its range to a potential 
Middle Eastern country which was interested in acquiring the technology.  
The United States tried to convince Pyongyang not to test its “Nodong” missile, 
using various diplomatic tools, as well as through talk that were kept secret at first, but 
that were later disclosed as having taken place through the United Nations channels in 
New York.  
 
2. Case Timeline 
 
October 16, 1996: The China Jiji Press Ticker Service reports that North Korea might be 
testing a missile in the Sea of Japan in the following days. The test may be conducted as a 
demonstration to a potential Middle East Country who would be interested in buying off 
the technology from Pyongyang. The hypothesis that the delegation in question might be 
Iran is also brought in by the paper, noting that a military delegation from this country is 
currently visiting North Korea.227  
 
                                                 
226 The Australian, “North Korea warns war is imminent,” April 10, 1996.   
227 Jiji Press Ticket Service, “North Korea plans missile test near Japan,” October 16, 1996. 
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October 17 , 1996: Both China and the United States were already aware of some missile 
preparation back in July, but cannot confirm whether the apparent move of some 
equipment associated with missile launch is indeed part of a launch process in the 
North.228  The United States military command decides to mobilize a reconnaissance 
aircraft originally based on the Kadena airbase in Okinawa in order to monitor the Sea of 
Japan. The Japanese channel N.H.K. also reiterated the fact that the Nodong-1 had been 
transferred to a potential launch site.229 
 
October 19, 1996: The United States decision to send a “strong message” to North Korea 
not to carry out the ballistic missile test is met by Japanese defense officials saying that 
North Korea had also placed different ships in the Sea of Japan in order to be ready for 
the missile’s landing.230  During an on-the-record roundtable with the Japanese media, the 
Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord expresses his wish for a cooling of the 
situation over the peninsula, assuming that the reports that had surfaced a few days earlier 
are true.231  
 
October 22, 1996: North Korea denounces Winston Lord’s visit to South Korea and calls 
upon its right to sovereignty, and that it would not let it be compromised by the United 
States.232 North Korea, through the Korean Central News Agency, reportedly prepares to 
launch test-missile. The United States expresses concerns over the situation and discloses 
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that it is discussing the issue with China. The United States refutes having any 
information regarding the potential Middle Eastern delegation that could be purchasing 
the North Korean Nodong missile. The United States also discloses that the Director of 
American Affairs in the North Korean Foreign Ministry will be coming to New York to 
conduct business related to the United Nations. The possibility of an eventual meeting 
with an American delegation is on the table.233   
 
October 23, 1996: The United States denies disclosing whether an American delegation 
has met with a North Korean delegation. The United States insists on the fact that North 
Korea is responsible for disclosing to the public who is heading their delegation.234  
 
October 24, 1996: The United States’ State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns hints 
at planned discussions that would involve letting North Korea know that conducting a 
missile test is not in its best interest. Though North Korea has not officially talked about 
testing the missile, the United States believes a potential missile test could be occurring 
shortly. Senior Clinton Administration members concede that not much besides 
diplomatic channels can really help improve the tense situation.235 
 
October 25, 1996: The United States State Department confirms that its officers from the 
State Department have met with Mr. Ri Gun, North Korea’s main negotiator in New 
York when the Korean politicians were visiting the U.N. headquarters. Major issues were 
raised during the conversation, including talks about an American-held prisoner in North 
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Korea.236 While Washington cannot confirm whether the missile had been tested or not, it 
confirms that North Korea was intending to test such a missile. The United States 
mentions again to the media its opposition to such testing.  The United States State 
Department estimates that the range of the Nodong missile is greater than 620 miles. An 
April report from the Pentagon indicates that the missile technology might be sold to 
Middle Eastern nations such as Iran, Saudi Arabia or Turkey.237 
 
October 27, 1996: K.E.D.O. policy advisors and spokesmen share concerns that the 
recent tumultuous events that rocked the Korean peninsula, such as the September 
submarine incursion as well as the missile-testing controversy might delay the start of the 
physical work stipulated by the 1994 Agreed Framework to build two light-water reactors 
to replace North Korea’s Yongbyong nuclear reactor.238  
 
November 5, 1996: Joint military drills start between Japan and the United States for the 
fourth time in two years. K.E.D.O.’s executive director Stephen Bosworth reinforces the 
idea that ongoing tensions on the peninsula would have an effect on the Agreed 
Framework and should not be ignored.239  
 
November 7, 1996: Charles Kartman, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East 
Asian affairs announces that North Korea seemed to have backed out from its missile-
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testing plans. The United States ventures to say that the North Korea retreat might have 
been because Pyongyang was responding to Washington and other countries’ concerns.240 
 
November 8, 1996: Information pertaining to the cancellation of the test starts to surface 
in different media. North Korean diplomats apparently informed their American 
counterparts of their decision during a meeting in the United States. Intelligence agencies 
in the United States, Japan and South Korea decide to remain under alert for any 
indications of a missile test.241  The United States informs the press that it was very close 
to getting the release of a Hunziker, an American that had been arrested by North Korea 
early in August as he was swimming across the Yalu River. In the meantime, South 
Korea also ends it search for fugitives from the North Korean submarine that ran aground 
in South Korea in September. 242  In a United States Department of State briefing, 
spokesperson Burns refuses to link the issue of the Agreed Framework with the missile 
testing, and the potential release of Hunziker. 
 
November 9, 1996: North Korea’s decision not to test its missile is qualified as being “for 
the time being” by an official close to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles 
Kartman.243   
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3. Discussion 
The Nodong launch is very different from the two other cases, which were labeled 
as single occurrence events. The Nodong launch episode is only lightly supported by 
hypotheses relating to human nature and nature of the state. Its resolution was tied to the 
international system. The episode did not involve a dedicated series of negotiation rounds 
or talks; the only meetings that took place to discuss the issue of North Korea’s potential 
testing of a missile in the Sea of Japan were held at the United Nations. Moreover, those 
sessions were not specifically designed to discuss the launch issue, but were used by the 
United States to try to convince or coerce North Korea not to launch any missiles. 
Understandably, North Korea did not appear to mind that no specific talks regarding the 
missile launch  were held from the regular United Nations meetings, and understandably 
so: North Korea probably did not expected to use its threat to test a nuclear missile test to 
gain concessions from the international community, especially at a time when other crises 
including the holding of an American citizen by North Korea and North Korea’s 
submarine incursion into Seoul’s waters had already created a tense situation. Instead, 
North Korea seems to have been determined to test the missile to impress the Middle East 
delegation that was expected to be present around the supposed launch date. The thought 
appears to have been that this would impress the delegation, helping North Korea’s 
economy while technically not violating any laws.  
The United Nations’ talks were fairly low level. North Korea was represented by 
the Director of American Affairs in the North Korea Foreign Ministry. The United States’ 
delegation was composed of officers from the State Department. North Korea did not 
have great interest in discussing the matter with high ranking U.S. official and did not 
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comment on the need to hold substantial talks. Thus, hypothesis 1A which stipulates that 
North Korea’s willingness to negotiate depends on the level of official the other party is 
inconclusive. The other human nature hypothesis can also be considered inconclusive: at 
no moment did the issues of the Nodong Launch go beyond the question of a missile 
launch. Once can speculate that there is just not much range for negotiation when it 
comes to launching a missile that is neither a nuclear weapon, nor an intercontinental 
weapon. North Korea had only two options: to launch or not to launch, and both the 
United States and North Korea were not willing to negotiate on the issue  
 The “unity in voices” hypotheses must be labeled as inconclusive as well given 
that there were no negotiation rounds besides the regular United Nations meetings that 
were scheduled to be held anyways. The international community, however, had a strong 
and unified team which message was carried by the United States during the United 
Nations meeting. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord voiced concerns regarding 
the launch while traveling to Japan and the United States and Japan organized joint 
military drills in November 1996 as a show of military preparedness. Moreover, The 
United States discussed the gravity of a potential Nodong launch with China. 
Cooperation was also apparent among the United States, Japan, and South Korea’s 
intelligence agencies who were watching for activity related to a possible launch of the 
missile. Thus, from the point of view of the closeness of the negotiating team, one can 
argue that the United States, Japan, South Korea and Japan were well represented by the 
United States’ actions and talks regarding the Nodong launch. All had shared regional 
interests. Both Japan and South Korea could be potential targets given that the Nodong 
had at least a 620-mile range. This goes hand in hand with hypothesis 2B which focuses 
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on the importance of national security versus collective security. The United States’ 
rhetorical stance de-linked the issue of sovereignty and the Nodong launch, and tried to 
emphasize the role of regional stability and the way it could be compromised by 
launching the missile. In the same vein, overarching crises did seem to impact North 
Korea’s decision not to test the missile; the accidental incursion of a North Korean 
submarine in South Korea’s waters and North Korea’s subsequent apologies suggest that 
the Nodong launch was not a simple, stand-alone episode. Despite the fact that 
spokesperson Burns had refused early in November to link the issues of the missile 
launch with captured American Huntzinger or the submarine incident, it is obvious that 
those crises were weighing heavily on North Korea at the time. Important opinions were 
also shared regarding the Agreed Framework by K.E.D.O. policy advisors and 
spokesmen regarding potential difficulties in implementing the framework should North 
Korea go ahead with the missile launch. Therefore, other overarching crisis did have an 
effect on North Korea when it had to decide whether to launch the missile of not, thus 
allowing us to support hypothesis 2B. It also seems that North Korea had reached a dead-
end in terms of options, because of the weight of the surrounding situations entrapping 
Pyongyang. North Korea’s hierarchical preferences in terms of outcomes were displayed 
through the Nodong case as North Korea did not want to see the end of the Agreed 
Framework and decided that launching the Nodong missile would probably lead to a 
more difficult situation. Moreover, the situation in 1996 had been very difficult for North 
Korea because of the drought and famine, and the economic incentives were thus very 
strong for Kim Jong-Il to play by the international communities’ rules. Therefore, with no 
real option, North Korea decided to back down. It did not attempt to negotiate 
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compensation from the United States for not launching the Nodong missile. Hypothesis 
2D thus cannot be supported. 
 
 
d. “The Kumchang-ri Compromise”. 
 
1. The Premises 
 The later part of the 1990s was dominated by North Korea's development, testing 
and sales of missiles, as well as whether or not Pyongyang was living up to the provisions 
of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Under the agreement, North Korea was not supposed to 
develop any nuclear energy. However, news that North Korea was building a nuclear site 
at Kumchang-ri surfaced early January 1998: various American intelligence satellite 
photographs showed increased traffic and building activity around the area. The news 
was later picked up by the U.S. media during that summer, and greatly publicized.  By 
mid-1998, the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula had become very tense as North 
Korea was threatening to block the International Atomic Energy Agency and other 
agencies such as the United Nations, from visiting its facilities even thought such 
organizations were supposed to have visitation right so that they could attest that the 1994 
Agreed Framework terms were respected.   
 When Ambassador Kartman visited the D.P.R.K. and expressed his concerns 
regarding underground construction in the Yongbyon area, Pyongyang had to decide 
whether it would allow inspectors to visit the site, in order to receive food and aid. Thus, 
negotiations on the terms of a potential visit took place between the United States and 
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North Korea, and spanned over more than six months, leaving many in doubts: even if 
the United States managed to gain access to Kumchang-ri, North Korea would probably 
have been able to remove any suspicious material by the time the first Americans would 
set their feet on the site. 
 




January 2, 1998: Following the release of a classified Defense Intelligence Agency report 
discussing a potential underground activity at the Kumchang-ri site, some news outlets 
start reporting that nuclear construction might be under way in North Korea despite the 
1994 Agreed Framework that prohibited such activities from taking place.244 
 
July 15, 1998: A General Accounting Office report points at North Korea’s lack of 
transparency regarding its nuclear facilities: according to the report, about five percents 
of the heavy fuel oil given to North Korea through the Agreed Framework terms was 
used for unauthorized purposed.245  Several commentators such as Senator Frank H. 
Murkozski argue the report shows that it is not possible to account for the amount of 
plutonium that North Korea might have diverted from its nuclear program. Murkowski 
warns that Washington’s current approach regarding Pyongyang does not involve enough 
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sanctions and tough actions, and that in his mind, the “carrot-and-stick approach is all 
carrots, no sticks”.246 
 
August 22, 1998: Talks in New York between North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim 
Gye-Gwan and U.S. Ambassador-at-large Charles Kartman are focused on the 1994 
Agreed Framework, as well as on the suspected construction activity that might involve 
more than 15,000 North Koreans on the Kumchang-ri site.247  
 
August 26, 1998: The United States insists that the Agreed Framework must be 
respected, and asks that access be granted to inspectors at the Kumchang-ri site. North 
Korea, however, insists that the site is strictly being used for civilian work and refuses to 
grant such access.248  
 
August 31, 1998: South Korean press agency Yonhap quotes a Washington source saying 
that North Korea might consider opening the Kumchang-ri site to inspectors, following 
the recent high-profile meeting in New York with Charles Kartman.249 On the same day, 
North Korea launches a ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan that lands halfway between 
North Korean and Japan.250  
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November 16, 1998: A U.S. delegation headed by Charles Kartman leaves for North 
Korea. The United States demands that he be allowed to visit the Kumchang-ri site.251 
James Rubin, the U.S. State Department spokesman, states that the aim of the visit is “to 
get the leadership in North Korea focused on the gravity of our concerns and the serious 
consequences for our relations should our suspicions not be resolved”.252 However, the 
U.S. delegation leaves without gaining North Korea’s access to the site after Pyongyang 
asks for $300 millions for a one-time visit of a site that is not Kumchang-ri.253 The 
delegation departs after 12 hours of negotiations.254  
 
November 21, 1998: The U.S. military commander for Asia and the Pacific, Admiral 
Joseph Prueher, suggests that North Korea is not acting rationally. South Korean 
government official Lim Dong Won plays down reports regarding North Korea’s illegal 
building at Kumchang-ri.255  
 
November 22, 1998: Internal clashes within the United States appear as Lt. Gen. Patrick 
M. Hughes presents reports that differ from apparently publicized information attributed 
to C.I.A. director George Tenet. Hughes is praised by Republican foreign policy 
specialists when he portrays North Korea as not yet capable of acquiring nuclear 
technology and suggests North Korea would prefer not to, if it could, find a settlement 
with the United States. It later becomes apparent that North Korea was ready to resume 
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its nuclear program if no avenues for normalizing relations with the United States 
presented themselves.256  
 
December 5, 1998: North Korea intensifies its rhetoric towards the United States, with 
North Korea's People's Armed Forces Vice-Minister Jong Chang-Ryol stating that 
“Arrogant U.S. imperialists have gone beyond the danger line in their aggressive attempts 
to stifle the D.P.R.K. with military strength”. 257 In the same statement, Jong warns the 
U.S. that war could be waged at any moment.  
 
December 8, 1998: Following talks with Pyongyang in New York, South Korean 
president Kim Dae-Jung suggests that the United States gives North Korea economic aid 
in exchange for the right to visit Kumchang-ri.258 North Korea announces that no amount 
of diplomacy can improve the situation since it had already escalated to movements of 
military troops and equipment. North Korea was implicitly criticizing the United States’ 
military presence in the peninsula. South Korean’s presidential spokesman Park Ji-won 
reports that President Kim Dae-Jung has urged William Perry to try to avoid sanctioning 
North Korea for potential nuclear-related construction on the North Korean site of 
Kumchang-ri.  If such a site was indeed being built, it would not be completed in a short 
amount of time.259 South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung cautions against overreaction, 
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citing that it is not obviously clear that North Korea has nuclear ambitions at Kumchang-
ri.260 
 
December 12, 1998: While visiting Beijing, William Perry is warned that North Korea is 
a fragile state, and should be treated with care. China reinforces its commitment to 
dialogue, peace and stability over the Korean peninsula. William Perry then proceeds to 
going to Tokyo where he warns that the United States might have to nullify the Agreed 
Framework if the security situation with North Korea became too intense.261 
 
December 15, 1998: North Korea appears to drop its financial demands on the United 
States. It appears content with receiving food aid in exchange for opening access to the 
Kumchang-ri site. The United States welcomes the stance and prospects for the Agreed 
Framework suddenly look better. North Korea’s openness could be read as a sign that it 
had not begun nuclear work in Kumchang-ri.262 
 
January 3, 1999: Steven Bosworth, American ambassador in South Korea, expresses his 
concerns over a potential breakdown of the Agreed Framework.263 
 
ROUND 2 
January 17, 1999: The United States and North Korea open a new round of talks in New 
York, just a few days before a round of Four-Party Talks are to be held in the same 
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location. North Korea argues that opening the Kumchang-ri site would jeopardize its 
national security. China also voices concerns that the United States might want to inspect 
other countries’ activities out of sheer suspicion.264  Pyongyang reportedly offers the 




February 28, 1999: North Korea and the United States begin a new round of talks in New 
York.266 Both countries exchange proposals involving a certain amount of food aid in 
exchange for access to the Kumchang-ri site.267 
 
March 16, 1999: North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-Gwan says he is very 
happy with the agreement that is reached after more than two weeks of negotiations.  He 
states again that the Kumchang-ri site does not have any nuclear-related materials.268 A 
joint statement by North Korea and the United States is issued: the statement mentions 
that the United States is invited by North Korea to visit the Kumchang-ri site in order to 
remove the United States’ concerns.269 Ambassador Kartman also states that cooperation 
regarding a bilateral agricultural program involving potato production is also envisaged 
between the two countries.270 The two sides reaffirm their commitment to the Agreed 
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Framework. Both sides see themselves as the victors at the end of the negotiations.271 In a 
statement released from the Department of State, Madeleine Albright announces that a 
U.S. team has been allowed multiple visits with full access to the Kumchang-ri site, and 
that the first visit will occur early May.272 
 
March 17, 1999: Criticism regarding the newly struck deal starts erupting as the 
Chairman of the House International Relations Committee worries that “good food was 
being poured down a North Korean hole”. 273 North Korea is likely to receive another 
200,000 tons of grain. 
 
March 18, 1999: The K.C.N.A., mouthpiece of the North Korean government, reaffirms 
that the construction going on at the Kumchang-ri site is absolutely not related to any 
nuclear materials. The K.C.N.A. affirms that the on-site visit agreement does not stem 
from a demand for inspection by Washington, but is rather an invitation from Pyongyang. 
It also states that the United States has admitted it had not acted right and as a result had 
decided to give political and economic compensations to Pyongyang.274 Rubin plays 
down the importance of the joint agricultural program, characterizing it as being a very 
modest potato project.275 South Korea also welcomes the successful conclusion of the 
talks, but warns North Korea about the occurrence of similar nuclear-related problems.276  
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March 18, 1999: South Korean sources says that U.S. intelligence spotted trucks leaving 
from the Kumchang-ri site, leading to think that evidence might be removed from the site 
prior to U.S.’ arrival.277 At the same time, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji maintains that 
China has been helping in the recent negotiations, despite the U.S. denying its role. 
 
March 29,1999: Controversies about how much food aid the United States will provide 
North Korea arise, with rumors that the aid could be as much as 600,000 tons of food.278 
 
May 9, 1999: The United States announces that it will dispatch a 15-member team on 
May 18 on the Kumchang-ri site. Inspections are set to begin on May 20, and should take 
at least a week.279  
 
May 29, 1999: The team that visited the Kumchang-ri site says it has found only an 
empty tunnel. Inspection started on May 20 and finished on May 24.280  
 
3. Discussion 
The Kumchang-ri case can be labeled as a single-occurrence, multi-round case, 
despite its ties to other encompassing issues related to the Korean peninsula, such as the 
U.S. military presence in Asia and the 1994 Agreed Framework. The basic premise of the 
Kumchang-ri case is rather simple: the United States, relying on intelligence, becomes 
suspicious that North Korea is violating the 1994 Agreed Framework by building a 
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nuclear site. The United States demands access to the site, and a series of negotiations 
ensues, both in the United States and in North Korea. The compromise reached was 
touted by both parts as a victory.  
Similar to the Pilot Negotiation case, we can assess that the Kumchang-ri case is 
of a high relevance to both the U.S. and North Korea as both parties decided to involve 
high figures early on in the debate. The first talks that took place in New York in August 
1998 involved North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-Gwan, and U.S. 
Ambassador-at-large Charles Kartman. This shows a departure from the regular 
diplomatic channels used by Washington when communicating with Pyongyang. These 
meetings were not part of the regular, weekly meetings that Washington had been having 
with the North Korea United Nations’ mission. Following this initial meeting in New 
York, the United States sent a delegation to North Korea in order to negotiate the right to 
visit the Kumchang-ri site. The United States’ delegation was once again led by Charles 
Kartman, thus showing a consistency in the U.S.’ approach to the negotiation. During the 
Pilot negotiation episode, the United States had first relied on Senator Richardson who 
had just so happened to be in North Korea at the time, but as the episode unfolded and 
dragged on, Washington decided to up its diplomatic representation by sending State 
Department Deputy Assistant Thomas Hubbard to North Korea. The United States’ 
choice for publicizing information also witness the importance of the negotiations: James 
Rubin, the United States Department Spokesman, led many of the information releases on 
the purpose of the U.S. visit to North Korea. News that North Korea might be amenable 
to discussion regarding allowing access to Kumchang-ri came after North Korea 
expressed its reticence to provide such access. However, it seems North Korea changed 
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its mind between August 26, four days after the New York talks, and August 31, when 
Yonhap quoted a Washington source saying that Pyongyang might be amenable to such 
discussion. However, North Korea’s launching of a missile in the Sea of Japan, might be 
interpreted as a sign that even though it was willing to further the discussion regarding 
Kumchang-ri, it was in no way doing the United States a favor or “softening up”. The 
United States seemed to have clearly understood that message; Washington sent 
diplomats of a similar diplomatic level to North Korea on November 16, 1998. 
Subsequent negotiations in New York in January were also headed by Ambassador 
Kartman for the U.S. side, and further comments regarding the negotiations and its 
effects were released by high U.S. officials such as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
and former Defense Secretary William Perry. North Korea therefore seemed to have been 
contented by the American diplomatic representation, or at least there is no evidence to 
suggest that North Korea was not pleased with the attention that was given by the United 
States through its diplomatic representation during the New York talks, and the 
Pyongyang visit. Thus, we can say that hypothesis 1A, North Korea’s willingness to 
negotiate is tied to the level of the representatives of its negotiation partners cannot be 
rejected.  
North Korea’s willingness to negotiate was also strongly tied to the outcomes that 
might be reached when dealing with the Kumchang-ri site. Initial talks regarding the 
Kumchang-ri site occurred in New York when the main agenda was the 1994 Agreed 
Framework. The issues at stake were in the realm of high politics: they dealt with 
creating a nuclear-free peninsula, with a non-nuclear North Korea, and producing energy 
that could not be used to build more dangerous weapons. Thus, the Kumchang-ri case 
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started as a high-politics case, but later turned into a low politics one once North Korea 
refused to grant access to the United States on “moral grounds” but demanded privileges 
and compensation for it. Negotiations that occurred after the initial New York meeting 
focused on finding a compromise that would lead to North Korea opening up Kumchang-
ri. The New York November meeting had already led to North Korea showing interest in 
negotiating access in exchange for money. Once this was agreed to, a high politics 
concept became a low-politics issue: basically, negotiating the price tag for the 
Kumchang-ri visit. Subsequent talks and negotiations did not deal with the issue of a 
nuclear peninsula, but focused on very clear and concrete ideas: potential nuclear-related 
construction, $300 million for a one-time visit, food aid and a joint agricultural program.  
Hypothesis 1B, even though it could have been dismissed at first, proves to be 
quite a potent explanation. The case progressed from high politics issues to simple 
matters. It became very clear as the negotiation process progressed, that the discussion 
had shifted from the Agreed Framework and what it meant to North Korea’s production 
of nuclear weapons and its violation of the Agreed Framework, to a simple discussion on 
negotiating a one-time access to the site. We can even argue that North Korea might 
have, at that point, already decided to “milk” the situation in order to shift the dialogue 
from high politics to low politics. Pyongyang is more comfortable with concrete issues 
that do not include demands for profound changes in the North Korean system. 
North Korea seemed, most of the time, to be speaking with a unified voice. In the 
Kumchang-ri case, there are no signs of instances of division between the North Korean 
political and military wings, as there were in the Pilot Case. However, the international 
community, especially those countries located in the Asia region did not fully support the 
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United States’ view on the negotiations. Dissent came from China, which was concerned 
about the United States’ request to inspect other countries’ activities based on mere 
suspicion. Dissent also came from South Korea with South Korean presidential 
spokesman Park Ji-Won reporting that President Kim had urged William Perry not to 
sanction North Korea over the Kumchang-ri issue. But clashes within the United States 
were revealed. These included Lt. Gen. Hughes’ criticism of the reports presented by the 
C.I.A, and the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee’s worries 
regarding sending North Korea more food and aid. Despite these dissenting voices, an 
agreement was reached, thus making it difficult for us to accept hypothesis 2A, even 
though the United States was technically the only other negotiating party. However, the 
Kumchang-ri compromise is directly linked to the application of the Agreed Framework, 
and thus because the Agreed Framework was signed by North Korea and a consortium 
led by the United States, Washington is not the sole party to it. Thus, we can consider that 
the international community was also to a certain extent a part of the negotiating team 
that was concerned with the Kumchang-ri site. Therefore, we cannot affirm nor confirm 
hypothesis 2A, and must rule it to be inconclusive.  
However, the second image – the nation-state – as a key variable explanation is 
strongly supported with hypotheses 2B, 2C, and 2D. On January 17, 1999, and just a few 
days before the opening of Four-Party Talks, North Korea stated that the Kumchang-ri 
issue was a matter of national security and that this issue was therefore at the top of its 
priorities. Other countries such as China and South Korea, as seen before, also insisted 
upon the fact that the United States’ asking for visitation rights amounted to challenging 
North Korea’s national sovereignty. Perhaps the fact that the Kumchang-ri issue was 
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touching so close to Pyongyang’s heart might have helped North Korea in the 
negotiations, since it knew that the United States would understand this issue as being 
vital to North Korea, and thus as being a potential threat for other nations, Washington 
included. Thus, hypothesis 2B can be supported on the part of North Korea who wanted 
to initially prevent the United States from taking the right to visit its facility, even if it 
would mean hard negotiations and could potentially lead to jeopardizing the Agreed 
Framework. The United States also did not care so much as to trust North Korea and try 
to keep the Agreed Framework alive, but rather was looking for clues that would make 
the Framework collapse, thus putting more emphasis on the national issue of having 
nuclear weapons rather than the collective security treaty in itself.   
 The Kumchang-ri case seems to be the quintessential representation of North 
Korea’s negotiation skills and its ability to extract what it wants from its negotiation 
partner. At no moment was North Korea threatened nor did it appear frightened over 
what might happen regarding the Kumchang-ri site. The United States did not support 
preemptive strike rhetoric at that time, and North Korea was allowed to pretty much 
direct the negotiations once it accepted that the United States might be allowed to visit 
Kumchang-ri. The United States’ initial demands were not granted; North Korea refused 
in August 1998 to allow the United States access. However, following the New York 
talks, North Korea was willing to negotiate on the terms of the visit. North Korea’s 
request of $300 millions for a one-time visit left the U.S. team no option but to leave the 
negotiation table, as accepting an initial offer by North Korea would have been a sign of 
weakness from the United States. By the time the two countries met for a new round of 
talks in New York in January and February 1999, talks were centered on the amount of 
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compensation that the United States would have to give to North Korea. Finally, the 
March 1999 agreement offered the United States what they had unconditionally requested 
more than eight months earlier, and gave North Korea an important economic 
compensation for allowing the U.S to visit a site that might not have contained anything 
to begin with, or that might have been emptied during the eight months of negotiation. 
The Agreed Framework was also left intact even though the United States had tried to use 
it as leverage back in December 1998. Thus, it is obvious that Pyongyang gained a lot 
from those negotiations, especially when it was later revealed after the inspection that the 
U.S. team had found only a giant tunnel at Kumchang-ri. Still, even though the U.S. did 
not find any evidence that North Korea was tampering with the Agreed Framework, it did 
not gain any more trust in North Korea’s behavior. Thus, North Korea did not appear to 
suffer through those negotiations, and it managed to achieve substantially more than 
other players as well, therefore supporting hypotheses 2C and 2D.  
 However strong the second image was, the third image is the most 
underrepresented in the Kumchang-ri case. The specter of the Agreed Framework did not 
seem to have put a strong hold on the negotiation regarding access to the site. North 
Korea’s rhetoric did not mention the agreement, and although the United States used the 
Agreed Framework as a sort of leverage, other international pressures on the United 
States, especially by South Korea and China who asked the United States in December 
1998 to go easy on North Korea counterbalanced any effect that the fear of a collapsing 
Agreed Framework might have had on Pyongyang. Moreover, even though this 
negotiation episode could be understood as being a stand-alone one, it did not solve more 
stringent issues of the relationship between the United States and North Korea. It can thus 
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merely be described as an incident that allowed North Korea to receive financial aid. 
Seen under this light, we might be tempted to support hypothesis 3B, since the 
Kumchang-ri incident was resolved, but the broader crisis that it was born out of, namely 




















Chapter Five. Multilateral Cases 
 
 The end of the 1990s led the way to a new type of negotiations between the 
United States and North Korea: multilateral talks. This new type of dialogue was built on 
the strength of plurality as well as on a will from the United States to seek more active 
participation from regional powers in the affairs of the Korean peninsula. Three major 
multilateral cases will be explores here: the Four-Party Talks as an example of a multi-
party, multi-round case; the Trilateral Talks as a multilateral negotiations; and the Six-
Party Talks, another multi-round, multi-party case.  
 
a. “Four-Party Talks”. 
 
1. The Premises 
 Even though the North Korea regime had a new leader in 1994 as  Kim Jong-Il 
took his father's position as the head of the North Korean regime, many if not all of the 
problems created by the 1953 Armistice were still preventing any peaceful resolution of 
the situation. The 1953 Armistice signed by the United States on behalf of the United 
Nations as well as signed by China and North Korea still stood as a major stumbling 
block to any potential detente over the peninsula. As North Korea started to weaken to 
due floods and food crises, many perceived that the Pyongyang regime might not be 
stable enough to survive to such drastic conditions, that North Korea was in a weak 
position, and thus more likely to negotiate on a potential peace treaty.  
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 The Clinton Administration as well as the Kim Young Sam and the Kim Dae-
Jung Administrations all shared South Korea's vision of a North Korean soft-landing, by 
which shall North Korea collapsed, it would be better to actually support the country 
financially instead of placating it. The process to hold a four-party forum that would 
include the participants to the Armistice was thus launched in 1996. Several months of 
pre-negotiations were necessary in order to ensure North Korea's participation to the 
talks.  
Peripheral events such as a North Korean submarine incursion into South Korean waters, 
as well as bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea regarding 
Pyongyang's ballistic missiles (referred before as the "Bilateral Talks: Missile 
Proliferation") also influenced the different rounds of Four-Party Talks.  All parties had 
to learn to communicate their interests, and to withstand the stressful process of multi-
party, multi-round, multi-year negotiations in order to reach a potential historic accord. 
 
2. Case Timeline 
 
ROUND 1 
April 16, 1996: U.S. President Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young-Sam 
propose in a joint statement the creation of four-way peace talks, to include their nations 
plus North Korea and China despite North Korea’s refusal in 1991 to convene under such 
a format. The talks are a surprising change of attitude given the long-standing U.S. 
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approach of resolving Korean tensions through North Korea-South Korea bilateral 
relations.281 
 
April 17, 1996: North Korea refuses the offer, arguing that only bilateral meetings with 
the United States are needed.282  
 
April 28, 1996: North Korea becomes more flexible to the idea of multi-party talks. 
Senior North Korean official Kim Jong U asks for more information regarding the 
proposed negotiations during a conference in Washington D.C. During a meeting with 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard, Kim asks for food aid as well as 
lifting of trade and investment sanctions as pre-conditions to the talks.283 
 
November 2, 1996: North Korea drops its objection to participate in Four-Party Talks 
seminar meeting with the United States and South Korea. Washington welcomes the 
news, though it is somewhat reticent to move along with the seminar while South Korea 
is more reserved, as it is still awaiting apologies from Pyongyang for the submarine 
incursion that occurred a few weeks earlier.284  
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November 13, 1996: North Korea refuses to consider the Four-Party Talks as it interprets 
the call from the United States to apologize for the September submarine incursion a 
revocation of the talks.285  
 
December 31, 1996: North Korea apologizes for the submarine incursion and is 
subsequently praised by China and the United States, which hope that the four-way 
process can start again.286 
 
March 6, 1997: The United States, North Korea and South Korea meet in New York at a 
roundtable to discuss the possibility of four-way talks. North Korea postpones the 
meeting twice. Its participation was conditional on receiving food aid from the United 
Nations World Food Program. The United States does not anticipate the four-way talks to 
begin before July, if they are to begin at all.287 
 
April 3, 1997:  The United States is said to have contributed $10 million and South Korea 
$6 million to the recent aid call from North Korea. Both the United States and South 
Korea insist that the aid is in no way related to the political tension regarding the four-
way talks. Pyongyang also asks to receive additional aid in exchange for joining the four-
way talks, but says it is willing to take Washington’s word on the assurance of food 
aid.288  
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April 12, 1997: Washington insists on its willingness to avoid a North Korean hard-
landing, and strengthens its position of trying to avoid war on the peninsula.289 
 
April 25, 1997: North Korea indicates it would join the peace talks only if provided food 
aid, American diplomatic recognition and an easing of trade sanctions by Washington. 
Seoul rejects the proposal.290 
 
June 30, 1997: North Korea is reported to have agreed to the first Four-Party Talks in 
New York in early August.291 
 
November 24, 1997: The Four-Party Talks are set to take place in Geneva on December 
9. The talks will focus, according to North Korea, on the removal of U.S. troops from the 
peninsula and on the conclusion of a peace agreement between Pyongyang and 
Washington.292 
 
December 4, 1997: The United States, South Korea and China plan a preliminary meeting 
on Monday, December 8, on the eve of the full session of the four-way talks in Geneva. 
A South Korean foreign minister says that because it is the first time the parties will meet 
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in such a setting, most of the negotiations should be centered on laying down a basic 





December 5, 1997 
 Through its official news outlet, North Korea denounces U.S. military activities 
and forecasts an American attack on the North’s soil using South Korean and Japanese 
military capacities.294  
 
December 6, 1997: A U.S. official indicates that the incoming four-way talks could be 
based on the 1991 agreement signed between North and South Korea.295  
 
December 8, 1997: A U.S. official indicates that no joint communiqué will be issued 
during the negotiations. He also states that the talks will not focus on concrete issues, but 
rather on procedural matters and scheduling issues for subsequent four-way talks.296 
 
December 9, 1997: The negotiations start in Geneva. China is represented by vice foreign 
minister Tang Jiaxan, the U.S. by deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, North 
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Korea by vice foreign minister Kim Kye-Kwan, and South Korea by Ambassador to 
France Yi Se-Yong.297 During the first round of talks, North Korea hints that it would be 
willing to consider a normalization of bilateral relationships with the United States, but 
also with South Korea. Chinese chief delegate Tang Jiaxuan also calls for the 
normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Washington.  
 
December 10, 1997: Following two days of talks, China is to be chairing the second 
round of the four-way talks that will take place in Genera on March 16th, 1998. The 
United States was chairing the first meeting, and by luck of draw, China will be chairing 
the next meeting, followed by South Korea and North Korea. The United States will also 
organize an ad hoc sub-committee for inter-sessional consultations in mid-February in 
Beijing.298 After the talks, North Korea describes the meeting as “ongoing”, while China 
stresses the remnants of the Cold War as being a still very important part of the 
negotiations. North Korea appears to have asked the United States to end the economic 
blockade as well as pressed for bilateral talks with Washington.299  
 
ROUND 2 
January 26, 1998: North Korea calls for a delay of the four-way peace talks. Speculations 
are that North Korea distrusts the Kim Young-Sam government, and wants to wait for 
South Korea’s newly elected president Kim Dae-Jung’s inauguration on February 25.300  
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January 30, 1998: North Korea requests that the future ad-hoc four-way talk committee 
takes place in Geneva instead of in China.301  
 
February 9, 1998: China, South Korea and the United States agree to meet two days prior 
to the beginning of the four-way talks.302 
February 20, 1998: The United States considers lifting economic sanctions on North 
Korea if the second round of four-way talks is successful.303  
 
March 11, 1999: The United States expresses its will to propose a series of confidence-
building measures with North Korea while attending the Four-Party Talks, but will be 
unlikely to reevaluate the terms of the embargo. The United States and North Korea are 
set to meet bilaterally in Berlin for an unrelated matter, and thus prior to the four-way 
talks.304  
 
March 16, 1998: North Korea wants to raise the issue of U.S. withdrawal from South 
Korea at the four-way talks, but the United States is unwilling to do so. At the opening of 
the talks, which were delayed because of procedural matters, the United States changes 
its position. North Korea joins the table after Washington agrees that Pyongyang is free 
to raise the withdrawal issue. However, after the first day of negotiations, the United 
States says it will not withdraw its troops.305 A South Korean source talks about the 
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subsequent unhappiness and lack of enthusiasm of the North Korean team after the 
failure of a bilateral meeting between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea is also 
reportedly displeased by the U.S. precondition of putting in place a permanent peace 
treaty prior to lifting the economic embargo. At the same time, North Korea stages a 
mock reaction exercise to a chemical weapons attack.306  China consults informally with 
North Korea at the beginning of the talks. North Korea appears dissatisfied at the seating 
arrangement, which puts the Korean delegation facing South Korea instead of the United 
States, as Pyongyang had requested. Subsequent delays occur because of this 
arrangement.307 Finally, North Korea refuses to discuss a broad agenda for the upcoming 
five days, thus forcing other participants to limit discussion to the agenda of the first two 
days.308  
 
March 17, 1998: South Korea announces that North Korea has agreed to resume bilateral 
negotiations between the two countries. This news is then refuted by North Korea’s chief 
negotiator Ri Gun who assures that he does not have the authority to make such an offer 
at the Geneva talks. South Korea then explains they might have misunderstood what Ri 
Gun had said, or that his comments might have been subject to potential misinterpretation 
because of their nature.309  
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March 18, 1998: Because of the tense situation following the misunderstanding of some 
of North Korea’s comments, as well as the refusal by the United States to discuss troop 
removal from the Korean peninsula, China proposes an excursion to a farm in order to 
refocus the negotiations. The senior officials will be working together in the bus.310   
 
March 21, 1998: Chinese assistant foreign minister announces that the talks will end on 
Saturday regardless of whether an agreement is reached or not.311 North Korea says that it 
will not join further rounds of peace talks if the United States does not remove its troops 
from South Korea.312 South Korea, on its part, deplores the lack of an agreement through 
a unique comment coming from its chief delegate in Geneva.313  
 
March 23, 1998: North Korea, through the Korean Central News Agency, calls again for 
bilateral talks with the United States to resolve the troop issue, and mentions the Four-
Party Talks as helping them understand that a normalization of the relationship with 
Washington should be achieved prior to subsequent rounds of multilateral talks.314  A 
U.S. official says that North Korea’s intransigence regarding its demands stood in the 
way of progress during the talks while North Korea places the fault on Washington’s 
unwillingness to discuss the status of U.S. troops as well as the fact that other nations 
were allowed by Washington, and through the talks, to intervene in North Korea’s 
internal affairs.315  
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March 24, 1998: A South Korean official from the ministry of Foreign Affairs hints at 
North Korea’s unwillingness to compromise at the meeting and its refusal to set a time 
for the next round if its demands were not met, and its seriousness regarding whether or 
not the four-way talks should continue.316 
ROUND 3 
May 29, 1998: A joint report form the members of the Seoul forum and the Council on 
Foreign Relations express concerns that multilateral talks only end up providing North 
Korea food and do not solve the Korean peninsula division problem. The report also 
expresses caution in trying to push the North to collapse.317  
 
July 21, 1998:  United States’ former deputy assistant and Clinton appointee as special 
envoy to the Four-Party Talks Charles Kartman will meet with a senior Chinese foreign 
ministry official on July 27 and plan to call on China, South Korea and North Korea to 
resume the four-way talks. Following this visit, he will also meet with a senior South 
Korea official early in August in Hawaii.318  
 
August 13, 1998: North Korea and the United States will hold preparatory talks late in 
August to pave the way for future rounds of Four-Party Talks. The talks are supposed to 
continue intermittently in New York until August 25. The news is carried by Ri Gun, 
North Korea’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations.319  
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317 BBC, “Koreas: South, U.S policy advisers express concern over four-way talks,” May 29, 1998. 
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September 15, 1998: U.S. spokesman James Rubin announces that a third round of Four-
Party Talks will be held in Geneva, and that a third missile talk between Washington and 
Pyongyang will also be held on October 1 in New York.320  
 
September 24, 1998: Because South Korea is expected to assume the rotating 
chairmanship of the four-way talks, the South Korean government decides to appoint a 
more senior official, and chooses former Vice Foreign Minister Park Kun-Won as chief 
negotiator.321 At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi calls for Japanese 
participation in peninsula peace talks. Obuchi proposes such an approach to President 
Bill Clinton while in New York, and asks for Russia to join be allowed to join the talks as 
well.322  
 
October 11, 1998: The North Korean spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, answering 
questions from the Korean Central News Agency, insists on the insincerity brought to the 
table by the United States, and calls again for a peace agreement between Pyongyang and 
Washington.323 
 
October 14, 1998: South Korea’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun-Yong 
says that South Korea will not prevent the issue of troop withdrawal from appearing on 
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the Four-Party Talks agenda, but also adds that such discussion should take place after a 
peace agreement about the Korean peninsula is reached.324 
 
October 19, 1998: North Korea denounces a U.S.-R.O.K. military exercise launched from 
Japan which simulates a North Korean ballistic missile launch that should take place 
from October 24 to November 2, the day when the third round of Four-Party Talks should 
open.325    
 
October 20, 1998: The Four-Party Talks start in Geneva with Kim Gye-Gwan 
representing North Korea, Charles Kartman for the United States, Park Kun-Woo for 
South Korea and Qian Yongnian for China. South Korea proposes the creation of two 
subcommittees and Ambassador Park also calls for more regular Four-Party Talks (every 
three months). The European Union also urges participants to adopt a constructive 
approach during the talks.326  
 
October 24, 1998: The talks, ending a day earlier than scheduled, produce an agreement 
to meet for a subsequent round from January 18 to January 22, 1999. The parties agree to 
set up two subcommittees to discuss tension reduction even though North Korea appears 
to have been tough on the issues of the subcommittees.327 China is apparently thinking 
that the subcommittees’ creation will solve a lot of organizational problems, and it 
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welcomes the positive endings to the talks.328 At the same time, South Korean Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Minister announces that South Korea will pursue the idea of Six-Party 
Talks independently from the Four-Party Talk mechanism, despite China and the United 




January 11, 1999: South Korea and the United States hold a preparatory meeting in 
Washington to coordinate their policies regarding the upcoming four-way talks.330  
 
January 15, 1999: Seoul plans to share with North Korea its intention to exchange 
information on military exercises as well as to open a military hotline in order to reduce 
tensions over the peninsula. The plans stem from a U.S.-R.O.K. initiative. Discussions of 
economic package deals towards North Korea are likely to arise as well.331  
 
January 18, 1999: After South Korea holds bilateral talks with the United States and 
China, the Four-Party Talks begin. Parties agree to subcommittee meetings for the five 
days of talks. Lower-ranking diplomats for each country represent their countries during 
the talks aimed at arranging the subcommittees.332 North Korea is chairing the meeting 
for the first time.333 At the end of the first day of talks, Ri Gun, the deputy head of the 
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North Korea delegation, reports that the United States and South Korea should not try to 
undermine the peace talks through some “incident”, warning that such a behavior could 
have serious consequences for the peninsula.334 North Korea seems to be referring to the 
abduction of Kim Gyong-Pil Berlin-based North Korea diplomat, by the United States 
and South Korea.335 
 
January 22, 1999: Four-way talks end with no specific agreements besides the promise of 
meeting again. The United States and China, though acknowledging that meeting again is 
a highly positive sign, warn not to expect quick progress regarding peace on the 
peninsula any time soon.336 In a joint statement, the four parties announce their intention 
to meet again in April, having reached compromise on procedure guidelines during the 
third round.337  
 
ROUND 5 
March 17, 1999: A ten U.S.-member delegation meets with South Korean officials to 
discuss its strategy regarding the fifth round of Four-Party Talks.338  
 
March 30, 1999: North Korea asks that the Four-Party Talks that are set to start on April 
12th be pushed back by ten days to two weeks. The request is made to accommodate the 
celebration of former North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung’s birthday.339 
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April 6, 1999:  The working group composed of South Korea, the United States and 
China agrees during a meeting to postpone the Four-Party Talks and resume them later at 
the request of North Korea.340 At the same time, the South Korea ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade dismisses media reports that it would place the issue of U.S. troops on 
the table during the upcoming talks.341 Such an allegation had been made following 
President Kim Dae-Jung’s comments regarding the status of U.S. troops on the Korean 
peninsula.342  
 
April 20, 1999: North Korea insists that the status of U.S. troops should be discussed at 
the Four-Party Talks.343 North Korea also blames South Korea for blocking progress at 
the peace talks344. 
 
April 24, 1999: The United States, South Korea and Japan are meeting in Hawaii to 
coordinate their North Korean foreign policies just as the Perry report is about to be 
released.345 At the opening of the talks, North Korea addresses the issues of U.S. troops 
in its keynote speech. South Korea says it will make less controversial proposals first, 
such as establishing a military hotline.346   
 
                                                 
340 Japan Economic Newswire, “4-way Korean peace talks to be held in April,” April 6, 1999. 
341 BBC, “Official denies US troops issue is Four-Party Talks topic,” April 7, 1999. 
342 The Korea Herald, “President’s remarks on U.S. troops embarrass working-level diplomats,” April 8, 
1999. 
343 Agence France Presse, “North Korea says US troops pullout should be raised at peace talks,” April 20, 
1999. 
344 Agence France Presse, “N. Korea accuses South of blocking peace talks,” April 21, 1999. 
345 The Korea Herald, “Seoul, Washingtonm Tokyo to meet in Hawaii for N.K. policy talks,” April 17, 
1999. 
346 BBC, “Koreas: delegates at Four-Party Talks to convene subcommittee meetings,” April 25, 1999. 
 151
April 26, 1999: President Kim Dae-Jung is reportedly trying to include Russia and Japan 
in a new six-party talk format.347 During the subcommittee at the Four-Party Talks, North 
Korea insists on a peace treaty with the U.S. while South Korea and the U.S. insist on a 
peace treaty between the Koreas.348 At the end of the talks, all parties communicate in a 
joint statement that they will meet again in August. The next round is designed to fashion 
ways to reduce tensions. 349  The talks do not discuss a Swiss proposal to create a 
humanitarian corridor to send aid to North Korea and host an international meeting to 
reduce tensions on the peninsula.350 
 
April 29, 1999: China, commenting on the four-way talks, views historical reasons as the 
reason for the lack of progress regarding a resolution on the peninsula.351 North Korea 
comments on the talks, saying that no real progress has been made, and that not 
discussing the troops’ status was a mistake.352 
 
ROUND 6 
July 14, 1999:  The media announces that the next round of Four-Party Talks will take 
place on August 5, with preparatory meetings on August 4. Two subcommittees, one on 
reducing tensions and the other on establishing peace will take place on August 6 and 
7.353 
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July 19, 1999:  A South Korea foreign affairs and trade official says that South Korea will 
not raise any inter-Korea issue at the Four-Party Talks.354  
 
July 31, 1999:  North Korea refuses an invitation from William Perry to North Korean 
First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-Ju to talk about the new U.S. approach 
to Pyongyang. No reasons are given for the refusal.355 
 
August 5, 1999: After the first day of talks, parties share little hope that anything will be 
achieved. Bilateral meetings regarding missiles between the United States and North 
Korea do not bring any agreement, as both sides stay wedded to their position. 356 
However, reports of constructive talks during the four-way talks lend hope for bilateral 
diplomatic relationships between the United States and North Korea.357 
 
August 6, 1999: North Korea shows some flexibility about discussing which parties 
should sign a potential peace treaty. However, North Korea insists that measures 
presented regarding the confidence-building aspect of the talks are not helpful. At the 
same time, North Korea’s chief negotiator states that Pyongyang will never recognize the 
Northern Limit Line in the West Sea.358 
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August 8, 1999: The round of talks ends with North Korea refusing to agree on a 
subsequent date for talks. 359  Pyongyang insists that it will only come back to the 
negotiation table if two key issues are included in the agenda.360  
 
December 17, 1999: The United States and South Korea express the view that Four-Party 
Talks should reconvene once North Korea and the United States have made progress in 
bilateral talks.361  
3. Discussion 
The Four-Party Talks represent the first attempt to achieve security over the 
Korean peninsula by using multilateral channels. For several years prior to the beginning 
of the talks, attempts at reaching a compromise on how the Korean War should officially 
end did not come to fruition, most likely because of the lack of proper diplomatic 
relations between the different parties, as well as because of different degrees of 
involvement in the situation from important actors. The key problem is still to determine 
which parties are involved in the Korean Armistice, and whether the issue of United 
States army personnel should be solved by bilateral talks between Pyongyang and 
Washington, or whether a normalization of the relationship between Pyongyang and 
Seoul should come first, to then allow American troops to disengage themselves from the 
peninsula. The Four-Party Talks are also the first continuous efforts by China, the United 
States, North Korea and South Korea to put together a framework for dialogue, as well as 
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create an official forum for parties to improve each other’s understanding of what the 
Korean situation means to each of them.  
 Out of the six rounds that took place from 1996 to 1999, only Round 3 and Round 
5 can really be labeled as having achieved some progress. The early rounds of 
negotiation, namely Round 1 and Round 2, were plagued by recurring North Korean 
requests for money in order in exchange for participating in to the talks. Before those 
initial rounds of talks even started, several meetings, or “pre-talks” had to be put in place, 
and North Korea’s numerous demands regarding food and economic aid had to be 
negotiated on in order to see the outline of a potential four-party meeting on the horizon. 
To this extent, North Korea can be considered to have been rather skillful, and to have 
taken opportunities to win some benefits even before the negotiation started. Thus, 
hypothesis 2D is supported, at least regarding North Korea’s attitude and success towards 
getting benefits even before any talks started. However, neither North Korea, nor the 
other parties involved in the talks received any substantial benefits during the actual 
rounds of negotiations other than continuing dialogue regarding the security of the 
peninsula; some talk is still better than no talk. We could consider that for North Korea 
being able to delay any potential change in the Korean peninsula, such as reunification by 
the South (implying the collapse or takeover of the North Korea regime) was beneficial. 
To this extent, the negotiations involving the different parties and North Korea can be 
seen as a zero-sum game. 
 Now looking further into the notion of gains and the notion of success in getting 
certain gains, the Four-Party Talks also show that North Korea responds better to 
incentives that are tied to low-politics matters instead of high-politics. One of the main 
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problems of talks was to separate different issues in order to make them more acceptable 
for debate. The agenda set up for the talks during the first round only consisted in 
building a framework and a set of rules specific to the talks, and did not delve into more 
subsequent issues regarding the Korean peninsula. The third round also saw more success 
in the talks, as the creation of subcommittees to be set for further talks was also agreed 
on. But in the end, the only matters that were agreed on by all parties, including North 
Korea, regarded setting up new rounds of talks. Thus, hypothesis 1B can be supported, 
since North Korea did not block agreement on the more trivial low politics issues, but did 
put on a confronting posture and refuse certain agreements and other matters pertaining 
to the political situation on the Korean peninsula such as the American presence on the 
peninsula 
 However, it is very hard to identify other particular North Korean negotiation 
behaviors during the Four-Party Talks. The talks did not really get to a level where real 
exchange and negotiating strategies were being used. It is nevertheless possible to uphold 
hypothesis 1A regarding the importance of face-value when negotiating. In this case, 
high-level officials were involved in the discussion. Furthermore, Thomas Hubbard was 
part of the negotiating teams that tried to persuade North Korea to join the negotiation 
table. South Korea decided to appoint more senior diplomats during the Third Round of 
talks. Moreover, North Korea strayed from its strategy of using the same negotiator as 
Kim Gye-Gwan was not the main negotiator for the second round, but came back as the 
main interlocutor for the third. The interlocutor for the second round, Ri Gun seemed not 
to have had enough power to decide on some decisions, as he stated that he did not have 
the authority to announce that the two Koreas would resume bilateral relations. This 
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incident also suggests a potential dissolution or tensions among the North Korean teams, 
and it leads us to wonder whether hypothesis 2A can also be considered valid. It seems 
that North Korea did not have enough cohesion among its team to have a clear line of 
command and direct negotiations the way it usually does. The fact that Kim Gye-Gwan 
resumed his position as the leader of the North Korean negotiation team for round 3 
might means that the North Korean command believed in him more than in Ri Gun who 
was the U.N. North Korean ambassador, and who belonged to the ‘New York’ channel of 
diplomatic relations, and therefore was perhaps not as close to the Pyongyang line of 
command. We cannot necessarily reject or validate hypothesis 2A because those 
negotiations did not really yield any benefits for any of the parties. We can determine, 
however, that when a potential unity of voices and clear cohesion within the negotiation 
teams is lacking, negotiations are hindered.  
 Finally, it is interesting to analyze the linkage between the Four-Party Talks and 
other crises that developed in the Korean peninsula at that time. The issue of the Agreed 
Framework does not seem to have been brought up as a leverage point by the different. 
There is no mention of the agreement during the negotiation episodes. Moreover, other 
diplomatic crises, such as the incursion in 1996 of a North Korean submarine in the South 
Korean waters, were not used by the United States as a catalyst to force North Korea to 
join the talk, or as leverage to push North Korea to accept an agreement. On the contrary, 
the submarine incident merely delayed the talks by a few months as North Korea refused 
to apologize for the incursion and defined the United States’ appeal for an apology as a 
revocation of the talks. Finally, the pressing issue of the Japanese abductees was not used 
as negotiation bait by any of the parties. This leads us to conclude that the Four-Party 
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Talks can be considered as quite isolated from other incidents and crises, and that 
hypothesis 3A that argues that a larger crisis can act as a pacifier for a negotiation 
episode should be rejected.  
 The most important significance of the Four-Party Talks can be found in the 
discussion and creation of subcommittees set up to facilitate negotiations among the 
different parties. The creation of subcommittees was a way to address smaller, more 
isolated incidents so that outcomes could more easily be achieved. In a sense, those 
smaller incidents could be considered similar to stand-alone crises.  
 
b. “Trilateral Talks”. 
 
1. The Premises 
 The failure of the 1996-200 Four-Party Talks to reach a peaceful agreement over 
the Korean peninsula left the whole region rather unstable. President Clinton was poised 
to visit North Korea for what would have been a historical trip, but the process fell apart 
after Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in 2000. The United 
States then welcome a new president as well as a new outlook on security and especially 
on the Korean peninsula, as George W. Bush took the reigns of power in 2001. 
 The September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent January 2002 "Axis of 
Evil" speech led to North Korea being openly characterized as a villain. Moreover, the 
nuclear situation over the Korean peninsula came to a new climax in October 2002 when 
North Korea openly acknowledged that it had been enriching uranium despite the fact 
that such action was violating the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea withdrew from 
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the Non Proliferation Treaty in January 2003, and it was obvious that a dialogue between 
the United States and North Korea was much needed. China decided to take the lead and 
bring the parties to a negotiation table in order to jumpstart the dialogue, and potentially a 
peace process as well. Efforts to enlarge the number of parties failed in the sense that 
South Korea and Japan did not join the table. However, China did, and the negotiations 
took place in April 2003 in Beijing. 
 
2. Case Timeline 
April 17, 2003: News that talks between the United States and North Korea have begun 
with China playing the role of a mediator, only three days after the fall of Baghdad. 
China’s importance in the planning of the negotiations becomes apparent and presents a 
good compromise between the United States’ call for multilateral negotiations and North 
Korea’s demand for bilateral ones.362 Officials in South Korea, however, are disappointed 
that the United States gave in to North Korea’s demand to exclude Seoul. A security 
adviser to President Roh highlights the fact that the negotiations are an effort to save face 
for the U.S. and North Korea.363 The United States does appear ready to consult with 
Japan and South Korea according to Japan’s Vice Foreign Minister Toshimistu Motegi.364  
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April 18, 2003: Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi calls President Bush to try to seek the 
inclusion of Japan in the upcoming talks.365 The U.S. gives credit to China for its role in 
influencing North Korea’s decision to join the talks noting that “it appeared that pressure 
exerted by China had compelled the North Koreans to change their position”.366 To 
everyone’s surprise, North Korean K.C.N. news agency releases a statement saying that 
North Korea was successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods.367  
 
April 22, 2003: American envoys arrive in Beijing after more than six months of stalled 
diplomatic process. The first negotiations are scheduled to start on Wednesday morning, 
and should continue until Friday. The U.S. delegation is headed by Assistant Secretary of 
State for Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly.368 The North Korean foreign ministry 
declares, however, that China will only act as a host during the negotiations.369 
 
April 26, 2003: Word starts to spread that North Korea has told the United States it 
possesses nuclear weapons, and that it might be exporting them to high bidders.370  
 
April 27, 2003: U.S. President Bush and Chinese President Hu have a phone conversation 
regarding the Korean peninsula. At the same time, sources reveal that North Korea had 
already told the United States in March during a regular United Nations meeting about its 
nuclear weapons, but that the State Department determined there was a translation 
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mistake, and therefore did not give much credit to the news. It did not, at any rate, share it 
with the public. The news is reiterated at the summit in Beijing.371 China, however, 
claims that North Korea did not reveal that it had nuclear weapons in the way the United 
States was publicizing it.372  
 
April 29, 2003: North Korea offers to abandon its nuclear weapons program, stop 
exporting its missiles, and allow foreign inspectors to return in exchange for a pledge of 
non-aggression from the United States. Colin Powell responds that the U.S. is looking at 
the proposal.373  
 
April 30, 2003: The White House declares it will not give any economic incentives in 
exchange for accepting North Korea’s offer: Ari Fleischer, the President’s spokesman, 
says that North Korea will not be rewarded for “bad behavior”. North Korea maintains 
that the United States is not being truthful when saying there will not be any reward to 
North Korea for giving up its nuclear program. The U.S. apparently declines the North 
Korean offer as a rift develops Colin Powell who is in favor of continuing the diplomatic 
effort, and Donald Rumsfeld who opposes a continuation under these circumstances.374 
The North Korean negotiation package calls for security guarantees from the United 
States, the lifting of economic sanctions, the provision of food and fuel deliveries as well 
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as aid from South Korea and economic relief from Japan as compensation for the 1910-
1945 Japanese occupation of Korea.375  
 
May 1, 2003: Despite different views regarding how to reach an agreement, the United 
States and North Korea agree to keep up the dialogue regarding the nuclear situation.376 
 
May 6, 2003: During a meeting with Australian Prime minister John Howard, President 
Bush outlines a new strategy to deal with North Korea. The strategy calls for accepting 
that North Korea has nuclear weapons, but working on preventing Pyongyang from 
selling them abroad.377 The Bush administration tries a new two-track approach that 
combines new meetings along with pressuring North Korea on the export of illegal drugs, 
counterfeiting and missile sales.378  
 
May 25, 2003: The United States and Japan warn North Korea against escalating the 
nuclear situation during Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch.379  
 
July 22, 2003: Chinese President Hu Jintao sends letters to both North Korea and the 
United States, pleading them to get back to the negotiation table.380  
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The Trilateral Talks are an important milestone in the history of the negotiation 
relationship between the United States and Kim Jong-Il as they are the first official talks 
following the election of George W. Bush to the White House. The political climate of 
the talks could not be separated from other international events since the talks happened 
only a few weeks after the fall of Baghdad. Moreover, North Korea had announced 
earlier in January 2003 that it was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty as it 
had decided to go on with reprocessing plutonium at the Yongbyon site, hence adding 
uncertainty to the nuclear situation over the Korean peninsula.  
 The talks were trilateral despite the interests of other states with a stake in the 
conflict. As such, China played the role of finding a compromise between North Korea’s 
call for one-on-one negotiations with the United States and Washington’s desire for a 
multilateral approach. North Korea had long been bypassing Seoul when it came to 
negotiations, and had been pursuing Washington in the hope of having bilateral talks. 
North Korea’s insistence on bilateral relations probably is an outgrowth of North Korea’s 
understanding of the Armistice to the Korean War. North Korea understands the 
Armistice as involving Pyongyang and the United States since Washington was headed 
the United Nations’ mission that led the war effort. However, because the United 
Nations’ mission force although led by the United States, was composed of several 
countries, American politicians understood the Armistice as being between North Korea 
and the United Nations. Thus, North Korea understands the relationship as being a 
bilateral one, while Washington sees it as a multilateral one. A multilateral approach may 
also help the U.S. to avoid being too confrontational and concessionary.  
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 The Trilateral Talks, though not being what Washington had hoped for when 
considering the prospect of talks with North Korea, were nevertheless considered 
important since they were the first encounter of the Bush administration with North 
Korea. They were also highly important to the War on Terror because of North Korea’s 
presumed active role in selling chemical and nuclear weapons to groups identified as 
terrorist groups by the United States.  
 Negotiations regarding the setting for the talks and who the participants would be 
were conducted by country leaders, with strong and constant discussions taking place 
among President Bush, President Roh, Prime Minister Koizumi, and Chinese President 
Hu. Japan’s insistence on being included in the talks along with South Korea’s 
disappointment that Pyongyang refused to include Seoul in the talks left China more in 
the position of a host than as a real participant. The U.S. mission to Beijing was led by 
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, while the North 
Korean delegation was led, as usual, by Vice Foreign Minister Kim, who had already 
acted in several negotiations instances during the Clinton Administration. Thus, high-
level officials were present. There was also considerable preparation that went into the 
talks. Several phone calls took place between President Bush and President Hu prior to 
the beginning of the talks, and high U.S. officials were involved along with Secretary of 
State Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld. Thus, conditions pertaining to hypothesis 1A 
are valid, since high level officials have been involved with the process since its 
inception, and North Korea did not negotiate its own participation in the talks, but rather 
negotiated on excluding other parties from the discussion. Hypothesis 1B is also valid by 
default as most of the discussion during the Trilateral Talks was focused on extremely 
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high-politics issues such as North Korea’s nuclear program, the possibility of changing 
the Armistice into a more permanent peace treaty, and North Korea’s trying to secure a 
non-aggression treaty with the United States. 
 The Trilateral Talks, however, mark the beginning of an unsettling trend within 
the U.S. Administration. This trend will influences subsequent negotiations during the 
Six-Party Talks: the Bush Administration appeared divided on the issue of how to deal 
with North Korea, and separated into right-wingers weary of North Korea’s intention by 
still willing to engage Pyongyang to some extents (those are called “Dove” by Victor 
Cha), and ultra right-wingers wanting to use much more than only sticks (those are called 
“Hawks” by Cha)381. Hypothesis 2A, regarding the unity of teams, can here be applied to 
the United States. The North Korean team seems to have stayed fairly constant in its 
composition and in its demand. However, the United States’ team was divided between 
hawks and doves, with Colin Powell leaning towards a dovish engagement and Donald 
Rumsfeld being on the side of the hawks who were taking a hard-line approach. This 
division seems to have stemmed from the lack of trust between President Bush and Colin 
Powell, and transported itself through the American negotiation team up to its leader. 
James Kelly did not have any leeway in negotiating with North Korea. Thus followed a 
distrust of Kelly by the North Korea negotiation team. Subsequently no agreement was 
reached at the end of the talks. 
 The Trilateral Talks, however, do not reveal any more strategic moves led by 
North Korea, nor do they show any advantage Pyongyang might have gleamed through 
its regular negotiation tactics. No agreement was reached, even though North Korea 
                                                 
381 Victor Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," International 
Security 27, no. 1 (2002). 
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asked for security guarantees from the United States, as well as the lifting of economic 
sanctions and the provision of food and fuel. At the same time though, while North Korea 
did not receive any tangible gains from the negotiations, it did not get hurt either. The 
United States did not enact harsher sanctions despite Pyongyang’s disclosure that it had 
indeed violated the Agreed Framework by developing nuclear weapons. At best, the talks 
provided a springboard for China to get more involved in the situation and use its 
diplomatic efforts to bring parties closer. Hypothesis 3A can also be refuted, as 
regulations regarding the Agreed Framework were not being brought up on North Korea 
for having violated the accord.  
 Thus, one can consider the Trilateral Talks as being a new phase in the 
negotiation relationship between the United States and North Korea. It fulfilled a desire 
by the United States to engage into multilateral negotiations instead of solving crises 
bilaterally. It also brought China in as a player. Most of the negotiations between 
Pyongyang and Washington since the initiation of the Trilateral Talks have been through 
multilateral channels, the most successful of them being the Six-Party Talks. This new 
U.S. approach has thus stayed true to what President Bush disclosed to Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard during their May 2003 meeting, namely that the United States 
would accept that North Korea has nuclear weapons and would not punish Pyongyang for 
having them, but would instead work on the premise that North Korea is a nuclear state, 








The 2003 Trilateral Talks between the United States, North Korea and China was 
an attempt to restart the dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang after more than 
three years without any contact, following the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York city as 
well a North Korea's pulling out of the N.P.T. treaty.  
The United States started to understand China as being a valuable partner, in the 
sense that it could influence North Korea to come to the negotiation table, as well as 
pressure Pyongyang to a certain extent. The Trilateral Talks led to the opening of a more 
comfortable framework of negotiations that sought to be comprehensive. Thus, the idea 
of a Six-Party Talks that would include the United States, North Korea, South Korea, 
China, Russia and Japan was a logical continuation of the work achieved during the 
Trilateral Talks. It also managed to answer Japan and South Korea's desire not to be 
bypassed when it came to the matter of Northeast Asia's security.  
Following North Korea's withdrawal from the N.P.T as well as its declaration in 
2003 that it had nuclear weapons, parties wanted to discuss a potential nuclear-free 
peninsula. However, once at the negotiation table, parties found it hard to restrain the talk 
to only matters of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, and domestic interests as well as 
old rivalry often took the upper-hand during the talks. Finally, a historical, but short-lived 
accord was finally signed on September 19, 2005, providing for a nuclear-free peninsula 
along the very similar lines of the defunct 1994 Agreed Framework. 
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2. Case Timeline 
 
ROUND 1 
September 2, 2002: The press reports that Kim Jong-Il and Prime Minister Koizumi will 
meet on September 17 to discuss the possibility of a six-party summit. 382 The report is 
rebuffed by the South Korea Foreign Ministry the same day.383  
 
September 18, 2002: Russian president Vladimir Putin tells Prime Minister Koizumi over 
the phone that he will support a proposal for Six-Party Talks. Koizumi confirms that he 
talked to Kim Jong-Il on September 17 regarding the potential meetings, and that he 
“achieved as much as could have been expected”.384  
 
August 1, 2003: North Korea accepts to take part in the six-country talks. The news 
reaches George W. Bush through President Hu Jintao. At the same time in Tokyo, John 
Bolton, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control describes Kim Jong-Il as a 
dictator, blackmailer and extortionist.385  
 
August 3, 2003: North Korea states it will not have any dialogue with John Bolton but 
that it will still participate in the Six-Party Talks.386 
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August 18, 2003: Japanese ambassador to Russia Nomura Issei and Russian foreign 
deputy Alexamder Losyukov hold consultations in Moscow about the status of the 
Korean peninsula. 387  Prior to the start of the negotiations, Losyukov assesses that  
chances to reach an agreement at the talks are very weak.388  
 
August 25, 2003: Wang Yi, head of the Chinese delegation, holds individual pre-
conferences with Alexander Lusyukov, James Kelly, Yi Su-hyok and Mitohi Yubanaka, 
heads of the Russian, American, South Korean and Japanese delegations.389  
 
August 27, 2003: Talks open in Beijing and parties are seated around hexagonal tables 
and by alphabetical order.390 During an informal bilateral exchange with Pyongyang, 
James Kelly promises North Korea that the United States has no intention of invading 
North Korea, reiterating instead Washington’s will to see a termination of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program.391 However, Washington plays down the significance of the 
bilateral meeting with North Korea.392  The United States stresses the importance of 
North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapons first. North Korea, sitting next to the United 
States at the negotiation table, insists on having Washington sign a legally binding treaty 
of nonaggression. North Korea also reminds the United States not to obstruct its trade 
with other countries. Japan asks North Korea to settle the issue of missile testing as well 
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as the abductees’ issue393, but North Korea insists that Japan broke its promise to send 
back five abductees who had been granted permission to visiting Japan to be reunited 
with their families.394 
 
August 28, 2003: After general meetings in the morning, parties break into groups in the 
afternoon and hold bilateral meetings.395 North Korea meets with Japan, and both parties 
discuss nuclear arms issues as well as the abductees’ issue.396  U.S. envoy James Kelly 
reportedly leaves the venue of the talk more than two hours earlier than the North Korean 
negotiators will.397 North Korea reportedly presents a proposal that states it would give 
up its nuclear ambition in return for fuel supplies, and in exchange for building the 
reactors that were promised by the Agreed Framework.398 The proposal presents four 
points: that the U.S. signs a non-aggression treaty, that North Korea receives guarantees 
of economic aid from Japan and Korea, the completion of the Agreed Framework terms, 
and finally that North Korea would in return not manufacture nuclear weapons 
anymore.399 North Korea holds meetings with South Korea and because of translation 
difficulties, Pyongyang asks for South Korea’s help in explaining the United States’ 
keynote speech.400  Finally, a U.S. official tells C.N.N. that a North Korean foreign 
minister had told the delegates that Pyongyang was considering declaring itself a nuclear 
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power and testing nuclear weapons, meaning it had the capacity to deliver such 
weapons.401 Apparently, North Korea’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il responded 
to Mr. Kelly’s rejection of a nonaggression pact by saying that North Korea would 
formally declare that it has nuclear weapons.402 North Korea considers the United States’ 
call for North Korea to disarm first preposterous.403 
 
August 29, 2003: During a State Department conference, State Department spokeswoman 
Jo-Anne Prokopowicz declares that the United States will not cede to blackmail in 
response to North Korea’s threat to declare itself a nuclear power.404 The talks end with 
an agreement to meet again within two months but no date and no venue is set.405 China 
says that the parties have reached a six-point consensus: 1) a nuclear-free peninsula is 
desired, 2) parties agree to explore avenue to resolve the problem with reasonable and 
just means, 3) parties want to continue dialogue, 4) a peaceful means should be 
employed, 5) that negotiations should be free of damaging actions and 6) the Six-Party 
Talks should be held again.406 The White House cautions that it has not yet seen a written 
copy of what North Korea had said regarding nuclear weapons, and thus insists it does 
not consider North Korea’s behavior as anything different from its usual blackmailing 
tactics 407 , but at some point during the negotiation, North Korea expresses doubts 
whether the talks should go on. Nevertheless, eventually all parties agree to go on with 
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the dialogue.408  The Russian government says that at some point, a statement was to be 
released to the media regarding a potential date for the future talks, but problems still 
remained. 409  South Korea appears satisfied with the talks and Seoul’s vice foreign 
minister says delegates shared the view that a solution should be tackled through a 
package deal that would be dealt with simultaneously and gradually.410 South Korea sets 
out to keep on furnishing economic aid to North Korea for compatriotism and 
humanitarianism.411 Japan appears satisfied with the talks, but expresses regret that the 
issue of the abductees could not be resolved.412 Japan also expresses its gratitude to the 
United States for raising the issue of the abductees.413 The South Korean minister of 
foreign affairs and external trade is to visit Washington early in September to discuss the 
results of the Six-Party Talks with the United States.414  
 
ROUND 2 
October 30, 2003: During a high-profile visit to North Korea by the Chinese leader of the 
Parliament, North Korea agrees to resume the Six-Party Talks.415  
 
December 27, 2003: North Korea apparently agrees to work with China to restart the six-
party negotiations. A joint statement by the Chinese and North Korean government 
underlines the importance of a second round of talks.416 
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February 24, 2004: On the eve of the second round of Six-Party Talks, Russia and China 
hold a consultation.  Russia also holds separate consultations with North Korea and South 
Korea.417 The two Koreas’ consultation with Russia is a first in the history of bilateral 
pre-talk meetings.418  
 
February 25, 2004: The parties are seated around a hexagonal table and in alphabetical 
order, an arrangement similar to the previous round of Six-Party Talks.419  The first 
morning of negotiations is going past the official adjourn time of 12:30 pm420. During the 
session, the issue of economic aid to North Korea is mentioned.421 China is reportedly 
pushing the participants to issue a written statement at the conclusion of the talks, and to 
establish working groups. The talks do not have a fixed end date.422  The United States, 
backed by South Korea and Japan, sticks to its hard line that it will not agree to detailed 
negotiations as long as Pyongyang does not commit to a complete, verifiable and 
irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program.423  South Korea brings a three-step 
approach to the table. In step one, North Korea expresses its willingness to dismantle its 
program in exchange for other countries to stop threatening North Korea with their 
military arsenal. In step two, corresponding measures are taken by relevant countries, 
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mostly being incentive packages. In step three, other issues besides nuclear ones are 
negotiated.424  
 
February 26, 2004: The South Korean offer of compensation is carefully reviewed during 
the talks, as step one and two are being discussed.425 However, after North Korea puts an 
offer of nuclear disarmament on the table, it accuses the United States of trying to block 
progress. North Korea’s embassy in Seoul calls a press conference and lambastes 
Washington.426 The United States is apparently on the verge of leaving the talks, if North 
Korea does not make a move. North Korea apparently tries to retain a part of its nuclear 
activity as a peaceful capability. Russia is reportedly understanding of the North’s 
position of not wanting to give up more than its nuclear defense program.427  The parties 
try to work on a draft of an agreement, and each party submits its own draft. The Chinese 
draft, however, does not include the full, irreversible, and verifiable elimination of North 
Korea’s nuclear facilities.428  
 
February 27, 2004: The parties agree to extend the talks by one day, in order to settle 
their differences. The six countries agree on a joint statement that is to be issued at the 
end of the talks, thus showing some form of consensus.429  
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February 28, 2004: As the talks close, a final statement is issued, citing differences, but 
also the understanding of mutual positions, the willingness to coexist peacefully, plans 
for meeting again in Beijing no later than the end of the second quarter of 2004, and 
setting up a working group in preparation for the plenary. The parties thank China for its 
organization of the talks.430 After the talks, the United States expresses its interest in the 
unprecedented dialogue that has taken place and reasserts the need for the parties to agree 
to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (coined ‘C.V.I.D.’) of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons. The United States also recognizes the mood of the talks as 
being much more relaxed than during the previous rounds, and acknowledges China’s 
role as not only a participant, but as a mediator and facilitator.431  The closing ceremony 
is delayed as North Korea was working on trying to include a last clause in the 
statement432, however Japan and the United States refuse the proposal.433 China cites the 
difference as being only a wording question.434 Despite the fact that North Korea and the 
United States met twice for about an hour each time, China points out that strong 
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ROUND 3 
March 26, 2004: Upon returning from a three-day trip to North Korea, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Li Zhaoxing announces that North Korea is ready for a new round of Six-Party 
Talks after Li talks for more than ninety minutes with Kim Jong-Il.436  
 
April 6, 2004:  China submits a draft regarding setting up work meetings for the Six-Party 
Talks, and the draft is accepted by all parties.437  
 
April 26, 2004: Colin Powell pushes aside the idea that it will not be feasible to go ahead 
with Six-Party Talks before the November 2 American presidential elections.438  
 
May 12, 2004: Working talks begin in Beijing. North Korea broaches the possibility of 
letting inspectors visit the nuclear facility as a first step towards dismantling the 
installation, after the United States demands C.V.I.D. North Korea, represented by Ri 
Gun, expresses its unchanged position on economic aid as compensation for allowing site 
inspection.439    
 
May 27, 2004: South Korea expresses its pessimism about holding a third round of talks 
soon, mostly because of other diplomatic schedules that parties have to follow. It also 
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declares that it is working on an alternate terminology to the United States’ C.V.I.D. as 
North Korea is strongly resisting the wording.440  
 
June 11, 2004: The United States, Japan and South Korea hold policy coordination 
meetings in order to prepare for the Six-Party Talks that will start on June 23.441  
 
June 21, 2004: Two days of working-level Six-Party Talks start. North Korea offers to 
present a clear roadmap for freezing its installations.442  
 
June 23, 2004: The United States proposes a new but highly conditional plan to North 
Korea, offering energy rewards in steps so that North Korea freezes its nuclear program 
in a three months period. North Korea says it will study the American proposal.443  
 
June 25, 2004 
 North Korea discloses the details of its “freeze-for-compensation” program, 
which includes a demand for 2 million tons of energy a year, the removal of its name 
from Washington’s list of terrorism-sponsoring states, and the lifting of all sanctions 
imposed over the years.444 North Korea also holds bilateral talks with the United States 
and apparently renews its threat to conduct nuclear weapons tests. Then, it holds talks 
                                                 
440 BBC, “Date for third Six-Party Talks yet to be decided, says South Korean foreign Minister,” May 27, 
2004. 
441 Japan Economic Newswire, “Japan, S. Korea to meet with U.S. over 6-party talks,” June 10, 2004. 
442 Yonhap, “U.S, N. Korea lock horns at working-level Six-Party Talks,” June 21, 2004.  
443 Yonhap, “Six-Party Talks produce no breakthrough: U.S. official,” June 25, 2004. 
444 Ibid. 
 177
with China. The closing ceremony is cancelled.445 At the dawn of the talks, parties agree 
to meet again and abide by the work of the working groups. The United States says it will 
look into the North Korea “freeze” proposal, and all parties agree on the principle of 
“word for word” and “actions for actions”, meaning a progressive approach that would be 
sequential in nature and whereby one party would commit to an action and being met by 
a similar commitment from its counterpart to then progress to the implementation of the 
commitment on both sides. North Korea is also pleased that the United States did not use 
the terms C.V.I.D.446  
 




July 28, 2004:  China proposes holding working group meetings from August 11 to 
August 14, prior to the start of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks.448  
 
August 24, 2004: North Korea backtracks from all agreements and common 
understandings reached during round three of the Six-Party Talks in response to supposed 
verbal attacks from George W. Bush. 449  Difficulties to set up new meetings are 
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acknowledged by China as well.450 The problems seem to have arisen from the fact that 
South Korea has conducted nuclear activities as well (South Korea has enriched uranium 
in 2000 and though Seoul has claimed that it was only developing experiments out of 
scientific curiosity, the experiments could still technically be considered a violation of 
some provisions of the N.P.T.).451 North Korea accuses the United States of maintaining 
a double standard over the Korean peninsula.452 It is now known that South Korea made 
uranium enrichment experiments in 2000 and had conducted an experiment to extract 
plutonium in 1982.453 
 
June 18, 2005: The European Parliament is to send a delegation to North Korea to urge 
Pyongyang to get back to the negotiation table. The delegation will also visit South 
Korea.454 North Korea says it is willing to rejoin the Six-Party Talks if the United States 
recognizes and respects Pyongyang as a regime.455  
 
July 9, 2005: The K.C.N.A. announces that North Korea’s vice foreign minister has 
agreed with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill to hold six-nation talks the 
last week of July.456 
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July 13, 2005:  Washington wants to change the format of the Six-Party Talks to allow 
time for extended negotiations without having a fixed set of days.457  
 
July 21, 2005:  The United States announces that it backs Japan in its will to discuss the 
issue of abductees during the Six-Party Talks.458  
 
July 23, 2005:  North Korea calls for the exclusion of Japan from the Six-Party Talks if it 
plans to raise the issue of kidnapped Japanese citizens again.459  
 
July 24, 2005: North Korea and South Korea meet in Beijing, a day ahead of the Six-
Party Talks’ start date.460  
July 27, 2005: North Korea rejects a proposal by the United States that North Korea must 
take the first step that had been presented during the June 2004 round.  
 
July 29, 2005:  Negotiations are expected to continue over the weekend as a fourth one-
on-one meeting was to be scheduled between the United States and North Korea.461  
 
July 30, 2005:  North Korea and the United States apparently reach an understanding of 
what “denuclearization of the peninsula” means.462  Parties conclude their meeting by 
                                                 
457 BBC, “US wants format change in Six-Party Talks:  South Korean envoy,” July 14, 2005.  
458 Japan Economic Newswire, “U.S. backs Japan bringing up abduction issue at 6-party talks,” July 21, 
2005.  
459 Yonhap, “N. Korea calls for removal of Japan from Six-Party Talks,” July 23, 2005. 
460 Japan Economic Newswire, “N. Korea, S. Korea delegations meet ahead of 6-party talks,” July 24, 
2005.  
461 BBC, “No sign of breakthrough as Six-Party Talks enter day four,” July 29, 2005. 
462 BBC, “North Korean sources tells Russian agency of progress at Six-Party Talks,” July 20, 2005.  
 180
agreeing to have discussions on a joint document. Japan calls for the inclusion of a clause 
regarding human rights issues.463  
 
August 1, 2005: Ending twelve hours of work, U.S. delegation head Christopher Hill says 
there have been no breakthroughs regarding the drafting process of a joint document, and 
that it will take many more days to reach a conclusion to the talks.464  
 
August 4, 2005: The ball seems to be in North Korea’s camp as parties wait for 
Pyongyang to make a real decision regarding its nuclear program.465  
 
August 8, 2005: The negotiators decide to take a three-week break from the negotiation 
after more than thirteen days of talks. Potential reconvene date for the negotiations is set 
as August 29.466  
 
August 10, 2005: Song Min-Soon, South Korea’s chief envoy to the talks, despite his 
closeness with Christopher Hill, blames the United States as much as North Korea for 
making it difficult to reach an agreement in the talks.467 South Korea asserts that North 
Korea did not specifically call for a provision regarding light-water reactors during the 
talks, but that Pyongyang stated it wanted to have access to peaceful nuclear activities.468  
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August 12, 2005: A South Korean official says North Korea should have access to 
peaceful nuclear energy, therefore creating a rift between Seoul and Washington.469  
 
August 16, 2005: Ambassador Hill sends a message to North Korea through the New 
York diplomatic channels, in an effort to “stay in touch” with Pyongyang during the talk 
recess. Washington also hopes for discussion with North Korea ahead of the official 
resumption of the talks.470  
 
August 20, 2005: The United States names a U.S. special envoy on human rights for 
North Korea, but denies that this is intended to put pressure on North Korea. Christopher 
Hill says that he had raised the human rights issue during the last round of talks in 
Beijing.471  
 
August 22, 2005: The United States announces it has had diplomatic contacts with North 
Korea during the previous week. The first one was an offer to provide an answer and 
clarification to North Korea regarding the U.S. position. The second contact involved 
U.S. special envoy for North Korean negotiations Joseph de Trani.472  
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August 30, 2005: North Korea cites the recent U.S.-South Korea joint military drill as 
delaying resumption of the Six-Party Talks, but says negotiations could resume on 
September 12.473  
 
September 2, 2005: China’s director general of arms control Whang Yan backs North 
Korea’s right to peaceful nuclear energy once it dismantles its weapons and returns to the 
N.P.T.474 
 
September 12, 2005: Bilateral meetings conducted between North Korea and the United 
States during the recess have apparently not brought the parties closer, as North Korea 
wants the right to nuclear energy, and also asks for resources. South Korea offers to 
replace the intended energy supply of the generator by electricity coming from the 
South.475    
 
September 13, 2005: North Korea sticks to its claim that it has the right to have peaceful 
nuclear energy.476 China cites lack of trust between North Korea and the United States as 
being one of the most important hurdles to overcome.477  
 
September 14, 2005: Talks deadlock over the fourth version of a draft proposed by China 
which does not mention the provision of a light-water reactor to North Korea.478  
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September 16, 2005: Parties are reported to have difficulties reaching a consensus on a 
revised version of the fourth draft that refers to the possible future construction of a light-
water reactor demanded by North Korea479 Leaving the negotiations to go back to his 
hotel, Christopher Hill states that North Korea is not really interested in energy but is 
more concerned with getting a “trophy” reactor.480 The United States also holds out the 
threat of freezing some of North Korea’s assets if there is no breakthrough at the talks 
during the next five days.481  
 
September 19, 2005: Parties agree to a statement that is then release, in which North 
Korea agrees to drop its nuclear program.482 The agreement states that North Korea has 
the right to a peaceful nuclear energy program and that a potential nuclear reactor could 
be discussed later on. The United States also states that it has no intention of invading 
North Korea. All six nations agree to promote cooperation in the fields of energy, trade 
and investment.483  
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September 20, 2005: North Korea says that it will not abandon its nuclear program until it 
receives a light-water nuclear reactor for energy production, thus rescinding its agreement 
to the statement released by the six-party nations the day before.484  
 
3. Discussion 
The Six-Party Talks are a very different type of negotiations than the previous 
bilateral and multilateral encounters between and among North Korea, the United States, 
and the other regional powers. Since Kim Jong-Il’s 1994 accession to power, many 
events have been shaping the relationship between these different powers. At the 
beginning of the Six-Party Talks in 2003, hopes to salvage the 1994 Agreed Framework 
were rather small, and parties seemed to have learned from the Four-Party Talks not to 
create too broad an agenda, like pursuing a peaceful Korean peninsula. From the onset of 
the Six-Party Talks, however, several factors influenced the talks. First, the addition of 
Russia and Japan, while logical additions given that the talks were about denuclearization 
of the peninsula, did not bring as much impetus as was expected. Russia’s role was rather 
negligible and Japan’s participation did not help improve the situation. Because Japan 
stuck to nationalistic goals during the talks, namely bringing to the table the issue of 
Japanese who were abducted by North Korea thirty years earlier, Japan exacerbated the 
discussions. The talks may have gone more smoothly if they had been limited to the 
already complex issue of nuclear weapons. It also seems that parties did not gain much 
consensus on ideas, and at some point, also constituted different poles of interests. In 
some sense, this was a case of the more players involved, the less chance for a consensus. 
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As a case in point, China and South Korea did support the idea that North Korea should 
be allowed to have a peaceful nuclear energy program, while the United States and Japan 
jointly opposed it. 
Lack of unity between players during the negotiations also played an important 
role. This was especially true for the United States. The first three rounds of negotiations 
proved themselves relatively fruitless until a breakthrough was achieved in the summer of 
2005. When looking at the constitution of the U.S. team, it is interesting to note a sharp 
change of attitude between the two Bush terms. During the first term, Colin Powell was 
coupled with James Kelly as a negotiator, but it seems that because of the tense 
relationship between President Bush and Powell, Powell was not empowered, and the 
United States negotiation team, as a result, did not have any leeway in the negotiations. 
During the second Bush term, however, Condolezza Rice, coupled with the Korean-
culture sensitive Christopher Hill, achieved much more than did the previous teams. This 
was most likely because of Rice’s closeness to George Bush who trusted her choices 
when dealing with foreign affairs. A split is also apparent in North Korea, especially 
regarding the military and the decision-making organs. At some point, North Korea’s 
request that negotiation-related documents not be released for fear that its military might 
get a hold of them is telling, and also reminiscent of the 1994 pilot case in which a split 
between the executive and military power could be detected. It thus seems that hypothesis 
2A, negotiations are more likely to be successful when there is unity of views in the 
team’s positions, is very salient, and could be supported for the Six-Party Talks.  
Another important point during the Six-Party Talks was the willingness of the 
players to try a different approach to the negotiations. During the summer of 2005, 
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participants decided to make the negotiation an open-ended process. Not having a fixed 
number of days designated to reach an agreement, parties changed the structure of the 
negotiations from a multi-round negotiation to a system much more similar to 
negotiations opened in response to a sudden crisis. The change in approach was 
accompanied by a change in the participants’ mindset. Instead of coming to the 
negotiations for a given period of time and then planning on leaving on a fixed date, 
participants now operated with a heightened commitment to the process and a willingness 
to stay as long as it would take to find agreement. It is thus possible to support hypothesis 
3B. Changing a negotiation structure to a situation more similar to negotiations to deal 
with an unexpected crisis when there is no fixed time frame involved seems more likely 
to produce more success than does adhering to a strict timetable.  
North Korea also took a more active and serious role in the negotiations. It did not 
negotiate its participation in the talks as much as it had done in the past. Regarding its 
negotiation strategy, North Korea placed a great weight on the important of face 
(hypothesis 1A). North Korea continued to demand respect. It refused to pursue talks 
with John Bolton after he used very harsh language to talk about North Korea. North 
Korea was extremely unhappy with the term C.V.I.D., “complete, verifiable, irreversible 
dismantlement” used to abbreviate what the United States wanted to achieve during these 
negotiations regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons. The term C.V.I.D. became a 
contentious issue for North Korea which refused to use the term and also refused to 
permit the United States to use it. After the United States finally abandoned the phrase, 
North Korea was much more disposed to resume serious negotiations. Thus, while no 
tangible gains were achieved throughout the negotiations, North Korea did not suffer 
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while negotiating. It also managed to impose some of its vision regarding how the 
relationship should be conducted and how Pyongyang should be treated in the 
international system, thus somewhat supporting hypotheses 2C and 2D regarding North 
Korea’s negotiating abilities.  
However, the most important trait of the Six-Party Talks was the power shift that 
operated between the United States and China. During the previous decade, China had 
not been as involved in the Korean peninsula’s affairs as now, probably because China 
was still not considered so much of a power or opened up to Western values, especially 
capitalism. By the 2000s, China distanced itself from North Korea and its accession to the 
W.T.O. and to global markets helped its image to change from that of a dangerous enemy 
at the beginning of the Cold War to more of a partner for the United States nowadays. 
Starting during the Four-Party Talks, and after, during the Trilateral Talks and Six-Party 
Talks, China was the main driver that managed to bring North Korea back to the 
negotiation table after each round of negotiations. One can wonder whether China was 
using North Korea as a pawn to protect itself from the United States, or whether China 
was extremely concerned and worried about a rogue North Korea and what would happen 
if North Korea collapsed according to a hard-landing schema. The United States has 
accepted China’s larger role, recognizing that East Asian nations would step up to the 
plate to take care of their own destiny. While such a situation might not have been 
desirable for the United States at the beginning of Kim Jong-Il’s reign, it is now almost a 
desirable and logical development, considering the United States commitment to and 
difficulty in the Middle East theater.  
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The main question regarding the Six-Party Talks is whether other successful 
rounds will follow. While Round 4 was extremely successful, with the signature of a 
common agreement that announced North Korea’s intention to abandon its nuclear 
program, Pyongyang’s reneging of the agreement only a few days after it was signed was 
a definite letdown. While the United States argued that North Korea’s request for a light 
water reactor was no deal breaker, the subsequent round of negotiations that occurred in 
November did not reach anything near the momentum that had been experienced during 
the summer. One can thus ask how many is too many rounds, and whether multilateral 








Chapter  Six. Negotiating with North Korea: Is There a Strategy? 
 
 The previous chapters have presented independent analyses of the seven different 
negotiation cases pertaining to the Kim Jong-Il reign, starting with the 1994 Pilot Case 
and ending with the September 19 agreement signed during the fourth round of Six-Party 
Talks. These individual analyses were based on archival work.  They have presented the 
cases and initial conclusions regarding the set of eight hypotheses grouped along the 
individual, state, and international levels. The present chapter will present an overall 
analysis of the cases and will focus on deriving North Korea’s negotiation strategy for the 
given period of study.  It will also present reinforcing anecdotes and views gathered 
through interviews with negotiation protagonists as well as experts.  
 
a. Timeliness of Negotiation Episodes: An Overview 
 
 The twelve-year period that is the focus of this study started with high hopes of 
fostering cooperation over the Korean peninsula as Kim Jong-Il took power only a few 
months before the Geneva Agreed Framework was signed in 1994. An overview of the 
cases shows a clear separation between various types of negotiations.  The first phase 
could be labeled “Teenage Diplomacy.”  It took place as soon as Kim Jong-Il came to 
power and is illustrated by the first and only crisis negotiation case in the time-period.  
This was an incident that was not initiated by North Korea but rather a pilot’s 
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miscalculation/mistake. The Pilot case opened the way for the world to see whether or 
not Kim Jong-Il had managed to succeed his father. 
  The second phase that can be labeled “Tentative Diplomacy” started in 1996 and 
ended in 2000. This phase was characterized by tense relationships over the Korean 
peninsula because of the 1996 incursion of the North Korean submarine into South 
Korean waters, North Korea’s difficulties overcoming the food crisis, and numerous 
floods and droughts. The Nodong case as well as the Kumchang-ri case are examples of 
bilateral diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang, and involved monetary 
compensation. The Four-Party Talks that also took place during this period show the 
importance of monetary compensation; North Korea used the initial rounds to win money 
for its participation in the talks.  In particular, 1998 and 1999 show an increase in the 
amount of negotiation that took place with North Korea, and reflect the interest that 
North Korea had for the Clinton administration.  Madeleine Albright’s 2000 visit to 
North Korea was meant to pave the way for a potential Clinton visit before the end of his 
term.485 Albright’s visit was also part of a succession of events that was tied to the failure 
of the Bilateral Missile Talks. According to Donald Gregg  who was then working for the 
Council on Foreign Relations, it was concluded that the missile crisis was risking the 
United States’ relationship with North Korea, and the C.F.R. asked that a high diplomat 
be selected to be sent to North Korea in order to help the issue move forward.486 As a 
result, William Perry was sent to Pyongyang and though he did not meet with Kim Jong-
Il, he managed to develop a relationship with his North Korean counterparts that was 
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strong enough so that General Politburo Director Cho Myong-Nok was sent to 
Washington to carry an invitation for President Clinton to visit North Korea.487  
 
 The 2000 Inter-Korea summit meeting was the most important reconciliation 
event that the two Koreas had taken part in since the division of the peninsula, but also 
coincided with a change of leadership in Washington D.C., as President Bush entered the 
White House. For many, the Clinton-Kim Dae-Jung years were the most successful in 
terms of diplomacy.  The first democratic government in South Korea did not constrain 
Washington as much as earlier regimes had 488  since previous regimes could be 
considered as being more authoritarian (With the Park regime that had many diverging 
views from the Carter administration, especially on the issues of human rights). That 
window of opportunity, however, ended with September 11, 2001.  In comparison with 
2000, 2001 and 2002 show a dearth in the relationship between the United States and 
North Korea, mostly because of the terrorist attacks and President Bush’s Axis of Evil 
speech in early 2002.  President Bush’s change in policy towards North Korea, illustrated 
by its decision not to pick up where President Clinton had left off, angered many South 
Korean conservatives, especially as it contradicted Colin Powell’s statements that the 
Bush policy would be no different than that of Clinton. Slowly, the Bush Administration 
started to show more flexibility and when President Bush came to Seoul in 2003, he was 
eager to talk with North Korea.489 Thus, the 2003-2005 period can be labeled a period of 
“Renewal of Multilateral Diplomacy.” It was characterized by two frameworks that relied 
heavily on China bringing North Korea to the negotiation table.  The monetary bait that 
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was used in the 1990s ceased to be a requisite for bringing North Korea into negotiations. 
Because of the war in Iraq and the United States’ 2002 preemptive strike doctrine, China 
decided to step into the situation in order to replace the absence of American diplomacy 
towards North Korea.490 Thus, because China saw North Korea as being a potential threat 
if it collapsed or if it had nuclear weapons, Beijing decided to assume the lead in the 
recent rounds of negotiation, and was largely responsible for bringing North Korea into 
the Six-party framework after the Spring 2003 Trilateral Talks in Beijing even though 
North Korea did not want anything else than bilateral talks with Washington.491 Another 
factor also weighed in on North Korea’s decision to come back to the Six-Party Talks for 
a second round without using the tactic of negotiating its participation for money: Hu 
Jintao had to go to the A.P.E.C. meeting in Pusan in November 2003, but had never been 
to North Korea before. Protocol between the two communist allies would dictate that Hu 
would have to go to Pyongyang first before going to Pusan. Hu appears to have used this 
opportunity to negotiate with North Korea.  He first visited North Korea before going to 
South Korea in exchange for North Korea’s promise to come back to the Six-Party 
Talks.492 The United States, for its part, was happy to have a multilateral framework, 
especially after having been accused of unilateralism regarding Iraq.493 Finally, China’s 
role should be highlighted as Beijing was a driving force behind the September 19, 2005 
agreement, presenting multiple drafts for parties to sign.  
Over the course of the period of study, negotiations episodes sometimes occurred 
simultaneously. Linkages between those negotiation episodes have generally not been 
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strong, as parties often refused to mention one negotiation episode as another was 
developing. As such, we have considered those episodes as discrete cases, but will, in this 
chapter, show linkages when those occurred. 
Table 5: Negotiation Rounds 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
January      Kumchangri R2 
Four-Party R4 
February       
March     Four-Party R2 Bilateral R4 
April   Bilateral R1   Kumchangri R3   
Four-party R5 
May       
June       
July    Bilateral R2 
 
  
August      Four-party R6 
September      Bilateral R5 
October   Nodong  Bilateral R3 
Four-party R3 
 
November   Nodong  Kumchangri R1  
December Pilot   Four-party R1   
 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
January       
February     Six-Party R2  
March       
April    Trilateral   
May Bilateral R6      
June     Six-party R3  
July      Six-party R4 
August Bilateral R7   Six-party R1  Six-party R4 
September      Six-party R4 
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October       
November Bilateral R8      
December  
 
     
       
 
 
b. Hypotheses Analysis: What Matters When North Korea Negotiates 
 
 
 The previous two chapters presented individual analyses of the seven case studies. 
Over the eight initial hypotheses that were used for this analysis a clear pattern appears 
from the aggregate results presented in the following table. 
 
Table 6: Summary of Hypotheses Analysis 
 Individual State International 






















Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Inconcl 
Bilateral 
Talks 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Inconcl 
Nodong 
launch 
Inconcl Inconcl Inconcl Yes Inconcl No Yes Yes 
Kumchang-ri Yes Yes Inconcl Yes Yes Yes No Inconcl 
Four-Party 
Talks 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Inconcl Yes No Yes 
Trilateral 
Talks 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Six-Party 
Talks 
Inconcl Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
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 The table shows rather strong support for hypotheses related to the individual, and 
especially related to hierarchical values and face-values, as well as strong support for the 
hypothesis related to preference for national security over collective security. Another 
robust hypothesis is the one related to North Korea’s preference for strategies and 
agreements that will have an impact at the level of low politics. Those results are not at 
all surprising in light of the literature that was reviewed earlier, as we have seen North 
Korea’s reluctance to open up its system and to abide by agreements that have a profound 
impact on its society (the fact that many non-governmental organizations that were 
delivering food to North Korea in the late 1990s were not able to conduct their mission 
without the North Korean government complete oversight and Pyongyang eventually 
expelling them from North Korea is also telling).494 What is more surprising is the lack of 
support for hypotheses related to the international system, especially the fact that larger 
crises or issues preoccupying North Korea do not act as pacifiers for smaller crises.  
 
 
1. Hierarchical Society and Fundamentals of Being a North Korean 
 
  
 The most robust hypothesis regarding North Korea’s negotiation behavior is that 
hierarchy is a key value. The sense that North Korea’s willingness to negotiate is tied to 
its interlocutor’s status can be revealed through several examples. For starters, during the 
1994 Pilot case, it became evident after a few days that Senator Richardson was not seen 
as a valid interlocutor by North Korea, and that there was a need for the United States to 
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send somebody who would be accepted by North Korea as being high enough in rank to 
be taken seriously. There was a lot of discussion in Washington as to whether Secretary 
of State Galluci should be the one to be sent to Pyongyang to negotiate the release of the 
pilots. However, because this incident was the first one to occur outside of military 
channels, the United States decided to take a cautious approach, and not send Galluci in 
order to save a last card in the case that Thomas Hubbard, who had been made the 
presidential envoy for the mission, was not able to secure a deal. The United States was 
thus very conscious about North Korea’s sensitivity to hierarchical levels. Thomas 
Hubbard was flown to Seoul in a special mission aircraft, a former Air Force-One plane, 
and Hubbard was then flown by the military to the Demilitarized Zone. The whole 
mechanism was clearly designed by the United States to impress North Korea, revealing 
Washington’s uncertainty about dealing with North Korea.495 North Korea’s concern with 
hierarchical levels, over the years, has created different problems as Pyongyang has had 
to learn and to be reassured that its counterparts had positions of importance. In K.E.D.O. 
negotiations, for example, when North Korea Vice-Minister Kang met with Galluci, 
problems arose as Galluci was not a vice-minister. The same situation repeated itself at 
first with Charles Kartman, who was only a deputy assistant secretary. However, 
according to K.E.D.O.’s Robert Carlin, ongoing negotiations with recurring actors seem 
to reassure North Korea: as long as some trust can be established through regular 
interactions with negotiators and North Korea realizes that their counterparts have been 
vested with authority, the title starts to lose some of its importance.496 According to 
seasoned negotiator Kang Choi, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
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also reinforces the idea that North Korea needs to have higher-raking counterparts, 
perhaps to satisfy a desire to be seen as an important nation. Choi mentions that Kim 
Jong-Il would be willing to meet with Condoleezza Rice personally, in a similar fashion 
as when he met with Madeleine Albright, but that a meeting between Kim Jong-Il and 
Chirstopher Hill or Joseph DeTrani would not be possible, since for North Korea rank 
matters more than substance.497 American negotiators are also aware of that North Korea 
values hierarchy. For example, former Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg 
mentions that every time he goes to North Korea, he manages to get a little higher on the 
‘food chain’ and manage to meets with officials who are ranked higher. He estimates that 
the higher-ranked person he has met on those trip probably ranked four or five relative to 
Kim Jong-Il’s position.498 The Dear Leader’s specific position within his own country 
and the fact that he is the head of most of North Korean agencies is also an indicator of 
the hierarchical value placed within Pyongyang’s system. The 2000 Inter-Korean summit 
for example, did not take place between South Korea president Kim Dae-Jung and North 
Korea’s Kim Jong-Il, but rather between President Kim Dae-Jung and North Korea’s 
head of state Kim Jong-Nam. Kim Jong-Il did not consider his position as the equivalent 
of that of Kim Dae-Jung, but granted him an audience.499 At the same time, Kim Jong Il 
considers South Korea to only be a puppet of the United States. One can wonder how 
much this attachment to hierarchy is coming from the nature of the North Korean regime, 
or from the Korean tradition which has strongly been influenced by Confucian concepts. 
The Asian value narrative does not seem to hold true for South Korea, however, even 
though South Korea was a Confucian and patriarchal society and Park Chung-Hee’s 





authoritarian regime of the 1960s and 1970s was similarly built on systems of hierarchy. 
However, South Korea has emerged as a democracy.  It is also a breeding ground for a 
strong civil society.500 
 One of the strongest values playing a role in the North Korean negotiations found 
in all seven of the cases and that is also linked to Asian values is saving face. The façade 
that North Korea has put in place in order to hide most of what is going on inside its 
regime has been coming down little by little as more foreigners are in contact with North 
Korean negotiators, and are going to Pyongyang for various summits, for example. 
Thomas Hubbard recounted that as he was in a car in North Korea during the Pilot case, 
he noticed men in the mountains, digging in the ground. When he asked the escort what 
those men were doing, he replied that people were looking for delicacies in those hills. 
Later on, as the car passed back in front of the mountains, the escort said that in fact, 
people had nothing to eat, and he then expressed his interest in food aid programs that 
could potentially help North Korea.501 There seems to be a different degree of face-saving 
that goes along with the hierarchical ladder, with North Korean officials at the top of the 
system trying to preserve a certain image of their country, whereas people at the bottom, 
and especially those further away from Pyongyang, having less interest in face-saving 
and more willingness to be candid about their situation.502 However, face-saving is an 
important variable that almost always surfaces in negotiations, and which non-North 
Koreans have integrated into their understanding of North Korea. After the 1996 
submarine incident, North Korea issued a quasi apology. During the 1998 second 
submarine incident, North Korea stated that it was sorry for what had happened and that 
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 199
it would try not to repeat such an incident. However, the apology was not fully directed 
towards South Korea. During the Taepodong launch that preceded the Nodong 
negotiations, North Korea also refused to apologize and refused to deliver any official 
statement.  It later called the missile a civilian technology satellite program, providing 
itself with a lexical loophole.503 Face-saving attitudes also prevent North Korea from 
allowing itself access to humanitarian assistance: during the food crisis, North Korea 
imposed a lot of conditions on different foreign workers that belonged to the World Food 
Program, and ultimately closed its doors to their aid and North Korea even refused the 
most innocuous forms of help coming from non-governmental organizations in order to 
prevent outsiders from seeing the dramatic conditions in which people were living and 
also dying.504 Face-saving is largely due, however, to the nature of the North Korean 
decision-making as well as the need not to appear weak.  This is crucial in order for the 
regime to maintain its total control over its population.  
 
2. Division and Unity: North Korea’s Internal Decision-Making 
  
 The hypothesis regarding unity in voices, namely that negotiations are more likely 
to lead to an outcome if there is a consensus among decision-makers on how to react, is 
supported in the case of the United States, but is not a strong explanatory factor when 
looking at North Korea. It appears, however, that Kim Jong-Il might be using the concept 
of a split between himself and the military/security apparatus governed by the National 
Defense Commission, in order to maximize his power. The organization of North Korean 
society is very formal, with three pillars that are the Korean Workers’ Party (which 




governs the Secretariat and the Political Bureau), the military/security (with the N.D.C. 
formally commanding the State Security Department as well as the Ministry of People’s 
Armed Force), and the State (with the Supreme People’s Assembly presiding over thirty-
three ministries). Kim Jong-Il is the General Secretary of the K.W.P. He also is the 
Chairman of the N.D.C. 505  These pillars are under the direct influence of Kim Jong-Il 
and his personal Secretariat.  
 








 Rumor has it that North Korea has been using potential conflicts of interest 
between the N.D.C and the Central Committee, as well as between Kim Jong-Il and the 
N.D.C. in order to gain leverage in international negotiations. At the same time, many 
have shown skepticism regarding a potential rift within the party and agency lines in 
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North Korea, and have insisted on Kim Jong-Il’s total hand on power. The initial analysis 
did not find comprehensive support for the argument that negotiations are more likely to 
lead to compromise outcomes when there is a unity of view in a negotiating team. When 
testing this hypothesis in light of the data gathered in the archival research, content 
analysis, and interviews, it appears that a conflict within North Korea’s leadership might 
be used as a negotiation strategy. Upon his arrival at the Joint Security Area, Thomas 
Hubbard was greeted by a middle level member of the negotiating team referred to as 
“Song”, who later on guided him to the Foreign Ministry at the request of Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kang Sok-Ju who was accompanied by chief negotiator Kim Gye-Gwan. After 
Hubbard and Song reached some sort of agreement on a statement, Song mentioned he 
now had to take the statement to the military, and indicated that he hoped it would work. 
Song later returned with the agreement saying it needed a few changes. As soon as 
Hubbard received approval from the White House (through an outgoing call placed from 
Canada, as no call to North Korea could be generated from the United States because of 
sanctions in place at that time), Kang Sok-Ju said he would need the Supreme 
Commander’s approval on the agreement, thus leading Hubbard to think that he needed 
Kim Jong-Il’s approval.506 This anecdote implies either that military approval was needed 
early on by the negotiators, which would mean that Kim Jong-Il did not have oversight of 
the military’s role in the crisis, or that North Korea wanted to provide the appearance of a 
clear split of power within its own leadership, to perhaps influence American negotiators 
and lead them to believe that it would be hard to secure approval from their leadership. 
They would therefore put pressure on American negotiators and show them that this 
negotiation would not be an easy one. Before Thomas Hubbard was sent to Pyongyang 
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and as he was coordinating a response to the incident with Senator Richardson, North 
Korea communicated through its New York desk that its military felt strongly that the 
pilot was a prisoner of war and thus there would be a high chance of resolution with the 
military if somebody senior was sent to Pyongyang.507 However, this apparent split could 
have occurred because the dispute involved military elements. The military’s 
involvement might have been because there was a need for North Korea to check the 
situation along the D.M.Z. Because Kim Jong-Il presides over the military, he would not 
need approval or permission from the military.508 Thus, the idea that the split was used as 
a negotiation technique seems more plausible, especially in light of a situation that 
directly involved the military. If the split was not a power split per se, it still might have 
been an ideological split.  The military field kept on pushing for an apology for the U.S. 
incursion in North Korea. At the same time, some in the military could have wanted to 
restart bilateral general officer talks with Washington.509 
 Kim Jong-Il’s power over the military has been witnessed directly by one highly 
ranked official at the South Korean Ministry of Unification who relates a lunch he had 
with Kim Jong-Il in 2000, and during which the Dear Leader asked Cho Myong-Rok, 
Vice-Premier of the National Defense Commission, to state his relationship with the 
Party. Cho Myong-Rok then started reading a statement that was saying that his agency 
would collaborate with Kim Jong-Il. However, Cho’s demeanor was surprising, as he was 
shaking and was visibly very uncomfortable vis-à-vis Chairman Kim Jong-Il. 510  
Evidence of the “military split theory” has also been reported by others stating that 
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people in the North Korean Foreign Office would spread the idea that there were 
reformers and hard-liners within the leadership. Yet, even though at times different North 
Korean negotiation teams will appear one after the other, the top leadership appears 
unified, aware of the international system, and ready to use a variety of tools to get its 
preferred outcomes. This was the case when Bruce Cumings went to North Korea and 
negotiated with the regime how many sites could be visited for the making of a 
documentary. He was confronted by a different team every day, but saw that each team 
had communicated with the ones that had come before.  Each team was able to cite some 
positions that had been enunciated earlier, even though they had not been present.  
 Is North Korea a good negotiator? The evidence are very mixed. The Pilot case 
showed that both parties received what they wanted, namely Washington recovered its 
pilot and the remains of the deceased, and North Korea received a “confession” that was 
actually re-written by Thomas Hubbard prior to its release. There seem to be two 
approaches regarding North Korea’s negotiation strategy: the first one contends that 
North Korea does not negotiate, as it only uses international events to try to maximize its 
gains given a situation, and is just acting out of luck. The second approach contends that 
North Korea has a very high sense of its interests and of other parties’ interests, and that 
it is an extremely crafty negotiator. Both approaches are supported by the Kumchang-ri 
incident, in which parties were clearly divided, as South Korea strongly believed that the 
site did not contain any nuclear matter, but the United States thought it did, and thereafter 
leaked the information to the New York Times. In this situation, North Korea got what it 
wanted. The United States paid a huge price for visiting the site, and the negotiation 
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paved the way to the missile talks. 511  The Kumchang-ri case, however, proves the 
ambiguity that the situation created: the United States, led by Joel Wit, managed to see 
the hole, but did not have the right to take any measuring equipment with them.512 Those 
who thought that North Korea did have nuclear weapons cried that Pyongyang had had 
time to remove all suspicious matter by the time the investigation team came. Those who 
thought that North Korea was clear of nuclear weapons argued that North Korea was 
truthful to the Agreed Framework, and that the United States was only looking for 
trouble. North Korea, besides the access price paid by the United States, also received a 
potato deal after the visit, and thus coming as a clear winner relative to what conclusion 
the United States managed to gather from the visit.  
 Multilateral talks, however, show a different dynamic. At first, North Korea did 
not want formal diplomatic talks with anybody other than the United States, but it started 
to become more flexible in its approach because of concurring factors, such as the war in 
Iraq. Looking at the overall period of study, it is possible to see a change in North 
Korea’s attitude toward joining talks. At first, the Four-party framework was a way for 
North Korea to win gains; it imposed preconditions that had to be met in order to have 
formal negotiations. Once it got into the process, North Korea started to bring issues to 
the table right away, and later on tried to be seen as accommodating and flexible to 
others.513 The hypotheses regarding North Korea being a versed player and getting better 
outcomes than others are hard to support.  If North Korea was a good negotiator, it would 
not be in the dire economic situation that it is in right now. However, North Korea seems 
to adhere to the standard of never compromising on its red line during negotiation. In 





inter-Korean negotiation, for example, North Korea was aware of its weak position when 
its submarine infiltrated South Korean waters, but it simply expressed its “regret” over 
the situation and refused to entertain the idea that the submarine’s incident was in any 
way linked to an order coming from the military, or from Kim Jong-Il in person. 514  
North Korea also appears to know what it can give and cannot give, and after starting 
with a tough position, which is often the case for the United States as well, it generally 
sticks to its red line, the position that is at the utter limit of what is acceptable to 
Pyongyang.  This might be a function of internal or external politics515, meaning that 
North Korea’s red line depends from what North Korea wants to achieve in term of its 
domestic policy, or depends on what is going on in the international system. To this 
extent, North Korea’s position can vary.  
 
3. Influence of the International Context 
 
 International crises and agreements have had a surprisingly low influence on the 
different rounds of the different negotiation episodes North Korea has been involved in. 
The most sensitive period for Pyongyang was negotiating the 1994 Pilot negotiations 
only a few months after the Geneva framework had been signed. Despite fears, especially 
in the United States, that a faltering of the pilot situation would endanger the Agreed 
Framework, very little linkage was apparent between the two situations, apart from when 
Ambassador Hubbard was negotiating the release of the pilot and mentioned that the 
United States signing the Agreed Framework would be in no way compatible with North 




Korea taking the American pilot hostage.516 It seems that the issue of linkage/de-linkage 
of crises is more apparent with the Bush administration than it was during the Clinton 
administration. The Clinton-Kim Dae-Jung tandem wanted to fortify the Agreed 
Framework, and thus did not want to provide reasons for North Korea to back out first 
from the Agreed Framework due to a small crisis. There was no real mention or linkage 
to the Agreed Framework during the Bilateral Talks or the Nodong incident, and very 
little during the Kumchang-ri negotiations. During the early period of the Bush 
administration, however, there was a strong will to link North Korea’s criminal activities 
to the negotiations in order to show that North Korea could not be dealt with using 
accepted international norms.517  
 The South Korean government objected strongly to linking negotiation episodes. 
North Korea also typically wanted to prevent linkages. North Korea does at times label 
small crises as ‘acts of war’ (for example, when the United States conducted joint 
military drills with Japan and with South Korea), but this linkage usually occurs outside 
of periods of inter-Korean or international negotiations. In these cases, North Korea is 
using a linkage strategy to delay coming back to the table. Over time, however, it seems 
that North Korea’s linking of crises has lessened.518 This seems to be because of a 
softening in North Korea’s position after the 2000 Inter-Korea Summit, as Pyongyang 
started to be more flexible regarding low-politics issues such as reconnecting the two 
Koreas’ railroads. However, North Korea’s negotiation posture after this period was 
largely a response to the Bush Administration’ s policy regarding North Korea, as well as 
the September 11 attacks that led to the War on Terrorism and North Korea’s 





classification as a member of the Axes of Evil. North Korea’s actual participation in 
negotiations is not linked to the urgency of any crisis, but rather, as established before, is 
tied to the gain, whether monetary or more substantial, such as the Four-Party Talks, that 
can be secured through negotiations.  It may also be tied to a will to change a situation 
that had impacted North Korea negatively, such as sanctions. Though the Iraq war was 
instrumental in getting North Korea to come to the Trilateral Talks in Beijing, Chinese 
officials cutting off heavy fuel oil shipments to Pyongyang in March 2003 had the effect 
of coercing North Korea to come to the negotiation table.519 North Korea has also shown 
a propensity to avoid talking about long-standing issues that pertain to its past. For 
example, Pyongyang categorically refused to have bilateral talks with Japan during the 
Six-Party Talks, even though Japan desperately wanted to discuss the issue of abductees 
with North Korea.520  
 The current situation, however, shows that an agreement such as the Agreed 
Framework, which could potentially have tamed smaller crises if parties had respected its 
terms, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to reaching more cooperative outcomes 
for all parties involved in negotiation processes over the Korean peninsula. Hard-liners 
inside the Bush Administration have never liked the Agreed Framework, in part because 
it was enacted by a Democratic Congress, but more importantly because it was judged 
too forgiving of North Korea.521 Pyongyang did not have to reveal anything regarding its 
potential nuclear weapons, and just had to promise to discontinue its program. One of the 
first actions that President Bush wanted to do when he came to office was to abandon the 
Agreement. North Korea, however, is trying to revert to the 1994 agreement, calling for 





light-water reactors.522 The Clinton Administration, however, was more willing to link 
crises together, since it was the artisan of the Agreed Framework. During the Kumchang-
ri negotiations, the United States maintained the importance of the Agreed Framework, 
pressed to have access to the site, and succeeded.523 However, because of monetary 
compensation as well as compensation in kind with the potato plan, it is not possible to 
conclude that North Korea was pushed to an agreement because it strongly respected and 
cared about the future of the Agreed Framework. The strongest proof that North Korea 
was not influenced by the Agreed Framework, however, is found in Pyongyang’s 
revelation in 2003 that it had indeed developed nuclear weapons despite the Agreement.  
 
 
c. Deriving Knowledge from Hypotheses: North Korea’s strategy. 
 
 The previous aggregate analysis of hypotheses related to North Korea’s 
involvement in the seven cases of negotiation with the United States and other parties, 
has showed so far that:  
(1) North Korea deeply values hierarchy when negotiating 
(2) North Korea has used internal splits between power lines as a way to gain 
leverage in negotiations 
(3) When negotiating, North Korea does not often depart from its red line does not 
accept an agreement that is different from its initial position 
(4) North Korea does not seem to be more conciliatory when negotiating if a larger 
agreement is already in place 





 These preliminary conclusions give us some understanding of the basic lines of 
North Korea’s negotiation strategy. It is also crucial, however, to evaluate North Korea’s 
behavior in negotiation compared to that of its counterparts. Looking at the cases 
analyzed, it is possible to group North Korea’s as well as other participant’s actions under 
four different categories, ranging from most to less conciliatory approaches. 
 First, North Korea has been using “give and take” approaches, here labeled as 
“Conditional Concessions”. North Korea has been using Conditional Concessions 
numerous times, and in all cases except for the Pilot Negotiation and the Nodong Launch. 
It is interesting to notice that North Korea has used a significantly larger number of 
Conditional Concessions that any other party involved in the different negotiation rounds. 
 Second, North Korea and other parties have been using a “take it or leave it” 
approach, here called “Stances,” by which parties request something without asking for 
anything in return. Stances are less conciliatory than Conditional Concessions. Stances 
have been used in every negotiation episode. 
 Third, parties have been using “Threats”, which are unequivocal statements used 
to compel or prevent a party from taking a certain action. North Korea has used Threats 
significantly less than the United States during the negotiation episodes. 
 Finally, “Actions” are perpetrated by parties, at the negotiations or aside from 








Table 8: Conditional Concessions 
 Rounds US NK ROK 
Pilot 
Negotiation 
    
Bilateral 
Talks 
R1  Ask U.S. to ease eco. 
sanctions in return 




 Inter  Ask for repatriation 
of defectors in order 
to come back to 
negotiation 
 
 R3  Requests U.S. grant 1 
billion a year in 
return for regulation 
of missile export 
 
 R4 Will ease eco. 
sanctions if missile 
program stopped 
Demands $3 billion 





 Inter  Would abandon 
missile program if 
could be provided 
satellite launchers 
 
 R8  Will give-up 
1,000kms-range 
missile development 
if U.S. launches 
satellites in China or 
Russia 
 
Nodong     
Kumchang-ri R1  Asks for $300 
million for visit of 
site –  
not Kumchang-ri 
Ask U.S. to give eco 
aid to N.K. in 
exchange for visiting 
Kumchang-ri 
 R2  Offers 2 chances to 
visit Kumchang-ri in 
exchange for 400,00 




  Ask for food aid and 
lifting of trade and 
investment sanctions 
as pre-conditions to 
the talks 
 
   Ask for food aid, 
American diplomatic 
recognition and 




 R2 Wants a permanent 
peace treaty prior to 
lifting economic 
embargo 
Will not join new 
round if US does not 
remove troops from 
S.K. 
 
 R6  Will not  come back 
to talks if 2 key 
issues are not 




  Will abandon nuclear 
weapons programs 
and will stop 
exporting missiles in 




   Package includes 
security guarantees, 
lifting of econ 
sanctions, provision 
of food, aid from 








R1  Will give up nukes in 
exchange for fuel 
supplies and reactor 
promised by AF 
(nonaggression, econ 
aid from SK and J as 
well) 
Package if N.K. 
wants 
 R2  Will not agree to 
N.K.'s request unless 
C.V.I.D. 
 




  Offer energy reward 
for N.K. to freeze 
installation in 3 
months 
Wants 2 million tons 
of energy a year, 
removal from 
terrorist list, and 
lifting of sanctions 
 
 Inter  Will come back if 
respected by the U.S. 










Table 9: Stances 
 
 
Rounds US NK ROK China 
Pilot 
Negotiation 
 Ask for safe 





and then will 
release pilot 
  
  Wants prompt 
access to alive 





and not ready 
to discuss 
return of Hall 
  


















   Asks for U.S. 
to sign apology 
statement 
  





Asks U.S. to 
limit talks to 
missile issue 
 
  Asks N.K. to 
hold joint neg. 
about peace 
treaty 
 Asks N.K. to 
hold joint neg. 
about peace 
treaty 
Asks N.K. to 
hold joint neg. 
about peace 
treaty  




   




   






   
 R3  Will continue 
to launch 




 Inter   South Korea 






kms to 300 








 Asks N.K. not 
to carry out 
ballistic 
missile test 
   




Responds it is 
a civilian site 
so no need for 
access 
Asks parties 








should be first 
choice 




that might not 










Creates 4 party 
talks 
 














   Calls for talks 
to occur in 
Switzerland 
instead of in 
China 
  
 R2  Wants to raise 























   Wants to 
discuss status 
of US troops 
during talks 
  
 R5  Wants to 
discuss status 





 Will not 
reward bad 
behavior 
  China asks 
U.S. and N.K. 





R1 No intention of 
invading 






  Wants N.K. to 
dismantle first 




 Pushes parties 
to write a 
written 
agreement 
 Inter  Wants to 
exclude Japan 










   Asks for right 
to retain 
nuclear energy, 






Table 10: Threats 
 Rounds US NK China 
Pilot 
Negotiation 
 Failure of N.K. to 
provide prompt 
information will be 
detrimental to 
Pyongyang 
Will release pilot 
only if proven that it 
was a navigational 
mistake 
(To N.K.) Further 
delays could be 
dangerous 
  $4 billion A.F. 
could be in jeopardy 
if crisis continues 
like this 
  
  Senators: N.K. 
should cooperate 
otherwise no A.F. 
  
  Not releasing pilot 
will lead to serious 
consequences 
  
Missile Talks R3 U.S. warns of very 
serious 
consequences if 
N.K. tests or 
exports its missiles 
  
 R4 Will suspend 
heavy-oil shipment 






 K.E.D.O. says 
tensions on the 
peninsula could 
have an effect on 
schedule of A.F. 
  
Kumchang-ri  A.F. might be 
nullified if situation 
too tense 
Launches ballistic 
missile in the Sea of 
Japan 
 
   To the U.S., war 





R4  U.S. and S.K. should 
not try to undermine 








 U.S. and Japan 





 Might freeze assets 




Table 11: Actions 
Actions Rounds US NK JP 
Pilot 
Negotiation 
 Restriction of 
military flights over 
S.K. 




  Asks China and so 
forth to negotiate on 




  Acknowledges plane 
unintentionally 
strayed 
Refuses meeting at 
Panmunjon 
 
  Refuses to apologize Releases a picture of 
Hall 
 
  Restriction of 





  White House sends 
letter of apology to 
N.K. 
Releases Hall  
  Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Thomas 
Hubbard sent to 
Seoul 
  






  A week later, U.S. 
sends more than 
50,000 tons of oil to 
North Korea 
  
Missile Talks R1  Cancels second 
round for technical 
reasons 
 
   Accepts proposal to 
get back to neg. table 
in June in N.Y. 
 
 Inter Takes in 2 N.K. 
diplomat defectors 
  




 R3 Bill Clinton 
authorizes the use of 
$15 million for the 
purchase of heavy 
fuel for delivery to 
North Korea under 
the 1994 Agreed 
Framework 
  
 R4  N.K. deploys 
ballistic missiles that 
have range to hit 
Japan 
 
 Inter Will provide 
additional 50,000 
tons of wheat to 
N.K. 
Extends ban on 
missile flight-testing 
after easing of 
sanctions 
 
  U.S. eases sanctions 
on N.K. imports and 
exports 
  
Nodong  Mobilizes a 
reconnaissance 
aircraft to monitor 
Sea of Japan 
Missile activity: 
potential testing 
about to be done 
 
  Starts joint military 
drills with Japan 
Informs U.S. of its 
plan to launch 
missiles during talks 
in N.Y. (but this will 
stay secret until the 
end) 
 
   N.K. appears to stop 
missile-launch plans 
 
Kumchang-ri  Sends delegation 
headed by Charles 





  Stages a mock 




  U.S. and Japan start 
military exercise 
 U.S. and Japan start 
military exercise 





  Broadcasts statement 





Inter  Will not talk to John 
Bolton 
 
 R2  Backs out of project 






1. Conditional Concessions 
 Conditional Concessions have been predominantly used by North Korea during 
rounds of negotiations, but also in-between rounds. In general, those Conditional 
Concessions reflect extortion. North Korea requests money and favors through this 
mechanism. One could infer that because North Korea did not use Conditional 
Concessions during the Pilot case, Pyongyang was genuinely concerned about getting an 
apology from the United States. In five other cases, Conditional Concessions have been 
related to food aid and money, as well as some higher-level politics issues such as 
Pyongyang abandoning its missiles in exchange for substitutes such as Russian satellites. 
North Korea’s request during the 1994-2000 period could be directly linked to its 
economic situation, and Pyongyang’s need for money and food in order to sustain itself. 
It seems that Conditional Concessions are not used when North Korea is seeking high-
level outcomes, such as an apology. However, the use of Conditional Concessions 
changed after the year 2000, with North Korea being more concerned with the issue of 
energy, as well as high-politics issues, such as having respect for the fact that Kim Jong-
Il’s regime is a sovereign regime.  North Korea also diversified its sources of support via 
the usage of Conditional Concessions towards Japan.  One example of such Conditional 
Concessions involved the requests for money in exchange for abductees’ release. As a 
general rule, Conditional Concessions are met with no similar proposals by the United 




 North Korea used stances especially in negotiation rounds where it was pushed 
towards a difficult situation by the United States’ usage of threats. North Korea used 
stances in the Pilot negotiation mainly to obtain an apology from Washington, but it used 
it more in multilateral negotiations, especially to delay the negotiation process. For North 
Korea, stances seem to be a defense mechanism whereas stances are more of an attack 
mechanism for the United States. For example, North Korea used stances during the 
Missile talks to keep the United States from publicizing talks, to avoid sanctions for 
something it did not do in the Kumchang-ri case, to get the U.S. to end sanctions and for 
technical reasons such as getting a delay in the start of the Four-Party Talks for a few 
days or a few weeks. It thus seems that North Korea uses stances when it is either not 
ready to have talks, or has internal problems related to talks, and when it wants the 
United States to not take a specific course of action. Finally, Stances have been used 
heavily during the Six-Party Talks, especially regarding issues that have been hurting 
North Korea’s pride, such as the Japanese occupation or topics related to its energy 
problem, therefore reinforcing the patterns of using stances as a defense mechanism, and 
not as a demand, as opposed to the United States. 
 
3. Threats 
Despite its label as an aggressive and rogue state, North Korea has used threats 
remarkably less than the United States. Most of the threats that the United States hinted at 
were linked to the Agreed Framework that was formulated before the Bush 
administration cam to office. North Korea, however, used threats during the Kumchang-ri 
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case as well as during the Four-Party Talks, showing that it was not very comfortable 
with this forum.  
 
4. Actions 
 Actions have been used before, during, and after negotiation rounds. Most of 
North Korea’s actions involve a military structure of some sort, such as putting in place 
missiles for testing, or staging a mock reaction to a chemical weapons’ attack. Most of 
North Korea’s military actions, however, seem related to threats that were proffered by 
the United States, especially in the case of the bilateral missile negotiations. 
 
 It can thus be inferred that North Korea’s negotiation strategy is composed of 
Conditional Concessions that usually represent its opening position which is, incidentally, 
its red line as well. As demonstrated earlier, North Korea seems to be very forthright in 
negotiations regarding its interests, and usually starts negotiations with a strong opening 
position. Threats are not often used, but Stances are considered as a way to gain either 
money or food. These strategies, however, do not suggest that there is a significantly 
specific North Korean negotiation style, but only suggest that North Korea is a tough 
negotiator that is aware of its red-line and potentially of its B.A.T.N.A. (Best Alternative 
to a Negotiated Agreement) as well.  It uses Stances to manipulate the negotiation setting 
and especially its timeline in order to strengthen its position in those international 
settings. A key finding is that North Korea’s negotiation style has evolved from that of a 
timid style in 1994, when Kim Jong-Il’s most important goal during the Pilot negotiations 
was to obtain an apology from the United States to that of a state strongly influenced by 
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the political context of the United States. Kim Jong-Il was very new to being a ruler at the 
time of the pilot incident, and it might be that Kim Jong-Il was insisting on establishing a 
precedent, essentially showing that he was a strong leader and making sure the United 
States understood that he was now in charge. However, after a difficult decade trying to 
feed his people and maintain the economy at a sustainable level, North Korea has shown 
clear signs of using negotiations in order to get monetary gains, no matter what political 
weight or image this would project to the world.  North Korea has developed a clear 
understanding that help coming from a negotiated agreement showed more power than 
help coming from non-governmental organizations delivering food relief. As Kim Jong-
Il’s legitimacy strengthened, so did his control over the means of production and 
information, and this situation led him to refuse aid from the international community, 
hence forcing him, a few years later, to reassess his policy regarding how North Korea 
could survive.524 North Korea’s negotiation strategy is thus not a stand-alone web of 
fixed decision-making processes, but is highly contingent upon international dynamics. 
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Chapter Seven.  From the Geneva Framework to the September 19, 2005 
Agreement: Implications for the Korean Peninsula and Worldwide Stability. 
 
 The previous chapters described the history of the Peninsula and North Korea’s 
place within the region and the world and demonstrated the peculiar nature of the 
Pyongyang regime. One of the main tasks of this work was to determine what a rogue 
state is, and to consider whether North Korea can be considered a rogue. The literature 
has considered North Korea as a rogue state, but the present work contends that 
Pyongyang is not a normal rogue state, but rather a peculiar rogue. It is a state that has 
succeeded in defying most of the international laws regarding war, weapons of mass 
destruction, and human rights, yet it is a state that cannot be fully deterred by the United 
States, the only superpower that would seem, in theory, to be able to back North Korea 
into a corner. Looking at the bilateral and multilateral negotiation history between North 
Korea and the United States has shown that North Korea has at times used negotiation 
strategies to appear weak in order to gain more concessions and at other times pursed a 
tough line, manipulating negotiation timelines and locations, as well as pursuing different 
strategies based on its desired outcomes: power consolidation through the request of 
apologies, economic relief through negotiating access fees to its facilities, and security 
and economic guarantees in exchange for its participation in multilateral negotiations.  
 This analysis, however, is insufficient to fully grasp the concept of Kim Jong-Il’s 
North Korea and how it deals with the international community, and especially the 
United States.  North Korea’s strategy is not only affected by other actors’ behaviors, but 
other actors’ actions and situations are also a factor in North Korea’s strategic evolution. 
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The archival research as well as the content analysis in this study have enabled a piecing 
together of evidence and facts. In addition, the interviews presented in this final chapter 
have revealed surprising information regarding the role of the United States and China in 
regards to the Korean peninsula’s stability as well as North Korea’s privileged place in 
negotiations, especially within multilateral formats. Interviews consisted of in-person as 
well as phone conversation with American and South Korea diplomats, negotiators, 
experts as well as researchers dealing with the topic of North Korea on a daily basis. This 
chapter will investigate ways in which North Korea has changed in regards to utilizing 
information, maximizing its power, and diversifying its sources of economic aid so that it 
can face various food and energy shortages in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.  
The chapter will present new game structures and incentives for reaching deals more 
quickly in a post-9/11 world. Overall, the chapter tries to answer the question of what 
type of agreement or course of actions would be beneficial for East Asia, and especially 
whether signing an agreement at all costs (which is what has happened on September 19, 
2005) is better than waiting for the right kind of agreement that may or may not come. 
 
a. North Korea’s Progress: Impact of Information 
 
 When Kim Jong-Il assumed his father’s leadership at the head of the D.P.R.K., 
North Korea was still a very secluded country that had only a minor understanding of the 
world system. However, North Korea evolved and though it has tried to monitor the flow 
of information coming inside its borders, a specific layer of the population has gained 
greater access to outside flows of information. This has had an effect on North Korea’s 
negotiation strategies, but also has led to questions regarding reforms and restrictions, 
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and has also led many to wonder whether Kim Jong-Il was most afraid of the impact of 
information on North Korea. To this extent, many have tried to utilize new modes of 
interacting with North Korea, such as inter-Korean summits and economic zones like the 
Kaesong complex, in order to gather evidence regarding Kim’s control over the country 
and the potential difficulties he might have in maintaining his place at the top of the 
regime.  
 
1. Learning about the World 
 
 North Korea’s understanding of history has evolved dramatically since the end of 
the Cold War, and Kim Jong-Il’s accession to power. South Korean diplomats tell of 
North Korea’s lack of understanding of American politics, for example the fact that it did 
not understand what Congress was, and how it functioned, as it just pictured the world as 
being structured similarly to its own regime. 525  Americans tell of North Korea’s 
ignorance in the mid 1990s regarding the American political system. Hermetical 
Pyongyang had difficulty understanding the constraints that a Congress could have over 
the president, for example.526 When considering diplomatic circles, however, a higher 
degree of sophistication can be found: during the 2002 meeting in Pyongyang between 
North Korea and the Kelly delegation, a dinner was taking place between the negotiators 
and the topic of the evening was the international system. Michael Green was in charge 
of leading the discussion with Kim Gye-Gwan. It was obvious from the conversation that 
Kim had read about international relations theory, as he had a clear knowledge of books 
by authors like Kissinger, as well as some understanding of realism. However, it seemed 




that his view of the international system was completely centered on North Korea, and 
how the Chu’che ideology had altered the world. In a sense this ethnocentric view of the 
world also meant that he thought that Washington was thinking almost constantly about 
the Dear Leader, and that North Korean elite and diplomats would therefore be 
disappointed when not paid attention to.527 Other diplomats also witnessed a change in 
North Korean negotiators’ representation, especially as exemplified by North Korea’s 
chief negotiator Kim Gye-Gwan who was giving the impression, at the time he started to 
be at the forefront of negotiations, more than twenty years ago, that he was no more than 
a farmer. By South Korean diplomats’ accounts, he now appears very sophisticated and 
confident, and so is his interpreter Chae Song-Hee. North Korea also seemed to have 
developed, over the past fifteen years, a system that has enabled its diplomats such as Lee 
Hyon-Chol, former Ambassador to Switzerland and First Deputy Director of the Korean 
Central Military Committee to master English very well,. Even though the substance of 
negotiations has not changed much, North Korea has evolved in its style because of its 
increased understanding of international affairs.528 It is now aware of who has the real 
negotiation power when it meets foreigners for negotiations. K.E.D.O. negotiators also 
noticed that North Korea became increasingly careful in the position it presented, as it 
showed a good grasp of historical record and sometimes a better one than that of the 
United States.529 This might be linked to the fact that North Korea has most of its foreign 
diplomatic relations centered on the United States, while the United States is engaged in a 
multitude of diplomatic processes simultaneously. If North Korea is more of a traditional 
rogue than a peculiar rogue, we could, however, label North Korean negotiators as 





peculiar negotiators: they have had numerous contacts with foreigners and especially 
American diplomats, and they also have been traveling extensively, which might lead us 
to think they are remote from the everyday life that most North Korean people live back 
in Pyongyang.   
 But North Korea has also seemed to embrace, to some extent, new developments 
in technologies. Kim Jong-Il is known to be reading the South Korean press everyday 
through the internet, though it is doubtful that he knows how to speak English. When 
Kim Jong-Il visited Shanghai in 2002 after his initial visit to Beijing in 2000, he was 
profoundly impressed by Chinese technological advancement. Upon his return to 
Pyongyang, he wanted to receive Chinese cars, computers, as well as develop buildings 
based on Chinese models, and even asked his aide (who happened to be Swedish, as most 
contacts between North Korea and foreign countries happen through the Swedish 
Embassy in Pyongyang) to send in an architect to develop new ideas. However, Kim 
Jong-Il does not seem to see beyond the hardware aspect of what an increasingly 
integrated China with many trade zones, means in terms of the type of information 
coming inward to the population, and that would be hard to prevent from reaching North 
Korean people. 530  Nevertheless, Pyongyang has also been involved in various 
technological programs such as between Syracuse University and Kimchaek University, 
regarding information technology exchange531, by which Syracuse and Kimchaek would 
collaborate on various research projects such as a secure fax program manufactured 
through a Japanese company, various language translation programs, digital copyrighting 




and watermarking programs as well as communication with digital assistants. 532 
Moreover, during the Pilot case, North Korea had difficulties understanding why the 
United States did not have any G.P.S. devices on their helicopters, as this would have 
prevented the pilot from straying from its course.533  
 A real problem for the Kim Jong-Il regime, however, is that information from 
outside of North Korea’s border has started to penetrate the country. Reasons for opening 
economic zones in Kaesong, for example, were to open up North Korea in a similar way 
to that of China, and manage to engender a societal change that would lead Kim Jong-Il 
to give up North Korea’s isolation, or to provoke regime change from within. 
Information, however, is far from having reached a significant amount of North Koreans. 
During a trip to North Korea in 2004, a British diplomat entered into talks with Korean 
farmers. After the farmers asked where the United Kingdom was located, the diplomat 
asked them how many countries, in their opinion, there were around the world. After 
serious deliberations, the farmers responded that there must be between eight to ten 
countries in the world. 534  There are also more striking examples of North Korea’s 
understanding of information and its importance. When a high-ranking South Korean 
diplomat was visiting Seoul, he mentioned to his North Korean counterparts that he had 
not seen any female drivers in the streets of Pyongyang and was surprised as there were 
many female drivers in South Korea. A little later that same day, he suddenly noticed a 
lot of females driving cars, but realized that the same cars were driving back and forth.535   
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 Government control of the flow of information, as well as its own quest for more 
information has led North Korea to be a society divided in terms of access: North Korean 
diplomats living abroad seem to have benefited from international contacts and to have 
enjoyed being exposed to different cultures, foods, and languages, while administrative 
people back in Pyongyang are struggling to keep the specific image of North Korea as a 
strong country, and are struggling to show this image to the international world, but also 




2. Power and Restrictions: Kim Jong Il’s Supremacy 
 
 North Korea’s negotiation approach and negotiation strategy is directly tied to the 
position and decision of its leader Kim Jong-Il. Because he had the difficult task of 
replacing his popular father and since North Korea encountered deep monetary and food 
problems early during his tenure, Kim Jong-Il has put in place a system of legitimization 
of power that works in a similar way at the national and international levels. At the 
national level, Kim has created the image, through propaganda and tight control over 
news outlets that North Korea is facing an emergency situation, and is on the brink of war 
with the United States, in order to pursue its own freedom.537  This creation leads North 
Korean people to believe that Kim Jong-Il is the only one capable of “saving” North 
Korea. This idea has been bolstered by use of the concept of a trinity that Kim Il-Sung 
extracted from his Christian upbringing. The Christian concept of trinity means that God 
is a single being who exists through three actors: the Father, the Son, as well as the Holy 




Spirit. For North Korea, the concept of trinity can be seen through the father (Kim Il-
Sung, the eternal leader), the son (Kim Jong-Il) and the Holy Spirit (the Chu’che 
ideology). 538  At the international level, Kim Jong-Il is legitimizing North Korea’s 
existence by creating a situation of brinkmanship in order to keep the international 
community interested in North Korea, and in order to receive aid from other countries.  
 Kim Jong-Il’s position has been debated by many, as it was not necessarily 
obvious in the early 1990s that he would manage to fill the shoes of his father Kim Il-
Sung. Indeed, Kim Jong-Il has been considered more of a dictator than his father, because 
of his difficulty in maintaining his legitimacy.539 To this extent, Kim Jong-Il is not able to 
change his standpoint as easily as his father did. A departure from his own principle 
could instill a change in public consciousness as well as public opinion and could 
potentially damage his power and legitimacy and for this reason, Kim seems to be relying 
more on nomenclature and on the military system to exert his authority, which explains 
the apparent conflict of interest between the party and the military during specific 
negotiation episodes. 540 For example, during the 1990s, North Korea thought that one of 
the most productive agricultural crops was corn. As a result, North Korea planted corn in 
every possible piece of arable land, whether fields or mountains. This planting, however, 
led to a lot of problems with soil erosion. But nobody said anything to Kim Jong-Il. 
When soliciting advice regarding potential reforms, if he fails to come up with a new 
idea, Kim Jong-Il usually encourages criticism as well as proposals of new ideas, but 
oftentimes, the person who voiced criticism or expressed the new idea disappears the next 
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day.541 Kim Jong-Il has delegated blame, publicly putting the blame on Foreign Minister 
Kang Sok-Ju.542 This blaming system has also reverberated in international negotiations. 
North Korea usually puts the blame on other parties, accusing them of being inflexible, 
once North Korea has started with a strong position it will not back away from. Once 
again, because face-saving of North Korea equates to face-saving of Kim Jong-Il, all 
international negotiations will also sooner or later affect Kim’s legitimacy and are thus 
treated as if the Dear Leader’s position depends on them. When South Korean teams start 
talking about North Korean internal problems in a negotiation setting with the North, 
talks usually end right away.543  
 Kim Jong-Il still suffers from a lack of charisma and authority. His father, 
however, was always extremely popular in North Korea and did not suffer from this 
problem Moreover, Kim Jong-Il has also been confronted with an older generation of 
hard-liners that his father had already been complaining about when he was well into his 
eighties. As early at 1994, Kim Jong-Il had had to convince those hard-liners within the 
party and within the military to have serious negotiations with the United States. 
However, over the years, Kim Jong-Il has been fully capable of making decisions that the 
military does not like.544 Kim Jong-Il has also suffered from a lowered commitment-level 
from China. Kim Il-Sung was the one who could speak Chinese very well and thus had a 
very close relationship with Mao that Kim Jong-Il has not managed to match with Jiang 
Zemin or Hu Jintao.545 This somewhat insecure feeling of always being compared to his 
father can be seen in some of the younger Kim’s actions such as his bragging to reporters 







during the 2000 Summit that everyone around the world was coming directly to 
Pyongyang to see him.546  
 Kim Jong-Il, however, is having the first and last word in most of the international 
negotiations that have been taking place between North Korea and the United States. 
During the Trilateral Talks, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission 
Cho Myong-Rok was on medical leave in Beijing and was giving most of the instructions 
to the North Korean delegation as it met with the United States and China. Kim Jong-Il, 
however, is the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and thus in a position of 
command directly over Cho Myong-Rok. American negotiators to the Trilateral Talks 
had the impression that the North Korean team needed to have decisions approved by 
Kim Jong-Il, and that it would take them anywhere between twelve to twenty-four hours 
to receive instructions from Kim.547 Moreover, Kim Jong-Il has clearly tried to cement 
his relationship with the military over the years, and this strategy has been clearly visible, 
as more of his visits are to the military.548  
 During the first rounds of the Six-Party Talks, parties also had difficulties in 
reaching agreements during the negotiations because of the talk structure and the time 
difference as Kim Jong-Il needed to approve all decisions.549 During the October 2002 
meeting in Pyongyang, Kim Gye-Gwan first denied the existence of the enriched 
Uranium Program and then Kang Sok-Ju acknowledged its existence on the second day, 
after hinting that the North Korean team had been up all night with people from the Army 
and the Atomic Energy Agency and inferring (though never officially acknowledging) 






that Kim Jong-Il had led the meeting. During the off-session discussion that American 
negotiators had with their North Korean counterparts, North Korea clearly indicated that 
Kim Jong-Il was personally approving all decisions.550  Such a statement, however, does 
not seem true for K.E.D.O.-type negotiations, as there is a lot of contention at the third 
and fourth level of power within the North Korean structure, and that some of those 
negotiations are clearly beneath Kim Jong-Il.551 Evidence thus suggest that when the 
United States negotiates with North Korea, Kim Jong-Il approves most if not all of the 
decisions, either directly or through the military. Thus, for the United States, negotiating 
with North Korea generally means negotiating with Kim Jong-Il.  
 
 
b. New Relationships: North Korea’s Support of Diversification 
 
 
 North Korea’s negotiation strategy over the past fifteen years has largely been a 
product of shifting dynamics over the Korean peninsula which have led to North Korea 
successfully shifting their source of patronage from the Soviets to the Chinese, as well as 
to the South Koreans, especially after Kim Dae-Jung’s accession to power in 1997.552  
 
1. The New Korean Peninsula’s Dynamics 
 
 North Korea has received sizable support from both the Soviet Union and China 
since its creation. However, since the early 1990s, North Korea had to face the 
dissolution of the Soviet Empire as well as an obvious change of direction towards a 





more open and market-oriented China as Beijing entered the W.T.O in 2001. While Kim 
Il-Sung had a very close relationship with Mao, the relationship that Kim Jong-Il has had 
with Chinese leaders is very different from the previous brotherhood bond. Nowadays, 
interaction between Kim Jong-Il and Hu Jintao is extremely businesslike.553  China has 
also been supporting North Korea economically, such as by building a glass factory there 
free of charge. Russia, however, has not provided any significant amount of support to 
Pyongyang since 2000. It has, however, provided some political support. Both countries 
have worked toward and in fact succeeded in achieving political normalization between 
Kim Jong-Il’s regime and Vladimir Putin’s government. There are also frequent 
exchanges between the two leaders, but unlike before, North Korea now has to pay for 
the military hardware it is receiving from Russia in cash.554 Thus, North Korea has not 
been able to count very strongly on Russia’s help during the Six-Party Talks, as 
Moscow’s role appears very limited and almost marginal at times. Russia and China, 
however, have formed a coalition and are constantly consulting with each other regarding 
the different rounds of negotiations, and coordinating their strategies in light of North 
Korea’s strategy. To some extent, Russia is also trying to play an objective mediator’s 
role between the United States and North Korea by trying to utilize the rather comfortable 
relationship achieved between President Putin and President Bush to convey North 
Korea’s position to Washington, impartially. 555  Because of this dwindling Russian 
support, North Korea has been forced to reassess its position regarding its allies, and 
especially has had to find other ways to support its economy. During the 1990s, North 
Korea started utilizing negotiation rounds as a way to secure agreements that would 





provide what was no longer provided by China and by Russia. Thus, North Korea has 
turned itself towards its neighbors, trying to secure a stronger friendship and support from 
China, as well as South Korea, while at the same time utilizing negotiation rounds and 
especially issues such as Japanese abductees and reparation for Japanese colonization to 
pressure Tokyo for monetary concessions. The relationship between Tokyo and 
Pyongyang, however, took a turn for the worse after Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to 
Pyongyang in 2002 when the topic of abductees was openly on the table, but was denied 
by North Korea, although it was later admitted by North Korea and then followed by 
Pyongyang’s signing of a treaty stating it would abandon its nuclear weapons program.556  
  
 The most important relational dynamics over the Korean peninsula are among 
China and the two Koreas. North Korea does not want to open up like China because of 
Pyongyang’s belief that if its people have more freedom, most of them will want to go 
either to China or to South Korea, and thus it will become harder for North Korea to 
retain its strength.557 North Korea also said in 1998 that it was aiming at putting a 
“mosquito net” over the country, meaning that it wanted to receive cool wind, but did not 
want to be bothered with insects. Pyongyang is thus willing to get aid, but will refuse any 
corrupt capitalist system as well as democratic ideas because Pyongyang has witnessed 
the U.S.S.R’s Glasnost and Perestroika policies that eventually made the Soviet Union 
collapse. 558  Pyongyang did initiate some economic reforms in 2002 such as the 
introduction of a new currency as well as wage increases and has also started initiatives 
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to open trade zones that could potentially employ as many as 700,000 North Korean 
workers. However, such enclaves as still extremely small in size, and there is no real 
commitment from the top-level to reform the system the way Deng Xiaoping did in China 
in 1978 and 1979. 559  North Korea’s ultimate goal in all negotiations and political 
relationships is its survival. Other goals include weakening South Korea, which can be 
achieved by trying to break the relationship between Washington and Seoul. But at the 
same time, North Korea has used the “one nation” argument with South Korea, saying 
that Seoul has a duty to help because their people are one.560 China, however, has an 
ambivalent position regarding the Korean peninsula. Up to at least two years ago, China 
thought that a two-Korea policy was not the right policy for the future of the Korean 
peninsula. The Chinese government also recognizes North Korea as being part of its zone 
of influence and belonging to the Manchurian region. Due to North Korea’s weapons, 
Beijing does not want North Korea to be problematic in the region, but likewise, it also 
does not want to antagonize North Korea.561 Moreover, China is unable to solve the 
North Korean problem, as it also has its own priorities such as economic expansion. 
Though North Korea is an important issue for Beijing, it is not as crucial as the issue of 
Taiwan.562  China is also genuinely concerned with the issue of nuclear weapons, and 
does not want North Korea to possess them. At the same time, Beijing and Seoul have 
developed a strong relationship and are concerned that any instability in the region might 
upset economic growth. As a result, both China and South Korea have been rather liberal 
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when opening their checkbook to sustain North Korea and prevent it from crashing.563 
This economic support of North Korea has also been coupled with a Chinese will to force 
North Korea out of its isolation, as there are evidence that China has started, since the 
early 2000s to pressure North Korea to open up change, and for example, cut its supply of 
oil for three weeks in February 2003 in order to force North Korea to come to the 
negotiation table in Beijing, for the Trilateral Talks.564  
 
 South Korea, under the Kim Dae-Jung administration has tried to sustain North 
Korea but has not pushed for unification.  The Sunshine Policy was meant to create a safe 
environment for North Korea to come out of isolation. During later summits, however, 
the emphasis was put on tension-reduction, such as the relocation of troops and South 
Korea kept trying to introduce confidence-building measures in order to appease the 
situation.565 Even though Seoul wants unification, it is perceived more as a myth rather 
than as an achievable reality. South Korea’s policy of giving to North Korea without any 
real conditions has been pursed both by its left-wing and right-wing politicians.566 Seoul, 
however, still considers itself to be in competition with China regarding the United States 
as well as North Korea.567 It has adopted the logic that if they do not act regarding North 
Korea, China eventually will. Because South Korea has adopted a policy aimed at 
avoiding a potential crash, it has weakened its bargaining power in negotiations.568 It thus 
did not provide Seoul with a strong B.A.T.N.A. over the last multilateral negotiation 








rounds. In addition to using the concept of “failed state” when talking about North Korea 
instead of referring to it as a “rogue state,” South Korea has tried not to challenge North 
Korea in order not to give Pyongyang a pretext for not coming back to the negotiation 
table.569  
 
 One might wonder whether China will have a more important role that South 
Korea in the future shaping of the Korean peninsula and to a larger extent, of Northeast 
Asia. For the United States, it seems that China’s role has evolved from that of a strategic 
partner under the Clinton administration to that of a strategic competitor under the Bush 
administration: for this reason, one might wonder what has China tried to achieved over 
the past few years when trying to mediate and broker deals between North Korea and 
South Korea and the Unite States. Is China a conspirator, a bad cop? Or is China a good 
cop, thus subscribing to a benevolent mediator vision of its role? It has been hard to 
receive a straightforward answer to this question from negotiation specialist, North Korea 
specialist as well as high-ranking diplomats interviewed in this study. A consensus seems 
to be reached, however, when considering the important role that China has been playing, 
and the fact that the United States, North Korea and China all consider China as one of 
the most important player in balancing Northeast Asia.  
 
2. Washington’s Role and Duties 
 
 North Korea considers the United States to be its main interlocutor in the 
international system, mainly because it sees the United States as being the signatory to 
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the 1953 Armistice treaty.570  As such, Pyongyang has tried to secure negotiations with 
the United States. Washington’s foreign policy as well as its involvement in international 
affairs, such as the Bush Iraq war profoundly changed North Korea’s behavior over the 
past fifteen years. The United States has had difficulties in maintaining a coherent policy 
regarding its involvement in East Asia, in part because of difficulties in legitimizing to 
South Korea as well as to the rest of the world the large number of troops stationed in 
South Korea after the end of the Cold War, as well as the rise of economic powers such 
as Japan and China, and because of the rise of anti-Americanism, anti-Bushism as well as 
the rise of Korean nationalism within South Korea.  
 From 1994 until the year 2005, the United States experienced two different 
governments with very different ideas regarding North Korea. The Clinton approach was 
assimilated to that of Kim Dae-Jung because Clinton accepted the Sunshine policy, and 
therefore adopted a softer approach toward North Korea.571 It was fully aware that such 
an approach would not fundamentally change North Korea. Instead the United States 
accepted demands from North Korea because Clinton was hoping there would be a 
gradual change in North Korea. North Korea was also conscious that a peace agreement 
was most likely not within reach until the start of 2001, when the Clinton Administration 
would cease to be in power. Although there was a will on both sides to come to an 
agreement, and this later led to Albright’s visit to North Korea, as history had it, the 
window of opportunity opened by both states was not enough. The paradigm shift that 
occurred in the United States in 2001 as a result of September 11 changed the dynamics 




of the system. 572  North Korea suddenly became a prime target, and the Bush 
Administration wanted the elimination of the regime. 573   It seems that the Bush 
Administration was concerned with issues of human rights, a concern that stemmed in 
great part from President Bush’s religious convictions. Thus, Washington did not want to 
see the Agreed Framework as legitimizing the North Korean regime in any way unless 
North Korea really took steps to deserve it. Hard-liners within the Bush Administration 
also were against the Agreed Framework, which they considered to be extorting 
America’s money.  They wanted the Bush government to abandon the Framework as 
soon as it came to power, while North Korea was at the same time, trying to go back to 
the Agreed Framework.574 The United States was also ready to go to talks as early as 
2002, bilaterally with North Korea, but then the talks were delayed because of various 
incidents happening in the West Sea, as well as because of the Axis of Evil Speech. 
During the preparation for those talks, President Bush specifically said that he did not 
want to enter into a tit-for-tat strategy with North Korea, nor would he be satisfied with a 
partial agreement. The United States was thus committed to taking a bold approach and 
giving a lot of money to North Korea if Pyongyang was ready to take a bold approach as 
well.575 Finally, the United States perceived North Korea as being a spoiled child that 
needed spanking, and thus started to focus on sticks more than carrots, with its basic 
policy being that unless North Korea started to do what was asked of them, then there 
would be no conversation possible, which explains why there were no talks from the 






closing of the bilateral missile talks in November 2002 until the short Trilateral Talks in 
Beijing in 2003.576 
 During rounds of negotiations that have occurred within the Six-Party Talks 
framework, the United States has also been faced with dwindling support from South 
Korea.  Because of the change of attitude the United States displayed after the 2001 
terrorist attacks, the United States entered into a policy of no talks with North Korea. 
This policy was, however, not followed by South Korea which kept on having ministerial 
talks in order to pacify North Korea in the absence of American diplomacy.577 This South 
Korean attitude was a function of several factors that included a rising antagonism by the 
younger generations of South Koreans toward the role of the United States in a potential 
peace process for the Korean peninsula.  Some have expressed the idea that the United 
States is not as concerned about nuclear weapons over the peninsula as it is worried about 
its loss of global hegemony over East Asia, especially considering the rise of China. This 
also stems from the different understandings of axis present in the region. The United 
States understands the Pacific region as having two central points, namely Japan and 
Taiwan, whereas South Korea is more concerned with China and North Korea.578 
 The United States, however, took another fork in the road in 2003 with the War in 
Iraq that has, once more, derailed the process of coming to a negotiated solution to issues 
faced by the Korean peninsula. The United States’ attention has been almost exclusively 
focused on the issue of Iraq, and many American government officials dealing with war 
and peace issues, when asked questions by the press regarding the North Korean 
situation, gave answers that clearly indicated that they had not been following 





developments regarding the Korean peninsula.579 It is thus possible to conclude that the 
North Korean issue was far from being at the top of the list of American priorities, as it 
probably spent more than ninety percents of its time dealing with the issues of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as the rest of its time on issues such as Taiwan, Darfur, Cuba, and 
North Korea, thus destroying North Korea’s vision that Washington is thinking about the 
Dear Leader every nights and days.580  
 North Korea strategized about its participation in international negotiation rounds, 
when it realized that a deal with the first Bush administration would be very unlikely 
given the administration’s attitude regarding the Agreed Framework, the hardening of 
Washington’s stance regarding terrorism and pariah states following the September 11, 
2001 attacks, the January 2002 Axis of Evil Speech, and the March 2003 military action 
in Iraq. Because North Korea has become more sophisticated and knowledgeable about 
the world, it was keenly aware of the United States’ election cycles, and was hoping that 
John Kerry would win the 2004 Presidential election. However, because of the way North 
Korea managed to diversify its support, thanks to China and South Korea’s willingness to 
foot almost any bill in an effort to pacify the situation as well as to replace the United 
States in its absence of involvement in the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang has developed a 
capacity to wait for events to take a more favorable course. Just as China and South 
Korea became substitutes for non-governmental organizations bringing relief to North 
Korea in the 1990s, North Korea has been waiting to engage in any meaningful 
agreement until the next American administration replaces President Bush’s. 581  The 
second Bush administration has, however, been more flexible, especially because as the 
                                                 




war in Iraq has created a lot of strains on the United States, the prospect of holding 
negotiations with North Korea along with other important players was viewed positively 
by the United States. It is debatable whether or not the Iraq war has hardened or softened 
North Korea’s position in international negotiations. The level of force used for the war 
showed a very aggressive United States. North Korea was not expecting such a display of 
strength but Pyongyang also got reassured that the United States, because of the current 
difficulty that its military is facing in Iraq, will not be able to be involved in a second 
conventional invasion.582 Thus, North Korea might now see holding negotiations simply 
as a way to gain time until an American administration change. The United States, 
however, has tried to raise new issues beside nuclear weapons, focusing on North 
Korea’s human rights and counterfeiting, for example.583 By many accounts, however, 
the issue of counterfeiting was far from being new.  The amount of money that had 
actually been involved in the illegal trafficking was not much, and there surely were 
issues of more pressing importance such as that of nuclear weapons on the peninsula.584 
Thus, it seems that the Bush Administration has had a hard time controlling its policy and 
its focus regarding North Korea, and that both Washington and Pyongyang have settled 
for a similar approach, waiting the other one out. Because of this mindset, few 
meaningful steps have been taken regarding resolution of issues, and both parties have 
engaged in a new game structure with rounds largely dictated by China. 
 
 





c. Brokers, Allies, and New Game Structures 
There have been different motivations for having negotiations, negotiation 
expectations and negotiation structures, and rhetoric during the talks.  Some issues have 
been polarizing while others have led to the formation of coalitions of negotiators.  The 
notions of trust and confidence-building have been crucial in influencing negotiation 
outcomes. Moreover, negotiations have been influenced by the current Bush 
administration’s apparent split over the issue of engaging with North Korea. Finally, the 
game has progressed from a time when parties tried to preempt the development of 
nuclear weapons by North Korea to a situation in which despite safeguards, North Korea 
has felt the need, for one reason or another, to develop such weapons. Thus, the question 
of what to do regarding the Agreed Framework and a potential denuclearization of the 
peninsula has occupied most of the diplomatic minds working on the North Korean issue.  
 
1. The Making of an Agreement 
 Is trust necessary in order to have successful negotiations? Is it possible for North 
Korea to trust its American counterparts, and for the United States to acknowledge that 
its negotiation partners are not only using rhetoric developed by regime propaganda, but 
are truly interested in reaching a negotiated agreement? By many accounts as well as 
obvious observations, the United States and North Korea do not have any history of trust.  
Both parties have actively accused the other about failed negotiations and about the 
escalation of the security dilemma on the Korean peninsula.585 Thus, there is a need to 
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establish credibility as well as raise the level of dialogue between the two parties.586  
Such dialogue has developed within the K.E.D.O. framework.  It created a relationship 
that had not existed before and talks were held at both lower ranks as well as top 
positions. 587  K.E.D.O. negotiators seem to have been able to initiate trust at those 
different contact levels, but other parties negotiating with North Korea, such as the South 
Korean negotiation teams dealing with inter-Korean affairs through the Korean Ministry 
of Unification believed that trust was not really possible from either the North Korean 
side or the South Korean side.  They felt the best that could be achieved was an 
“understanding”, a more exact term to qualify the relationship.  For South Korean 
negotiators trust meant the ability to deliver on promises made.588  
North Korean negotiators seem to be well-regarded, well-recognized, and well-
qualified. Initial impressions of American negotiators during negotiations suggest that 
North Korean negotiators are intelligent diplomats who are also very well-informed589  as 
well as keen on analyzing the negotiation, even though it is uncertain whether they 
actually “game” the negotiations. 590  North Korean negotiation delegations are often 
composed of five or six people, with some that are not critical to the negotiation, and a 
few that are usually key actors, such as Kim Gye-Gwan.591 North Korean diplomats are 
also recognized for their love of the diplomatic game, for being quite personable, as well 
as for their frankness, as in the case of the Six-Party Talks where American diplomats 
reported that they never felt that North Korean diplomats were lying unless they had 








explicitly been told to do so by the North Korean regime.592 South Korean diplomats also 
note the way North Korean counterparts try to show their sincerity and commitment to 
their country’s official line of conduct and position on issues when talks are in session, 
but that they can become extremely candid and honest about the reality of the North 
Korean situation when in private settings.593  
 If trust – or at least a somewhat good relationship – is achieved at the negotiation 
level, is it possible to translate this to the international issue-level? The Clinton 
administration saw a clear-cut difference between trust and confidence-building, positing 
that trust was not a necessary condition, and even less a sufficient condition in order to 
create positive agreements that would be upheld by parties. The difference between 
confidence-building and trust is that confidence can be achieved by building the kind of 
agreement that will make parties feel that if one of them breaks out, everybody will know 
about it. Thus, the Agreed Framework was an attempt at confidence-building that is also 
argued by Clinton Administration supporters to have enabled the United States’ access to 
the Kumchang-ri site. Nowadays, however, the Agreed Framework has almost been 
abandoned, and surely has not been given much support by the Bush Administration, 
while North Korea has been trying to get back to an Agreed Framework-type of 
agreement, hence believing that the table could be wiped clean and that new partnerships 
could be created. North Korea, however, was not willing to accept the terminology 
“confidence building” up until the end of the Four-Party Talks. The failure of the Four-
Party Talks was largely due to North Korea’s repetition of issues - negotiating a peace 
treaty, the reduction of American troops on the peninsula, and the cessation of joint 




military exercises between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. North Korea was 
insisting on the wording “tension reduction,” but finally gave in, and accepted China, 
South Korea and the United States’ “confidence-building” terminology.594  The same 
terminology issue arose again during the Six-Party Talks with the United States’ 
Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement (C.V.I.D.) of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program. After North Korea’s signature of the September 19 agreement at the 
Six-Party Talks, the time is ripe to bring new confidence-building measures.  The first 
step should be the creation of a negotiation environment and the second the discussion of 
each actors’ security concerns so that all players start on an equal footing. This process 
will have to be ongoing until there is an agreement that provides strict implementation of 
plans that are drawn up and provides for sub-committee meetings.595  
 Reaching an agreement with North Korea, however, will depend on several 
factors. First, there is a clear need to identify parties’ priorities. The United States’ 
priorities seem to be monetary concerns, military power, and prestige on the international 
scene while North Korea tends to go for prestige first, then power, and then money. The 
Clinton Administration was willing to give North Korea face, to recognize a 
normalization of relations, to refrain from using language that was too aggressive, and to 
utilize titles in conversation that North Korea preferred. The Bush Administration, 
however, influenced by a different strategic climate and a different understanding of its 
own security, was not willing to give North Korea face as it wanted to confront 
Pyongyang with the issue of human rights. To some extent, the United States also 
abandoned faith in North Korea regarding confidence-building institutions such as the 




Non Proliferation Treaty and the Agreed Framework.596 Second, negotiations with North 
Korea have been largely influenced by the type of forum that was provided for the talks. 
Over the past fifteen years, several formats have been tested, some with more success 
than others. The Six-Party Talks are the most comprehensive model of talks that have 
occurred between the parties. Previous rounds of negotiations have been heavily 
influenced by timelines and the question of whether negotiations should have an open-
ended structure, such as was the case with the Six-Party Talks’ fourth round. There is a 
normal rhythm, a sort of normal evolution that takes place during negotiations.  
Everybody comes and presents their opening positions, communicates back and forth to 
their capital, and then has some time to reformulate their positions. Some argue that a 
natural bilateral negotiation process on a substantial issue like North Korean development 
of nuclear weapons would take anywhere from five to ten days.597 The Six-Party Talks 
departed from the usual format in which the United States was trying to put artificial 
deadlines on negotiating sessions in order to make North Korea come to their bottom line 
faster.598 The Six-Party Talks also embodied a clear pursuit of multilateral efforts that had 
been initiated during the Four-Party Talks and highlighted China’s efforts to bring about 
a new round of talks using the Beijing Trilateral forum. The United States seemed to have 
drawn lessons from the 1994 nuclear crisis, where the process of negotiation was not an 
open one. The United States has therefore been trying to reach formats that include more 
than just North Korean and American negotiators in one room, in order to avoid being 
blamed by North Korea if there is no agreement reached at the end of the day. However, 
such a structure back-fired for the United States: the Six-Party Talks were a forum 





designed to bring a coalition of five countries (the United States, South Korea, China, 
Japan and Russia) against one (North Korea). However, China and South Korea have 
largely supported the idea of appeasing North Korea by basically agreeing that North 
Korea should be allowed peaceful nuclear energy facilities, while Russia has largely 
stayed outside of the debate, and Japan alienated itself by pressing the issue of abductees 
with North Korea, leaving the United States rather alone in the process.599  
The Six-Party Talks’ first round was also very successful because the small group 
format that was agreed upon enabled discussion, but the tight timeline made it difficult 
for parties to consider the draft statement that China had put on the table. The United 
States’ negotiators had to get approval from Washington on some issues, and North 
Korean delegates also needed Kim Jong-Il’s approval. Parties, including China, realized 
that time zones made it difficult for negotiations to follow a “natural course”, and this led 
to a change in format and the fourth open-ended round in which parties benefited from 
much more time.600 Parties have also realized, in light of the tense international situation, 
that a breakdown of channels of communication between the parties would lead them to 
have to take a course of action regarding, if one takes North Korea’s position, a potential 
American preemptive strike or, if one takes the United States’ position, actions regarding 
North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. All in all, the situation can only be more 
unstable if there are no talks, and all parties seem to be conscious of this.  However, it has 
been difficult for the United States to keep a constant position regarding the North 
Korean issue, because while the Untied States may be a rational and realist actor, it is far 
from being a unitary actor.  




2. Forget-Me-Not: Nuclear Weapons, Hard-Liners and Sunbathers 
 The United States and North Korea are now back to a stalemate situation: the 
September 19 agreement that was touted as being a big step forward has not delivered 
any constructive steps towards a peaceful resolution of the situation. Three years of 
negotiations among the United States, North Korea and other members of the 
international community have been dominated by the issue of nuclear weapons. Why did 
the Six-Party Talks fail to produce any meaningful agreement despite a strong 
commitment to dialogue on all parts? It seems that the answer to this question lies in part 
on the side of the American negotiation team, and to a larger extent, in the dynamics 
within the Bush Administration. During President Bush’s first term, Colin Powell was 
given the reign of power and quickly said that he would continue with Clinton’s approach 
but was quickly reprimanded for his comments.601 It seems that the Bush Administration 
has been divided among different power lines. Some say that there are tensions between 
hard-liners and moderates.602 Others qualify the tensions as being among hard-liners and 
ultra hard-liners.603 One of the most salient theories running around Pennsylvania and 
New York Avenues, is that Powell did not have a good relationship with Bush, and thus 
was not fully empowered by the president. Others also suppose that Dick Cheney, not 
wanting to give any leeway to North Korea, intervened to prevent Powell from following 
a more dovish approach. As a result, James Kelly might have been left with very few 
instructions as to what to do during the early years of the Six-Party Talks. 604 Stories of 
how difficult it was for Colin Powell to get the undivided attention of the President also 






arise, as he was apparently not able to talk to him unless he was on Air Force One, flying 
somewhere in Africa.605 The second Bush Administration has appeared more flexible in 
terms of having a dialogue with North Korea for reasons that we have seen earlier.  In the 
second term a different team was put together with Christopher Hill and Condoleezza 
Rice. The Rice-Hill team received more of the president’s confidence than the Powell-
Armitage team.606 Besides internal divisions, the United States has also suffered from 
conflict within agencies, as the State Department has tended to put an important emphasis 
on diplomacy, while the Pentagon has tended to undercut diplomacy. The National 
Security Council has been trying to bring them together at the beginning of the Six-Party 
Talks.607 Thus, the new approach could be considered a synthesis of two approaches that 
were opposed to each other.608 During the first administration, no party could agree on 
the course of action to take.609 There were sharp personal divisions on the issues, such as 
Dick Cheney’s hatred for North Korea’s regime to Colin Powell’s position that it was not 
a sane course of action just to consider regime change in North Korea as an option. There 
seems, however, to have been a unified understanding of the Six-Party Talks’ importance 
for rejuvenating a dialogue that had abruptly ended and created a hiatus during which 
North Korea reacted to the Iraq invasion by supposedly sending Kim Jong-Il into hiding 
for more than forty days in a bunker designed for his protection, located in China.610  
 With the leeway Condoleezza Rice gave to Christopher Hill, it appears that Rice 
entrusted Hill during the fourth round of Six-Party Talks to manage to get the six parties 








to agree on the denuclearization of North Korea as a precondition to negotiate.611 The 
hiatus that the United States took while it was more preoccupied with September 11, 
2001 was also accompanied by the fact that there was no real North Korea specialist in 
the administration at that time. The situation was unchanged during the second 
administration, however critics started to arise, saying that the United States was refusing 
talks with North Korea, and thus accused Washington of not being interested in a 
successful resolution of the nuclear weapons crisis. The fact is, however, that the United 
States did not expect that North Korea would be so forthcoming about its nuclear 
weapons. Washington seems to have based its approach of the nuclear weapons crisis on 
the Kumchang-ri experience. When the United States confronted North Korea, alleging 
that is was using the site to develop nuclear matter and nuclear weapons, North Korea 
fiercely denied the allegations. In October 2002, however, when James Kelly met with 
Kim Gye-Gwan and confronted him about nuclear power, North Korea did not deny it, 
but rather acknowledged it.612 North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons as a 
direct result of the United States having nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula as 
early as 1958 and up until 1991.613 North Korea seemed to have used its potential nuclear 
weapons as a bargaining chip during the 1990s. The Yongbyon reactor is not a reactor 
type that can easily be used to create weapons, as it is a copy of a British Coldwell 
reactor that was used in Great Britain during the 1950s. The fact that North Korea 
unloaded the reactor’s fuel only twice could be a sign that Pyongyang was not 
systematically collecting the fuel and thus was not serious about creating nuclear 





weapons then.614 Since the beginning of the twentieth century, however, North Korea has 
changed its approach.  It desires to retain its weapons in order to achieve deterrence, 
especially in light of America’s War on Terrorism as well as its preemptive strike on Iraq. 
To some extent, the American paradigm shift has reinforced North Korea’s determination 
to have nuclear weapons in order to survive. The more sophisticated North Korea’s 
nuclear capacities become, however, the more difficult it will be for the United States to 
find a compromise.615 Evidence in international politics also show that giving up nuclear 
weapons programs have often been associated with regime change, such as in the 
Ukraine, South Africa, Brazil or Argentina, with the exception of Libya that has become 
the United States’ prime model for successful abandon of illicit nuclear programs.616  
Why would North Korea try to retain its nuclear weapons at all costs if it is 
conscious about what happened in Iraq? The logic of deterrence seems to be a strong 
factor in North Korea’s rationale, but not necessarily in the conventional state-to-state 
sense. Having nuclear weapons deters internal factions within Korea from being 
dissatisfied with their leader, as the prospect of being a nuclear state and belonging to the 
“big boys’ club” would reassure an institution like the Korean People’s Army.617 There 
are, however, suspicions regarding the nature of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program. Russia, for example, has been consistent about saying that North Korea does 
not have nuclear capacities. The Foreign Ministry has claimed that they knew very well 
about Pyongyang’s capacity because of its close relationship with Moscow. According to 
Russia, North Korea has the capacity to produce weapons’ grade plutonium, but Moscow 






does not believe that North Korea has actual weapons.618 A few years ago, experts who 
went to North Korea were convinced that Pyongyang did not know how to reprocess 
plutonium. North Korea showed them a piece of metallic plutonium. When experts asked 
North Korea to see the bomb, they said they were looking at it.619 However, the prospect 
that North Korea has now been developing weapons using highly-enriched uranium is a 
new concern that must be addressed. 
 The most important question to answer at this point is about the relevance, or lack 
of relevance of the September 19, 2005 agreement. After several weeks of negotiations 
and a number of drafts presented by the Chinese delegation, China insisted on the 
inclusion of the provision, in the agreement, of light-water reactors to North Korea in a 
bid to push North Korea to sign the agreement as well. Both South Korea and China then 
called Rice in a joint effort to put pressure on her. Finally, the United States decided to 
sign the accord, with North Korea committing to “specific and immediate” provision of 
the reactor, while the United States committed to a vague “appropriate time”.620 The 
difference in interpretation of the agreement thus came about very quickly, the day after 
the agreement was signed. This was clearly part of North Korea’s negotiation strategy in 
order to put pressure on the United States so that it can get rewards from the agreement, 
and it can have the leisure to blame the United States if Washington reneges on its part of 
the deal.621 Finally, the United States’ difficulty to come to a consensus and especially a 
unity in action when working on the issue of North Korea is seen in the tough statement 
made by Washington the morning after the agreement was signed. The statement clearly 






indicated that the light water reactor would not come before North Korea took critical 
steps first. This language was not written by Christopher Hill; rather, it represented the 
position of certain people in the Bush administration.622 The United States is still not 
ready for a single approach regarding North Korea, and that this plays in Pyongyang’s 
favor.  North Korea is waiting for the end of the Bush administration’s in 2008, and its 
replacement by a new administration. Thus, division within the line of command in the 
United States and especially along the corridors of the White House has been 
strengthening North Korea’s negotiating power.  Neither sunbathers who supported the 
Agreed Framework and Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy, nor hard-liners who hinted at 
their support of regime change in North Korea have been able to forecast what the Dear 
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Chapter Eight. Conclusion 
 
 
“As far as the outside world was concerned, the Paradise on Earth created by the great 
leader and bequeathed to the dear leader existed only in the minds of a self-serving 
leadership and a brainwashed population.”623 
 
 
 These words from Michael Harrold summarize the difficult path that North Korea 
has chosen to pursue: stricken by the experience of colonialism under the Japanese 
occupation of more than three decades, engrossed in the cult of personality that has led to 
the first communist monarchy, beaten down and starved by poor economic decision 
making and catastrophic climactic conditions, North Korea has isolated itself from most 
of the international community and developed nuclear weapons. It is now categorized by 
many as an abhorrent rogue state.  
 But it is important to be more nuanced than this. The literature has shown that the 
definition of a rogue state has evolved over time. Rogues were first understood as states 
that did not fit traditional characterizations of rational states acting in the international 
system. Most of the states classified as rogues were involved in the creation and the 
trading of weapons of mass destruction, and had ties with terrorism. The 1991 Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait exemplified how a rogue state could suddenly threaten the 
international system. The United Nations’ response that was largely led by the United 
States showed that the threat that could be posed by rogue states had been taken seriously 
by the international community.   
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 Is North Korea a rogue state and if so, should the international community engage 
with it? Pyongyang has been considered one of the leading rogue states because of its 
isolation from the international system and because of the ways that its behavior has 
mirrored the aforementioned rogue attribute: North Korea has sponsored and enacted 
terrorism (the Rangoon attack and the bombing of the K.A.L.858 flight in the 1980s, for 
example); has defied the international system by expelling World Food Program officers 
who were trying to alleviate the North Korean population’s hunger in the late 1990s;  
tested missiles over Japan on many occasions; reprocessed plutonium while its Yongbyon 
reactor was supposed to be frozen as per the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework; and 
withdrawn from the Non Proliferation Treaty as it developed nuclear weapons. Moreover, 
the Dear Leader’s enigmatic personality, as well as Pyongyang’s belligerent prose have 
cemented the country’s position as one of the rogue states that the United States, and to 
some extent the international community, love to hate. 
 How has the international community engaged with North Korea? The Clinton 
Administration paired up with the Kim Dae Jung Administration to support an 
engagement policy that was designed to help North Korea emerge from its isolationism 
and that also aimed at preventing North Korea from crashing down and destabilizing 
South Korea and to a larger extent, the Northeast Asian region. The Bush Administration, 
however, has adopted a different strategy that has evolved due to the War on Terrorism. 
At first, the Bush Administration did not have a clear strategy on North Korea, but 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Washington’s new preemptive approach to 
terrorism crystallized, and the President singled-out North Korea as a member of the Axis 
of Evil in his 2002 State of the Union Address. The United States decided to suspend 
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diplomatic relations with North Korea, and as a result, China has become the main 
interlocutor between North Korea and the United States, as Beijing jumpstarted 
multilateral rounds of talks that led to new efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.  
 How does North Korea negotiate? The existing literature focuses on the Kim Il 
Sung period. It only briefly touches Kim Jong-Il’s reign, which is the focus of this 
dissertation. Previous studies have pointed out North Korea’s inflexibility during 
negotiations, its propensity to blame its negotiation counterparts for the lack of progress 
during and after talks, and Pyongyang’s tendency to reinterpret signed agreements. There 
are, however, serious shortcomings in the literature: North Korea has often been studied 
in the context of the Cold War, and very few studies manage to overcome stereotypical 
ideas of North Korea, such as expectations of Pyongyang’s imminent collapse due to its 
economic problems or that Kim Jong-Il would have a hard time being perceived as a 
legitimate leader by his own citizens. Most of the literature regarding how North Korea 
negotiates has dealt only with the onset of the Kim Jong-Il era, and thus the time is ripe 
for an up-to-date analysis of Kim Jong-Il’s regime and its negotiation strategy from 1994 
up to the present. Moreover, when looking at the broader literature on rogue states and 
international negotiations, it is apparent that most of the studies are centered on how the 
United States has framed rogues and negotiated with them. It tends to assume that 
rogues’ behavior and roguery is constant. Thus, it is vital to consider a different 
dependent variable, namely North Korea’s negotiation strategy, rather than yet again 
focusing exclusively on Washington’s approach. By focusing on a different dependent 
variable and looking at how Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea has been negotiating and which 
 258
factors influence dynamics in North Korean strategies, this dissertation explores whether 
or not there is consistency in North Korea’s negotiation strategies.  
 
 Determining whether there is a consistent North Korean negotiation strategy in 
light of its interaction with the United Stats means looking at various cases of negotiation 
episodes in which Pyongyang has been formally involved. Seven cases that have 
involved North Korea and the United States as negotiators, and some of which have 
involved regional powers or superpowers in formal negotiation settings, were selected for 
archival and interview research. 
 The first case, the 1994 "Pilot Negotiations," dealt with an American helicopter 
crossing the D.M.Z. which was shot by the North Korean Army, and it showed how the 
U.S. government had to negotiate with North Korea in order to recover the remains of 
one pilot and obtain the release of the second, without the incident impeding the 
implementation of the Agreed Framework. The second, the 1996-2000 “Bilateral talks: 
Missile Proliferation”, involved bilateral talks between the United States and North 
Korea. They were held in order to discuss Pyongyang’s missile proliferation and revealed 
how North Korea was asked to agree to the Missile Technology Control Regime and in 
turn asked the United States to provide compensation for lost missile-related revenues. 
The third case, the 1996 “Nodong launch,” dealt with North Korean preparations for a 
test of its medium-range Nodong missile and Washington’s response to these plans, 
defensively trying to assert its power by sending a reconnaissance ship and aircraft to 
Japan. Several meetings were then held in New York between the United States and 
North Korea, in order to reach a compromise on the missile testing. The fourth case, the 
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1999 “Kumchang-ri compromise” explored Ambassador Kartman’s visit to the D.P.R.K. 
and his concerns regarding underground construction in the Yongbyon area. Pyongyang 
had to decide, in order to receive food and economic aid, whether it would allow 
inspectors to visit the site. The fifth case, the 1997-1999 “four-party talks,’ described how 
the United States, China, South Korea and North Korea met to discuss a potential 
resolution to the 1953 Armistice. The sixth case, the April 2003 ‘Trilateral talks” showed 
how China invited North Korea and the United States for several days of talks in Beijing, 
in order to restart the negotiation process over the peninsula after a hiatus of more than 
three years.  The seventh case, the 2003-2005 “six-party talks” involve the talks between 
the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea to discuss the 
possibilities for a nuclear-free peninsula 
Next, the findings regarding the main research question, namely whether there is a 
North Korean negotiation strategy and which factors account for dynamics in this 
strategy, were discussed, in light of the qualitative analysis of the cases via archival 
research and elite and expert interviewing. Empirically, the data suggests that there is 
indeed a North Korean negotiation strategy, one characterized especially by the 
importance of “saving face,” as well as the centralization of power in North Korea.  
Individual-level hypotheses regarding saving face proved robust as explanations 
of negotiation behavior in many negotiation cases and showed that North Korea is highly 
influenced by and responsive to its perceptions of the ranking of its negotiating partners.  
Additionally, the results falsify hypotheses linked to the state which had suggested the 
strategic impact of a split between North Korea’s elite and its military, and North Korea 
did not appear to use the image of such a split in order to gain leverage in international 
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negotiations. Likewise, there was little support for hypotheses pertaining to the 
international system which predicted linkages between crises.  
North Korea’s inflexibility in terms of its red line has resounded across the 
various negotiation cases.  This finding is perhaps one of the most important, along with 
the fact that North Korea seems to be more responsive to negotiations that pertain to 
issues of low-politics and more inflexible regarding outcomes that would require change 
to its own system or issues of high-politics.  
What are the implications of these findings? First, there is theoretical value-added 
component as the study has challenged some assumptions that the literature has made 
regarding North Korea. In contrast to what the literature suggests, there is a consistent 
North Korean negotiation strategy and this strategy cannot be understood, much less 
responded to effectively in negotiations, if North Korea is dealt using conventional 
wisdom that assumes it is collapsing, isolated, ignorant, and irrational. Moreover, the 
time constrictions that are often discussed in the negotiation literature do not appear to 
change the likelihood of an agreement being reached. Rather, open-ended negotiations 
have proven to be a more favorable setting in the case of the six-party negotiation. 
Putting artificial deadlines in order to reach an agreement faster are counterproductive as 
North Korean negotiators are not entrusted by their regime to make their own decisions at 
the negotiation table and because North Korea is often inflexible when it comes to its 
position during negotiations.   
The results of this study may well generalize to other negotiations involving 
North Korea and economic or non-state actors. Although the focus has been on state-level 
negotiations, similar constraints are likely to involve North Korea’s behavior in 
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negotiations involving economic enterprise because there is no private enterprise in North 
Korea, the country is fully centralized, and all decisions pertaining to the state are made 
by elites. A similar methodology could also be used to look at and compare the behavior 
of other rogue states which have similar characteristics: a state with a centralized 
government led by an omnipotent ideology (or religion, for example), a state that 
develops weapons that threaten regional and international stability, and a state that also 
challenges the United States’ hegemonic power.  
It is probably in the field of policy and in practical negotiation settings that the 
study has the most important implications, however. This study has showed, however, 
that the negotiation relationship between Washington and Pyongyang has evolved: during 
the “teenage” and “tentative” diplomacy period, North Korea was under a lot of scrutiny 
as it was the first time that Pyongyang was taking part in relatively public and open 
negotiations. During the “renewal” of diplomacy phase, however, it seems that the United 
States stole the spotlight and a very important part of North Korea’s negotiation strategy 
seemed to have been fomented as a reaction to Washington’s actions. The United States 
needs to be sensitive to North Korean culture and to the fact that Pyongyang has learned 
about the international system over the past decade, and is no longer as unaware about the 
world as it was when Kim Jong-Il took the reigns of power. North Korean diplomats have 
learned to become first-class negotiators through their repeated negotiation interactions, 
within the K.E.D.O. framework, as well as through inter-Korean talks, and bilateral and 
multilateral rounds of talks. In terms of policy, a new outlook on North Korea is needed: 
the United States has focused on generating North Korean behavioral change, especially 
regarding nuclear energy. However, it is crucial to understand that North Korea’s nuclear 
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weapons give Pyongyang important benefits. First, whether or not North Korea has 
nuclear weapons and is able to deliver them, the fact from the North’s perspective is that 
having them may serve as a deterrent for Washington: it has so far prevented the United 
States from launching a preemptive war in North Korea. Second, North Korea can 
generate revenues from the sale of such weapons, and thus alleviate the burdens of its 
failing economy. Third, North Korea can extract monetary concessions by negotiating 
access to inspectors concerned with North Korea’s potential development of nuclear 
weapons, being rewarded for its nuclear efforts (evident during the Kumchang-ri case, for 
instance). Fourth, North Korea can control its population by indoctrinating its people to 
think that the regime is one of the leading world powers because it belongs to the 
restricted club of Nuclear Weapons States.  For all those reasons, it seems highly unlikely 
that North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons based on Washington’s pressures. 
The United States’ expectation of North Korean nuclear concessions and behavioral 
changes is thus misguided. It is more feasible to first focus on altering the strategic 
climate surrounding the peninsula and its negotiation partners in order that North Korea 
no longer need to own or use such weapons. 
 Further study is needed to explore how the strategic climate could be changed, if 
negotiation strategies are altered to account for North Korean behavioral patterns and 
constraints regarding nuclear concessions. Such an approach could involve strategies that 
help alter North Korean perceptions that the United States would launch a preemptive 
war at any time. Moreover, strategies that help improve North Korea’s economy could 
lead Pyongyang to be less dependent on and interested in generating revenues from the 
sale of missile technology or ownership of weapons of mass destruction. But an equally 
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important change is necessitated not on the side of negotiation partners, but actually 
within the North Korean regime: as long as North Korea feels it needs to control its own 
population and uses nuclear power to help establish its legitimacy, there will be very little 
possibility to make Pyongyang less of a military dictatorship and more of a democracy.  
It also seems crucial to reevaluate the role of China in the international system 
and especially in Northeast Asia. Though China may have, at some point, been 
considered as a rogue, it is now a crucial partner to the United States in bringing North 
Korea to the negotiation table. It seems important to work on evaluating China’s strategic 
approach in Northeast Asian negotiations, especially regarding whether or not China has 
the willingness, ambition, and ability to become a military hegemonic power that could 
challenge the United States. 
Finally, it is necessary to continue observing the evolution of the six-party talks 
beyond the September 19 agreement. The terms of the agreement stated that “The Six 
Parties are committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” 
The agreement also stated that “the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent 
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.” Whether such a 
forum will happen during the remaining tenure of the Bush Administration appears 
unlikely624. However, it is highly probable that Kim Jong-Il will continue to rule and be 







                                                 
624 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005. U.S 
Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm (Accessed May 2006).  
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Appendix I. List of newspapers 
 
AAP Newsfeed 
AEI Online (Washington) 
AFX - Asia 
Agence France Presse  
Asahi News Service 
Asia Pulse 
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political 
BBC Monitoring International Reports 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring 
Buffalo News (New York) 
Business Times (Malaysia) 
Canberra Times (Australia) 
Chicago Sun-Times 
China Daily 
Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA) 
CNN 
Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia) 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur 
Financial Times (London, England) 
Global News Wire 
Hobart Mercury (Australia) 
International Herald Tribune 
Japan Economic Newswire 
Jiji Press Ticker Service 
Journal of Commerce 
Korea Herald 
Korea Times 
Los Angeles Times 
Malaysia General News 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Wisconsin) 
New Straits Times (Malaysia) 
Newsday (New York) 
Ottawa Citizen 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) 
Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) 
Pyongyang Report 
Rocky Mountain News (Denver, CO) 
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) 





The Asahi Shimbun 
The Associated Press 
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution 
The Australian 
The Boston Globe 
The Boston Herald 
The Daily Yomiuri 
The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) 
The Guardian (London) 
The Herald (Glasgow) 
The Hindu 
The Houston Chronicle 
The Independent (London) 
The International Herald Tribune 
The Irish Times 
The Japan Times 
The Jerusalem Post 
The Korea Herald 
The Nation (Thailand) 
The New York Times 
The Nikkei Weekly (Japan) 
The Observer 
The Ottawa Citizen 
The Press Trust of India 
The San Diego Union-Tribune 
The San Francisco Chronicle 
The Seattle Times 
The Straits Times (Singapore) 
The Tampa Tribune Tampa Tribune (Florida) 
The Times 
The Toronto Star 
The Washington Post 
the Weekend Australian 
United Press International 
USA TODAY 
Voice of America 
Washington News 
World News Connection 
Xinhua News Agency 





Appendix II. Main Protagonists during Negotiation Rounds 
 
 
a. Pilot Negotiations 
 
US organization chart: 
Active Role Spokesperson Person of Interest In Korea at the time 
Bill Clinton, 
U.S. President 
Michael Mc Furry 
State Department 
Spokesman 





Bobby Hall             
U.S. Pilot 
Warren Christopher 
Secretary of State 
Newt Gingrich          
House Speaker 
Donald Gregg           
U.S Ambassador in 
South Korea 




D - New Mexico 
Kenneth Bacon         
Pentagon Spokesman 
Richard Armitage       
Assistant Secretary of 
Defense in the 1980' 
Jim Coles              
8th U.S Army 
Headquarters in Seoul 
Leon E. Panetta         
White House 
 Chief of Staff 
Elaine Mc Devit         
State Department 
Spokeswoman 
Robert Manning        
Bush Administration 
state Department Policy 
Advisor 
Genera Gary Luck      
Senior U.S Commander 
in the theater 
Robert Galucci          
Ambassador-at-large 
 Bob Gaskin             
Former Pentagon Korea 
Strategist 
James Laney           
U.S Ambassador to 
South Korea 
Thomas Hubbard       
State Department 
Deputy Assistant 
 William Taylor         
Korea Expert at the 
Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
 
William J. Perry        
Defense Secretary 
 Brent Scowcroft         
Former President of 
Bush's National Security 
Advisor 
 
  Joseph Bermudez       









North Korea’s organization chart: 




the DPRK UN Mission 
in New York 
Song Ho Gyong          
Vice Foreign Minister 
KCNA                
North Korea Official 
News Agency 
O Jin U                 
Army Chief Marshall 
 
Kang Sok-Ju            




South Korea’s organization chart: 
Active Role Person of Interest 
Jang Jai Ryong 
Director General of 
American Affairs for 
South Korea's Foreign 
Ministry 
Yu Suk Ryul           
North Korea expert at 
the Institute of Foreign 
Affairs and National 
Security in Seoul 
 
 
b. Missile Launch 
 
US organization chart: 






Lee H. Hamilton 
Head of the Woodrow 
Wilson International 
Center for Scholars 
James Laney 
Ambassador to Seoul 
Robert Einhorn 
Deputy Assistant 






U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State 




Madeleine K. Albright 





 James Foley 
Spokesman 
  




DPRK organization chart: 
Active Role Person of Interest 
Lee Yang Ho 
Defense Minister 
Chang Sung Gil 
Ambassador, defected 
from Egypt 
Jo Myong Rok 
First vice chairman of 
North Korea's National 
Defense Commission 
Chang Sung Ho 
Diplomat on a trade 
mission to Paris and 
brother of Chang Sung 
Gil 
Li Hyong-Chol 
North Korean Foreign 
Ministry Foreign Affairs 
Director 
Kim Myong Gil 
Counsel at the North 
Korean mission at the 
U.N. 
Ri Gun 
North Korean Deputy 
Ambassador to the U.N. 
Han Chang-on 
U.S. expert in the North 
Korean foreign ministry 
Jang Chang Chon 
Head of North Korea's 
bureau on United States 
affairs 
 




Director-general for US 
affairs at the North 
Korean foreign ministry 
 
Jong Song-il 




ROK organization chart: 
Active Role Person of Interest 
Kim Young-Sam 
President 
Gen. Gary Luck 
Commander of the 
















c. Nodong Launch 
 
US organization chart: 
Active Role Spokesperson Person of Interest In Korea 
Bill Clinton             
US President 
Nicholas Burns          
State Department 
Spokesman 
Jason Shaplen          
Policy adviser and 




Robert Einhorn         
US Chief Negotiator 
Winston Lord           
US Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asian 
and Pacific affairs 
Michael Mc Curry       
White House 
Spokesman 
Stephen Bosworth      
KEDO's executive 
director 
Mr. Lovquist         
Swedish diplomat acting 
on behalf of the United 
States in Pyongyang 
Charles Kartman        
Deputy assistant 
secretary of state for 
East Asia 
   
William J. Perry        
Defense Secretary 
   
 
 
DPRK organization chart: 
Active Role 
Kim Jong-Il             
Leader 
Li Hyong Chol          
Director of American 
Affairs in the North 
Korean Foreign Ministry 
 
 
ROK organization chart: 
Active Role In Korea 
Kim Young-Sam         
President 
Jim Coles              
8th U.S Army 
Headquarters in Seoul 







d. Kumchangri Compromise 
 
US organization chart: 
Active Role Spokesperson Person of Interest 
Bill Clinton 
President 
James Rubin                  
U.S. State Department 
spokesman 
David Albright, Institute for 
Science and International 
Security 
Charles Kartman 
United States Special Envoy 
James Foley 
Department spokesman 
Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes      
DIA director 
William J. Perry                
Former Defense Secretary 
 Admiral Joseph Prueher 
US military commander for Asia 
and the Pacific 
Stephen W. Bosworth 
U.S. Ambassador 
 Kenneth Quinones              
Former director of North Korean 
affairs in the State Department 
Madeleine Albright             
Secretary of State 
 Kongdan Oh 
North Korea specialist at the 
Institute for Defense Analyses in 
Washington 
  James T. Laney 
Former American Ambassador to 
South Korea 
  Robert Manning                
Director of Asia Studies at the 
Council on Foreign Relations 
 
ROK  organization chart: 





Lim Dong Won 
Top foreign official 
 
 
DPRK  organization chart: 
Active Role Spokesperson 
Kim Gye-Gwan 
Vice Foreign Minister 
Kim Myong Chol             
North Korean writer and editor 
who lives in Tokyo and serves as 
an unofficial spokesman for his 
country 
Officer O Kum-chol             






JAPAN  organization chart: 
Person of Interest 
Keizo Obuchi                  
Japanese Prime Minister 
Masahiko Komura              
Japanese Foreign Minister 
 
 
e. Four-Party Talks 
 










DPRK organization chart: 
Active Role 
Mr Son Sen Phir 
Envoy 
Kim Jong U 
Chairman of North 
Korea's Committee for 
Promotion of External 
Economic Cooperation 
Han Song Ryol 
North Korean vice 
foreign minister 






The United States 




















U.S. policy coordinator 




North Korean vice 
foreign minister 
Li Gun 
North Korean deputy 
ambassador to the United 
Nations 
Kang Sok-Ju 
First vice minister for 
foreign affairs 
 
ROK organization chart: 
 
Active Role Spokesperson Person of Interest 
Lee See-Young 
Ambassador to Paris and 
negotiator for 1st round 
Lee Kyu Hyung 
Seoul's foreign ministry 
spokesman 
Park Young Ho 
Senior research fellow at the 








Former Vice Foreign Minister 
Ambassador 
Song Young Shik 
South Korean Deputy Foreign 
Minister 
 Kim Kook-Chin 
Professor at the Institute of 
Foreign Affairs and National 
Security 
Park Chung-Soo 
South Korean Foreign Minister 
  
Choe Soung Hung 
Senior official at the South 
Korean Foreign Ministry 
  
Kang In-Tok 
National Unification Minister 
  
Hong  Sun-Yong 




Director of the Inter-Korean 
Policy Division at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 
  
Ryoo Jin-Kyu 











CHINA organization chart: 
 
Active Role Spokesman 
Tang Jiaxuan 
Vice Foreign Minister 
Tang Guoqiang 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Chen Jian 
Chinese delegation chief, 







Asian Affairs Bureau of the 




f. Trilateral Talks 
 
US organization chart: 
 




Mr. Bush's Spokesman 
Choon Nam Kim,               
East West Center in Hawaii 
Colin Powel 
Secretary of State 
 Scott Snyder 
Asia Foundation representative in 
Seoul 
John Bolton           
Undersecretary of State 
 Ashton Carter 
Harvard professor and Clinton 
administration national security 
expert 
Donald Rumsfeld               
Defense Secretary 
 Eric Heginbotham             
Director of the Korea task force 
at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in Washington 
Paul Wolfowitz 
Mr. Rumsfeld's Deputy 
 David Albright                
Institute for Science and 
International Security in 
Washington 
James Kelly 
Assistant secretary of state of 
Asia and Pacific affairs 
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Professor of international politics 






ROK organization chart: 
Active Role Person of Interest 
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President 
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Senior research at Sejong 
Institute 
Rha Jong Il 
Security adviser to 
President Roh Moo-Hyun 
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Professor of international studies 
at SNU 
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Professor at the Korean Institute 
of Foreign Affairs and National 
Security 
 Kwak Sung-Ji 
North Korea watcher at 
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DPRK organization chart: 
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Kim Jong-Il  
Leader 
Ri Gun 
Negotiator in New York 
 
 
JAPAN organization chart: 
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Junichiro Koizumi              
Prime Minister 
Yukio Takeuchi 
Vice Foreign Minister 
Toshimitsu Motegi              




CHINA organization chart: 
 
Active Role Person of Interest 
Hu Jintao 
President 
Shin Yinhong                
Director of the American Studies 
Centre at the People's University 
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 Wang Gungwu               
Director of East Asia Institute at 
the National University of 
Singapore 
 
g. Six-Party Talks 
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Mitchell B. Reiss 
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Official with the 
Foreign Affairs and 
Trade Ministry of the 
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 Koh Yu-hwan 
Dongguk University 
Wi Sung Lac 
Deputy head of the 
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Republic of Korea 
 Ihn Kyo Joon 
reporter with Yonhap 
News Agency of ROK 
Yoon Young-kwan  
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Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
  
Cho Tae Yong 
Director general of the 
South Korean Foreign 
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Ministry's task force on 
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nuclear issue 
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Expert on US foreign 
policy at the Chinese 
University of Hong 
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Wang Yi 
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Appendix III. Internal Review Board Informed Consent 
 
 




Ten Years of Dealing with Kim Jong-Il: Can Negotiations Ensure 
Conflict Resolution? 
Why is this research being 
done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Miranda Schreurs 
and Virginie Grzelczyk at the University of Maryland, College 
Park.  We are inviting you to participate in this research project 
because you have expertise in the Korean peninsula, especially 
regarding the negotiation rounds that have taken place between 
North Korea and the United States. The purpose of this research 
is to understand North Korea’s negotiation behavior. Initial 
research has been completed, using archival and media sources, 
Information coming from experts who have been associated with 
the North Korean negotiation behavior is now being sought in 
order to confirm initial findings, and expand understanding on 
North Korea’s negotiation strategy.  




The procedure involves participating in an interview, envisioned to 
last about one hour, about your experiences and expertise with 
negotiating with North Korea during the 1994-2005 period. A set 
of pre-drafted questions will be used as a blueprint for 
conversation.  
With your permission, this interview may be recorded digitally or 
through note-taking. 
What about confidentiality? 
 
 
We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential.  
To help protect your confidentiality, you have the right to request 
anonymity for the entirety of the interview or segments of the 
interview. You may request anonymity that involves not having 
your name, your position, or the name of your organization 
identified, for part or the entirety of the interview. If you request 
anonymity, the data of the anonymous sections will be stored 
separately and confidentially, with no identifying information. If 
applicable, the digital recording of the interview will be kept by the 
investigator by up to 5 years before they will be destroyed.  
Unless you request anonymity, your identity might be associated to 
your statements in the research results. 
What are the risks of this 
research? 
There are no known risks associated with participation in this 
research. 
What are the benefits of this 
research? 
The benefits to you include the opportunity to discuss a salient 
subject in the international arena.  There will be no monetary 
compensation. This research is not designed to help you 
personally, but the results may help the investigator learn more 
about the North Korean negotiation patterns. We hope that, in the 
future, the research community as well as the political community 
will yield from this research a greater understanding of North 
Korean negotiation patterns. Projects findings are likely to interest 
researchers, academics, and policy-makers involved with 
negotiations processes as well as the Korean peninsula 
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Do I have to be in this 
research? 
May I stop participating at any 
time? 
You are free to ask questions and/or to withdraw from 
participation at any time without penalty and/or decline to answer 
certain questions. If you withdraw, any record of your participation 
will be destroyed. 




This research is being conducted by Miranda Schreurs and 
Virginie Grzelczyk at the University of Maryland, College Park.  If 
you have any questions about the research study itself, please 
contact Miranda Schreurs at 3140 Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 
20742 (Tel: 301-405-7797, Email: mschreurs@gvpt.umd.edu) or 
Virginie Grzelczyk at 3140 Tydings Hall, College Park 29742 (Tel: 
240-899-4646, Email: vgrzelczyk@gvpt.umd.edu 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or 
wish to report a research-related injury, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, 
College Park, Maryland, 20742;             
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu;  (telephone) 301-405-0678  
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving 
human subjects. 
Obtaining a copy of the 
research results: 
You may request a mailed letter or e-mail highlighting the results 
of the research. The letter will be mailed to you or the e-mail will 




Statement of Age of Subject 
and Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that: 
   you are at least 18 years of age;  
   the research has been explained to you; 
   your questions have been fully answered; and  
   you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research 
project. 




Signature and Date 
 















































 Initial here if you agree to have the interview digitally recorded. 
 Initial here if you agree to have notes taken during the interview. 
 
 Initial here if you wish to be anonymous through the entirety of this interview. 
A transcript of the interview will be produced off the text/recording of your interview, and 
will not mention your identity. The original test/recording of your interview will be 
destroyed.  
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Appendix IV. Interview Request Sent to Participants 
 




My name is Virginie Grzelczyk.  I am currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of 
Maryland, specialized in negotiation and conflict resolution.  I have been working almost 
exclusively on the topic of the Korean peninsula for the past six years.  My interest began 
while I lived in South Korea, as a Master’s student in International Negotiation at Ewha 
University in Seoul and earlier as an undergraduate exchange student. 
 
My dissertation, entitled “Ten Years of Dealing with Kim Jong-Il: Can Negotiations 
Ensure Conflict Resolution?” investigates the 1994-2005 bilateral and multilateral 
negotiation relationship between North Korea and the United States, and includes such 
negotiations as bilateral missile talks, negotiations about access to the Kumchang-ri site, 
and more recent developments such as the Six-Party Talks. 
 
Would you be willing to meet me for an interview to discuss some specifics regarding 
negotiating with North Korea?  Because of your expertise and first-hand knowledge, your 
participation in this research project would be tremendously beneficial to the field of 
international relations and negotiations. 
 
The interview takes approximately one hour, and can be conducted in person, or by 
telephone, at your convenience. You can also request anonymity if you so desire.  
 



















Appendix V. Interview Questions 
 
 
1) Which negotiations episodes would you characterize as being the most important 
ones in the period from 1994 to 2004 between the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.A.? 
2) How would you characterize the negotiation history between the D.P.R.K. and the 
U.S.A. since 1994?  
3) Which topics of negotiation are the most important to deal with between the 
D.P.R.K. and the U.S.A.? Why? 
4) Do you think that most negotiation episodes between the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.A. 
appeared in a private setting and have therefore not been exposed in the media? 
5) Do you believe that the D.P.R.K. has a negotiation strategy regarding the U.S.A.? 
If so, what is it? 
6) Do you believe that the U.S.A. has a negotiation strategy regarding the D.P.R.K.? 
If so, what is it? 
7) Do you believe that negotiations between the two parties can result in a win-win 
situation? If so, how? If no, why not? 
8) How do you think negotiation attempts between the two parties could be 
improved? 
9) Which are the actors (states, international organizations, individuals, etc) that 
would be the most important in order to improve negotiations between the 
D.P.R.K. and the U.S.A.? 
10) If secret talks and negotiations exist, do you believe that their effects can be 
negative on ‘official’ negotiations? 
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11) Do you believe negotiations to be an important tool in the resolution of tensions 
between the U.S.A. and the D.P.R.K.? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
12) Do you believe that the higher the ranking diplomat involved in the negotiations, 
the more North Korea will be interested in the negotiations? 
13) Do you think that low politics issues have a higher likelihood of finding a 
positive-sum game when it comes to negotiations with North Korea? 
14) Do you believe that the number of constituencies between a state has an effect on 
negotiations? If so, how? 
15) Do you believe that national security is the prime interest of both North Korea and 
the United States, and thus they will not be interested in as much in collective 
security patters? 
16) How would you qualify North Korea’s general disposition during the 
negotiations?  
17) Would you say that North Korea is a versed actors? Would you say that North 
Korea is a sophisticated player as well? Why or why not? 
18)  Do you believe North Korea to be a rational, unitary actor? 
19) Do you believe North Korea often gets more than the other parties present at the 
negotiation table? 
20) Do you believe the shadow of a larger crisis and possible spillover will be a 
pacifier for a lesser crisis? 
21) Do you think stand-alone crises have a better chance of being resolved than 
ongoing negotiations rounds? 
 285
22) In view of the conclusions drawn by the database, do you believe that the 
situation between the parties has been accurately reported? 
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